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Minos juge aux enfers tous les pâles humains. 
Ah! combien frémira son ombre épouvantée, 
Lorsqu'il verra sa fille à ses yeux présentée, 
Contrainte d'avouer tant de forfaits divers, 
Et des crimes peut-être inconnus aux enfers! 
Racine, Phèdre 
L'homme, en Occident, est devenu une bête d'aveu. 
De là sans doute une métamorphose dans la littéra­
ture: d'un plaisir de raconter et d'entendre, qui était 
centré sur le récit héroïque ou merveilleux des 
"épreuves" de bravoure ou de sainteté, on est passé 
à une littérature ordonnée à la tâche infinie de faire 
lever du fond de soi-même, entre les mots, une vérité 
que la forme même de l'aveu fait miroiter comme 
l'inaccessible. 
Michel Foucault 
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Introduction

PÂLEUR JANSÉNISTE: RELIGION,

LITERATURE, DISCOURSE

All of Racine's work, and Phèdre in particular, has often raised the ques­
tion among critics about the relation between literature and religion. 
The debate has taken many forms; for some it is a question of deciding 
whether the play is predominantly Christian or Greek. Chateaubriand 
characterized Phèdre as "une épouse chrétienne." According to the 
Hellenist R. C. Knight, Racine "a fondu ensemble l'héroine éhontée de 
Sénèque et l'héroine pudique d'Euripide" (343). The idea of a "Phèdre 
janséniste" goes all the way back to Arnauld's supposed remark that 
Racine's tragic victim was "une chrétienne à qui la grâce a manqué." 
Racine himself surely contributed to this kind of interpretation by writ­
ing in his preface to the play that Phèdre was an object lesson in Chris­
tian morality in which "les moindres fautes sont sévèrement punies." 
The dramatist saw his play as a chance to reconcile tragedy with 
"quantité de personnes célèbres par leur piété et par leur doctrine qui 
l'ont condamné dans ces derniers temps"—a clear reference to Nicole 
and the other Jansenist opponents of the theater. 
The link between Jansenism and Phèdre had become such a cliché 
by Proust's day that the young hero of La Recherche goes to his first 
theatrical representation fully expecting to see "cilice chrétien, pâleur 
janséniste" and "Princesse de Clèves et de Trézène" appear on stage. 
His literary idol, Bergotte, has so filled his head with these impression­
istic labels that the real performance of the play turns out to be a disap­
pointment. There is no readily apparent Jansenist pallor, and, at first, 
he even prefers the acting of the secondary characters to that of the 
famous Berma. 
1 
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The incident serves as an ironic lesson about the secondary cultural 
production that accompanies an artistic heritage. Marcel is a naive, 
incompetent spectator because he has not yet learned to see Phèdre 
with the same eyes as his bourgeois culture: a composite aesthetic ob­
ject in which moral rigor, aristocratic distinction, and hystericized fem­
ininity are combined in a timeless essence. For us the incident is a 
challenge to go beyond Bergotte's nebulous phrases in search of a more 
rigorous and historically aware model of cultural mediation, one that 
can explain Phèdre as an aesthetic, ascetic, and erotic object of desire. 
The lesson of Proust is also that, like Bergotte, we cannot avoid proj­
ecting some of our own methodological obsessions onto Phèdre. 
I begin by surveying some of the recent attempts to define the rela­
tionship between Phèdre and Port-Royal. Meticulous comparisons of 
the Greek and Latin sources with Racine's text have lead Maurice Del­
croix and Antoine Adam to conclude that the seventeenth-century dra­
matist borrowed so heavily from his sources that there is little room 
for "la thèse janséniste": "N'est-il pas significatif que de tous les vers 
de la tragédie, ceux qui pourraient nous paraître les plus visiblement 
inspirés par le jansénisme, soient précisément la traduction d'un dével­
oppement de Sénèque?" (Adam 4:371). In the same spirit, other critics 
have disqualified the Jansenist theory because none of the technical 
terminology of Jansenist theology is employed in Racine's writings. 
Unless there are "certaines propositions nettes touchant le péché origi­
nel, la grâce et la liberté de l'homme," there is no basis for calling the 
play Jansenist (Backès 148). 
Given the fact that Racine wrote neoclassical plays and not theologi­
cal treatises, one could hardly expect to find extended discussion of 
religious doctrine in his plays. Mediation must not be so narrowly con­
ceived that only an explicit reference to a theological issue can qualify 
as a Jansenist element. Likewise, the identification of a "source" does 
not rule out reference to contemporary issues. Because a passage is 
based on Seneca does not deprive it a priori of possible Jansenist ech­
oes in its new context. There are less philological and positivistic ways 
of establishing the intertextual relation between the sacred in Racine's 
plays and specific religious movements of his day. 
MEDIATION: MEANING IS EVERYWHERE 
Lucien Goldmann first proposed a more complex way of relating Jan­
senism to Racine. Drawing on the early Lukâcs's theory of tragedy, he 
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sought to establish a connection between Racine and Jansenism on the 
basis of a similar "world vision." This is the set of beliefs shared by a 
class: "Une vision du monde, c'est précisément cet ensemble d'aspir­
ations, de sentiments et d'idées qui réunit les membres d'un groupe 
(le plus souvent, d'une classe sociale) et les oppose aux autres 
groupes" (26). The group in this case is the robe nobility, and their 
tragic world vision reflects their political eclipse under absolutism. 
Referring to the last chapter of Lukâcs's Die Seek und die Formen, 
Goldmann defines the tragic as "une crise profonde des relations entre 
les hommes et le monde social et cosmique" (51). He adopts a chrono­
logical scheme in which the tragic world vision follows a period of 
triumphant rationalism, to be succeeded, in turn, by a dialectical sys­
tem. The seventeenth-century tragic thinkers, Pascal and Racine, are, 
according to this interpretation, a reaction against the individualistic, 
rationalistic worldview of Descartes and Corneille. They express the 
anxiety of a subject adrift in a cosmos without divine structure and a 
world without a transindividual human community (41). It is a world 
devoid of value under the gaze of a cruel, hidden God whose very 
existence can only be assured by the "pari." Living under these condi­
tions, one can either abandon the world, like the "solitaires," or follow 
the more tragic path of answering the hidden God's absolute impera­
tive of living in the world. This is the "refus intramondain" that Gold­
mann finds in Phèdre and the Pensées. 
Many detailed objections can be raised against Goldmann's thesis: 
Is the "pari" a permanent disposition of the believer in Pascal? Of what 
use is so narrow a definition of the tragic that it only applies to three 
of Racine's plays? Can Pascal's texts be called "tragic" in the same sense 
as Racine's, since it is only in the latter that we encounter the tragic 
myths? But these questions are secondary to a larger methodological 
objection to the concept of world vision. 
This approach maintains that all cultural productions have a dis­
cernible consistency about them because they are all projections of the 
same ideal structure, derived causally from economic circumstances. 
Racine is a "Jansenist," like Pascal, because his work finds its coherence 
and its ultimate explanation by reference to an idealistic construct—the 
noblesse de robe's world vision. No allowance is made for the differences 
between Racine and Pascal, or between them and Lukâcs for that mat­
ter; there is one tragic essence, and all cultural manifestations of this 
view are so many signifiers of the same homologous signified. Thus, 
under Goldmann's analysis, Racine's plays become direct expressions 
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of Jansenist theology, albeit a humanist Marxism's version of that theol­
ogy, for example: "Le Soleil de Phèdre est, en réalité, le même Dieu 
tragique que le Dieu caché de Pascal, de même qu'Andromaque, Junie, 
Bérénice et Phèdre sont les incarnations concrètes de ces 'appelés' dont 
la reconnaissance constitue dans l'Ecrit sur la Grâce un des critères pour 
différencier les jansénistes des calvinistes" (352). Le Dieu caché is a great 
pioneering effort to illuminate literature from a totally social perspec­
tive, but its version of mediation, of how one discourse relates to an­
other, must be abandoned in favor of a model capable of respecting 
the specificity of cultural objects. 
Marxist critics now speak of the "relative autonomy of instances," 
meaning that superstructural phenomena do not simply reflect pre­
vailing infrastructural realities. The idea of a single underlying 
worldview has also been abandoned. Each cultural production has its 
own specificity, and the relation it bears to economic or other cultural 
formations is not one of simple replication. Fredric Jameson has pro­
posed the term transcoding to describe how the different spheres of 
cultural production can be related to one another. This conveys the 
idea of a constant rewriting and recasting of cultural representations 
from one level to another. He defines the critic's job as "the invention 
of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a particular code or language, 
such that the same terminology can be used to analyze and articulate 
two quite distinct types of objects or 'texts,' or two very different struc­
tural levels of reality" (Political 40). The word transcoding has obvious 
psychoanalytic overtones; Jameson says elsewhere that the rhetoric of 
the unconscious must be used to understand how the different cultural 
sectors are related: "production, projection, repression, displacement 
and the like" ("Religion" 44). 
Jameson's version of mediation is based on Louis Althusser's con­
cept of "structural causality." It is a vision in which meaning and cau­
sality in society are not read from an infrastructure upward but rather 
derived from the total system: "a mediation that passes through the 
structure rather than a more immediate mediation in which one level 
folds into another directly" (41). 
Religious discourse is of particular interest because it is "the sym­
bolic space within which the collectivity thinks itself and celebrates its 
own unity." We are at the core of Jameson's methodology here because 
a transcoding of the text which includes religious discourse enables 
the critic to make the essential mediation: "All literature, no matter 
how weakly, must be informed by what we have called a political un­
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conscious; all literature must be read as a symbolic meditation on the 
destiny of the community" (70). 
A similar desire to depart from the classical Marxist version of me­
diation characterizes the work of Michel Foucault, and it is from his 
writings that I borrow two concepts central to this study: discourse and 
dispositif. In L'Ordre du discours Foucault describes discourse as "une 
violence que nous faisons aux choses" (55). This is perhaps the best 
definition of the word; it suggests that language is more than just a 
transparent medium for human interaction and technical achievement. 
It also separates Foucault's approach from the older, materialistic 
determinisms. 
"Le discours n'est pas simplement ce qui traduit les luttes ou les 
systèmes de domination, mais ce pour quoi, ce par quoi on lutte, le 
pouvoir dont on cherche à s'emparer" (12). Much of Foucault's work 
is devoted to analyzing the rules that organize language into definable 
discourses capable of exerting the kind of power alluded to in this 
passage. The reason discourse is the object of struggle and control is 
that it empowers a whole range of individuals and institutions to inter­
vene in people's lives. Authoritative discourses give the doctor, the 
judge, the teacher, and the critic the right to intervene in their area of 
competence. Rules of "rarefaction" limit access to certain discourses; 
censorship limits certain forms of expression; normative discourses 
establish the boundary between madness and reason. 
Foucault envisages cultural unity as being achieved by a mediation 
between discourses and the work of the critic as consisting in establish­
ing "séries discursives." Like Althussser, he insists on the autonomy 
of cultural instances; the order of discourses is not determined by me­
chanical laws or inherent ideal laws: "Enfin, s'il est vrai que les séries 
discursives et discontinues ont chacune, entre certaines limites, leur 
régularité, sans doute n'est-il plus possible d'établir entre les éléments 
qui les constituent des liens de causalité mécanique ou de nécessité 
idéale. Il faut accepter d'introduire l'aléa comme catégorie dans la pro­
duction des événements" (Ordre 61). A given society is nothing more 
than a fortuitous series of discourses: "Les discours doivent être traités 
comme des pratiques discontinues, qui se croisent, se jouxtent parfois, 
mais aussi bien s'ignorent ou s'excluent" (55). Here is where Foucault 
parts company with even the most Hegelian Marxists by his denial of 
any evolutionary or dialectical laws of history. 
In his later work Foucault added two important dimensions to his 
discursive approach: he focused more on the positive, solicitous nature 
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of some discourses, and he developed the concept of the dispositif to 
include nonlinguistic phenomena in his cultural analyses. He felt that 
he had been too idealistic in his approach, too concerned with written 
and spoken codes. In his work on the history of prisons and the history 
of sexuality he included a wide range of written and unwritten codes 
and practices that societies have used to define their sexuality and 
govern their prisons. In an interview he defined the dispositif as: 
Un ensemble résolument hétérogène, comportant des discours, 
des institutions, des aménagements architecturaux, des décisions 
réglementaires, des lois, des mesures administratives, des én­
oncés scientifiques, des propositions philosophiques, morales, 
philanthropiques, bref: du dit, aussi bien que du non dit, voilà 
les éléments du dispositif. Le dispositif lui-même, c'est le réseau 
qu'on peut établir entre ces éléments. ("Jeu" 63) 
The language of the last sentence reveals the same sort of purely rela­
tional vision of society that we saw in Jameson and Althusser. Society 
exists only as the total equation of its many local operations. There are 
no privileged expressions of its essence. To paraphrase one of 
Foucault's aphorisms, meaning is everywhere. 
L'AVEU 
As indicated above, the other tendency of Foucault's last work on dis­
courses was his interest in the positive aspect of some discursive prac­
tices. His earlier insistence on rarefaction and censorship gave way to 
a study of practices in which subjects were not repressed and excluded 
from expressing themselves but rather encouraged, even forced, to 
speak. People are subjected to power/knowledge not only in what 
they are forbidden to say, or in what authoritative pronouncements are 
made on their behalf, but also, and perhaps most insidiously, in what 
they themselves say when they take up the task of stating their own 
subjectivity, putting it into words, making it available to the various 
moral, legal, medical, and other normalizing institutions at work in 
society. 
Foucault's prime example of this kind of discourse was the practice 
of avowal, which seems omnipresent in Western societies: "L'aveu a 
diffusé loin ses effets; dans la justice, dans la médecine, dans la péda­
gogie, dans les rapports familiaux, dans les relations amoureuses, dans 
 7 INTRODUCTION
l'ordre le plus quotidien, et dans les rites les plus solennels; on avoue 
ses crimes, on avoue ses péchés, on avoue ses pensées et ses désirs, on 
avoue son passé et ses rêves, on avoue son enfance; on avoue ses mala­
dies et ses misères" (Hist. Sex. 1:79). 
Here I believe we have found a specific kind of discourse and a 
theory of cultural mediation especially promising for the study of Ra­
cine, Jansenism, and a whole range of questions involving literature, 
religion, and society. Since avowal is, as Foucault says, "diffused" so 
widely within our culture and our history, its study should be particu­
larly capable of producing the kind of serial vision of societies that our 
most sophisticated sociological critics advocate. 
From the desert communities of primitive Christianity to Dante's 
total vision of humanity, from the pulpits, stakes, and confessionals of 
the Counter-Reformation to the alcoves and stages of court society, the 
confessional dispositif will prove to be one of the essential networks 
that define subjects and societies. 
CONFESSION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: 
DETERTULLIEN A FREUD 
In 1881 Bertha Pappenheim, the pseudonymous Anna O. of the Studies 
on Hysteria, was relieved of her hysterical symptoms by "talking them 
away" to her physician, Joseph Breuer. Anna suffered from bouts of 
depression, headaches, visual impairments, nervous cough, and a curi­
ous loss of her native German tongue—all attributable to a stifling 
domestic life and the burden of caring for her dying father. Breuer 
found that, under hypnosis, Anna could recall traumatic experiences 
related to her father's illness and death and that the recounting of these 
events eased her symptoms. It was Anna herself who named this pro­
cess (in English) her "talking cure." The case contained, Breuer would 
later claim, "the germ cell of the whole of psychoanalysis" (qtd. in Gay 
64). It was this case, related by Breuer to his understudy, Sigmund 
Freud, that proved decisive in the emergence of psychoanalysis. 
It sparked the young Freud's interest in hysteria and hypnosis and 
turned him away from the prevailing somatic explanations of mental 
illness. Abandoning the neurological laboratory in favor of Charcot's 
amphitheater in Paris, Freud began the search for purely psychological 
explanations for his patients' symptoms. The idea of the unconscious 
(das Unbewuflte) appears for the first time in Freud's writings in the 
Studies on Hysteria, and henceforth this concept, not brain pathology, 
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would be the focus of his diagnosis and treatment. Anna O. had dis­
covered and named the essential tool for access to and treatment of 
the unconscious. 
Over a period of ten years the talking cure would be refined: the 
"fundamental rule" and free association were substituted for hypnosis, 
and the transference phenomenon was added to the mechanisms of 
the cure. But it was Anna O. who had first opened up to psychiatry 
her "private theater" and named the process whereby the verbalization 
of that inner reality cured her. Was this event so pristine a moment of 
methodological breakthrough that it could be fittingly named only by 
a hypnotized twenty-two-year-old woman? Pure serendipity? Or had 
Breuer and Freud not stumbled, knowingly or not, onto a method of 
relieving hysteria and guilt through speech which had a long history 
in the West? Was Anna O. not predisposed psychologically by her mi­
lieu, with its historical accumulation of discursive practices, both 
to repress her sexuality and to seek relief through avowal? Is Anna 
O.'s illness and treatment evidence not only of the "secular advance 
of repression," alluded to in The Interpretation of Dreams, but also of a 
parallel secular advance of confession? 
It will be one of the contentions of this study that Anna O.'s "private 
theater" and her talking cure, the actors, scenario, and plot in this med­
ical drama (patient and doctor, consulting room and oppressive bour­
geois interior, dutiful daughter and dying patriarch), were all 
anticipated, culturally, by a millenary tradition of talking cures of the 
soul, verbal performances that territorialize the self, dividing it into 
inner and outer domains and submitting it to medical-religious au­
thorities empowered to reconcile it with the community at large. It is 
a history that we will trace in its strictly religious origins, but also in 
its spilling over and "recoding" in other cultural domains, specifically 
in the literary creations of three authors whose work resonates with 
decisive moments in the history of confessional discourse. 
There are hints of the link between religious confession and psycho­
analysis in Freud's earliest writings. Studies on Hysteria uses the Ger­
man word for confession to describe the effects of the talking cure: "The 
injured person's reaction to the trauma only exercises a completely 'ca­
thartic' effect if it is an adequate reaction—as, for instance, revenge. But 
language serves as a substitute for action; by its help, an affect can be 
'abreacted' almost as effectively. In other cases speaking is itself the ade­
quate reflex, when for instance, it is a lamentation or giving utterance to 
a tormenting secret, e.g. a confession \Beichte\\" (2:8).1 
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In The Discovery of the Unconscious, Henri Ellenberger states that al­
though the Reformation abolished the sacrament of confession, certain 
Protestant communities continued to practice a "Care of Souls" (Seel­
sorge) based on the belief that a secret transgression, usually sexual in 
nature, could lead to nervous disorders that only confession could re­
lieve. The idea of the "pathogenic secret" circulated widely among 
clerics and laymen in the 1880s and 1890s and was first systematized 
as a basis for psychotherapy by the Viennese physician Moritz Bene­
dikt. Freud refers to Benedikt's ideas in the "Preliminary Communica­
tion" (1893) as being "the closest approach to our theoretical and 
therapeutic statements" (2:8). This reference is, in a sense, the closest 
thing to a "smoking gun" connection between the tradition of Chris­
tian confession and the therapeutic practices of Freud's day. But Freud's 
implication in the history of confession is more pervasive than a foot­
note to an obscure physician. The confessional constitution of the sub­
ject comes to Freud from many sources, some of the most important 
being literary. 
Freud addresses the question directly in The Question of Lay Analysis, 
to which I will return shortly after some further qualifying remarks 
about the continuities and discontinuities between confession and psy­
choanalysis. I will outline briefly the similarities and differences be­
tween psychoanalysis and confession in order to avoid the impression 
of an essentializing, anachronistic imposition of psychoanalytic con­
cepts upon what I maintain was its ancestor—confession. It is a point 
that Foucault was at pains to emphasize in his own work: "Je ne 
cherche pas à construire avec cette notion d'aveu, un cadre qui me 
permettrait de tout réduire au même, des confesseurs à Freud. Au con­
traire, comme dans Les mots et les choses, il s'agit de mieux faire apparaî­
tre les différences" ("Jeu" 82). There are always two methodological 
moments in Foucault's historiography: the genealogical and the ar­
chaeological. The events of the past are viewed simultaneously as 
intimately linked to the present but also as archaeologically cut off from 
our age, buried in different epistemological strata than our own period. 
Present-day instances of aveu are thus historically unique, but also part 
of a "machinerie d'aveu" that, as Foucault once said in an interview, runs 
"de Tertullien à Freud" ("Jeu" 78). We must try to see these practices 
from the double perspective of archaeology and genealogy. 
Of course, archaeology and genealogy are metaphors for the way 
discourses evolve over time. Cultural practices are neither artifacts 
waiting to be uncovered by an archaeologist nor genes to be traced by 
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a geneticist from one generation to the next. But the words usefully 
suggest how the same practice is both a hybrid formed of preexisting 
"genes" and a unique artifact located in a specific cultural stratum. 
Psychoanalysis is made up of prior elements drawn from medicine, 
religion, and literature which coalesced in a single moment to form a 
unique discourse. There are, as a consequence, always analogies be­
tween psychoanalysis and confession. Point by point one can establish 
these similarities which prove that the talking cure derives historically 
from confession. But just as important are the crucial differences that 
appear in the study of these analogies and that prove the radical differ­
ence between analysis and confession. Let us take a look at some of 
the similarities and differences. 
1. Transference and the other scene. In confession, as in analysis, 
the believer performs a ritual that takes its meaning from another 
scene. The confessant addresses his or her pater peccavi not just to the 
priest but most essentially to a transferential father in heaven. The 
other scene of Christian confession is the spiritual world of heaven and 
hell, time and eternity, sin and forgiveness. The other scene of analysis 
is the unconscious and its repressed memories and childhood fanta­
sies. The analyst allows himself to be a surrogate for the real father so 
that the analysand can reenact forgotten traumatic events and gain 
mastery over them. The difference lies in the fact that analysis encour­
ages the patient to dramatize his or her hostility toward the father, 
which is viewed as normal, universal, and admissible. The hostility is 
cathartically released by free expression. In Christian confession the 
expressivity of the words and the accompanying emotions are im­
portant, but the confessant is supposed to feel contrition, not aggres­
sion. In Christianity, grace and forgiveness are conferred by the 
transferential father; in analysis, only the patient can heal himself by 
imaginatively enacting a relationship with a human father whose real 
participation in the cure is irrelevant. 
2. The power to relieve symptoms. Several similarities and differ­
ences appear here. In The Question of Lay Analysis (1926), Freud dis­
cusses the difference between confession and psychoanalysis in the 
form of a dialogue. The question is posed: "You assume that every 
neurotic has something oppressing him, some secret. And by getting 
him to tell you about it, you relieve his oppression and do him good. 
That, of course, is the principle of confession." Freud responds: "In 
confession the sinner tells what he knows, in analysis the neurotic has 
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to tell more. Nor have we heard that confession has ever developed 
enough power to get rid of actual pathological symptoms"(20:189).2 
According to Freud, only psychoanalysis obliges the confessant to 
delve into his or her unconscious and search out the hidden causes of 
neurosis. This comparison is true concerning simple confession, but 
there are more sophisticated techniques of spiritual direction which go 
back to the Desert Fathers. In the monastic communities of the East, 
monks were obliged to reveal all of their thoughts (not just sins) to a 
spiritual director who then deciphered those thoughts as originating 
from either God, the devil, or the monk's own unconscious. They em­
ployed a hermeneutics that resembles psychoanalysis on several 
points.3 
The distinction would be less the technique than the underlying 
world vision and the nature of the outcome. One is a spiritual pardon, 
an absolution in which an expected punishment for sin in an afterlife 
is suspended, the other a metaphorical medical cure. Psychoanalysis 
was invented by physicians, it was called a "cure," and its language is 
couched in scientific neologisms. Abreagieren, Ubertragung, Durcharbei­
tung, Agieren—these are the terms Freud developed for the phases of 
the cure. The analysand comes to a doctor with some expectation of 
being healed in the manner in which modern internal medicine is ca­
pable of healing the body. The old religious guilt is replaced by a non-
judgmental attitude that dispels excess guilt and restores psychic 
energy to a repressed subject. All analysis asks of its adherents is the 
courage of enlightened self-knowledge; its healing powers are based 
on the knowledge and emotion that issue from the subject's confession; 
the uncensored outpouring of the self leads to both intellectual insight 
and an emotional replay of past traumatic events, both of which effect 
the cure. 
Confession was likewise called a cure, and the priest was consid­
ered a doctor. The Lateran decree describes him as an "experienced 
doctor who applies wine and oil to the wound and inquires of the 
sinner the circumstances of his sin." Besides the obvious differences in 
the kind of medical science that serves as a metaphor for confession 
here, there are other major differences between the religious scene of 
confession and psychoanalysis. 
The religious confessant is in the grip of sin and the devil. Speaking 
of missionaries soliciting confessions in seventeenth-century France, 
Bernard Dompnier says that their methods were based on one assump­
tion: "Le pécheur est un prisonnier de Satan" (213). They drove this 
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message home in their sermons to the extent that people actually re­
ported seeing the various devils that possessed them. "Bientôt, des 
pécheurs ébranlés par la prédication reconnaissent que Satan leur ap­
paraît ou leur parle, soit lorsqu'ils commettent certains péchés, soit la 
nuit. Quelquefois, la mission est le théâtre de scènes de possessions" 
(214). Such terror culminated in the salutary "aveu de bouche," which 
defeated the devil and liberated the beleaguered sinner. The faithful 
hastened to confession to deliver themselves from a hidden menace 
that had suddenly manifested itself in the community. 
Reflecting on such scenes, however, one recalls Freud's pronounce­
ment on the difference between confession and analysis: "Nor have we 
heard that confession has ever developed enough power to get rid of 
actual pathological symptoms." Confession certainly had enough 
power at its disposal in centuries past, and this power could lead to a 
relief of "pathological symptoms." Dompnier says that in the seven­
teenth century, spiritual anxiety and guilt often led to somatic distur­
bances that ecclesiastical authorities readily interpreted as the 
consequences of sin. Confession could both relieve guilt and cure 
symptoms: "Elle [la confession] arrache en effet les corps à la tutelle 
du diable, soit dans le cas des possessions, soit dans celui des maladies 
qui—rappelons-le—sont souvent présentées par les ecclésiastiques du 
temps comme des conséquences du péché" (214). 
3. Possession and alienation. Although in The Question of Lay Analy­
sis Freud insists on the difference between psychoanalysis and confes­
sion, elsewhere in his writings he sees the analogy between his cases 
and those of demonic possession from the past. Speculating in a letter 
to Fliess that "the medieval theory of possession, held by the ecclesias­
tical courts, was identical with our theory of a foreign body and a 
splitting of consciousness," he asks why the confessions of possessed 
women under torture were "so like the communications made by my 
patients in psychical treatment" (1:242). Freud explains the parallel in 
terms of the seduction theory. Like his hysterical patients, the pos­
sessed, by their language and mimetic symptoms, are acting out de­
tails of the seduction scene. 
Catherine Clément sees the coincidence as evidence of a continuing 
persecution of female sexuality under the guise of the witch and the 
hysteric. Speaking of hysterical symptoms as metaphorical signs writ­
ten on the body, she writes: "Poids subversif du retour du refoulé, 
évaluation du pouvoir de l'archaïque, puissance ou non de l'imaginaire 
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sur le symbolique et sur le réel, c'est là le coeur de l'histoire qui lie 
ensemble la figure de la sorcière et celle de l'hystérique" (Cixous and 
Clément 22). The sorceress and the hysteric act out a recalcitrant fe­
male sexuality that is linked to paganism and bisexuality These scan­
dals of female sexuality must be exorcised through confessional 
rituals; the witch and the hysteric must take upon themselves all that 
is "unnatural" and inadmissible about human sexuality. 
Shortly after the letter to Fliess maintaining that the devil in posses­
sion cases was in fact the childhood seducer, Freud shifted to the the­
ory of infantile sexuality. Henceforth, the hysteric's symptoms were no 
longer fragments from an actual seduction scene but rather fantasies of 
being seduced, childhood wishes directed toward the father. But this 
only intensified the inquisitorial aspect of analysis: the patient had to 
admit to harboring a desire for the father or his surrogate (e.g., Herr 
K. in the Dora case). 
Thus although psychoanalysis maintains that the devil is a persecu­
tory image of the father and that the external alienation present in 
possession cases signifies the estrangement of the conscious from the 
unconscious, both the exorcist and the analyst resort to confession as 
a means of bringing about a cure. In exorcisms it was believed that if 
the "Father of lies" could be engaged in conversation and forced to 
state his name, he could be dislodged from the body of his victims. 
This conviction was so strong that, in the face of scarce evidence, exor­
cists often tortured confessions out of uncooperative subjects. Urbain 
Grandier, the Jesuit priest accused of demonically possessing the Ursu­
line nuns of Loudun, was mercilessly tortured in an attempt to extract 
a confession. Aldous Huxley describes the attempts of the exorcist, 
Father Lactance, to defeat the devil by forcing Grandier to confess: 
[Grandierl was bound, stretched out on the floor, with his legs, 
from the knees to the feet, enclosed between four oaken boards. 
By driving wedges into the space separating the two movable 
boards, it was possible to crush the victim's legs against the fixed 
framework of the machine. . . . One of the new wedges was in­
serted between the boards and this time it was Father Lactance 
who swung the mallet. "DicasV he shouted after every blow. "Di­
cas, DicasV (231,234) 
Lactance wanted a confession to justify the death sentence that was 
imposed on Grandier, but he also wanted a verbal victory over the 
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devil. He wanted to unleash Grandier from the power of Satan. The 
torture would stop if the accused would only speak, just as the hysteri­
cal symptom would disappear if the patient could be induced to talk. 
One can see in Freud a descendant of Father Lactance, another wielder 
of power/knowledge exercised by those who insist on the confession 
of the subject. Foucault and Clément draw the parallel in order to 
shock modern readers into recognizing the power wielded by thera­
pists, ministers, and police. Behind the analyst, Foucault wants us to 
see the exorcist: "On avoue ou on est forcé d'avouer." 
In a recent study of confession, Jeremy Tambling has addressed this 
question and chosen to take issue with Foucault, Deleuze, and Jacques 
Donzelot, who characterize Freud as an oppressive, normalizing scien­
tist: "Far from psychoanalysis colluding with forms of confessional 
knowledge, it has the capacity to put into question precisely the re­
pressions and interdictions forming the basis of religious confession 
and of societal restraint" (182). It is undeniable that psychoanalysis 
undermines religious confession by deculpabilizing much sexual be­
havior ostracized by Christianity and by seeking to eradicate unwar­
ranted guilt, not sin. The question is whether Freud replaced a 
religious ritual—by definition for Freud an obsessive ceremony de­
signed to ward off repressed desires—with an equally coercive prac­
tice based upon pseudoscientific norms. Freud ends up pathologizing 
and discriminating against "perverse" sexualities with the same meth­
odology and zeal as the moralists. 
Tambling sees in Freud's later work an attempt to dismantle "the 
Oedipal representation of things," a project he shares with the 
Nietzsche of The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. By this he means 
an attempt to liberate the subject from its infinite indebtedness to the 
past and the patriarchal order. Along with many others, let us say that 
if Freud is to be excluded from the list of normalizing scientists and 
abusive confessors, it must be done by emphasizing the other Freud, 
the scientist who admits that theory itself is propelled by a drive, a 
Wisstrieb; the autobiographical author who constantly sets himself up 
to be psychoanalyzed by his readers; the grammatological psycholo­
gist whose final model of the mind is the text. The uniqueness of Freud 
in the history of confessional discourse is the fact that his text furnishes 
the tools for its own deconstruction. We will return to the liberatory 
potential inherent in Freud's use of literature shortly, but there remains 
a final key distinction to be drawn between psychoanalysis and con­
fession. 
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4. Religious versus secular epiphany. At the core of Christian con­
fession is a spiritual, mystical event. St. Augustine, addressing himself 
to God, says: 'Thou are there in the hearts of those that confess to 
Thee" (Confessions, chap. 5, p. 165). Confession undoes evil through 
verbal reenactment, and it brings God into the heart of the believer; it 
is a divine epiphany. In another passage from his commentaries on 
the Psalms, Augustine equates confession with spiritual life itself. The 
sinner, like Lazarus, is dead and bound by his sins until Christ calls 
him forth: "The Lord Himself with His voice aroused him from the 
tomb, restored his life by crying unto him, overcame the mass of earth 
that was heaped upon the tomb." The sinner hears this call from God 
and leaves the tomb by confessing: "When thou hearst a man is sorry 
for his sins, he hath already come again to life; when thou hearst him 
by confessing lay bare his conscience, he is already drawn forth from 
the tomb" (Schaff vi, 500).4 
The basis of psychoanalysis is a different sort of epiphany—a hu­
manist and materialist manifestation of the Nature of Man. Psycho­
analysis, like religion, can console for life's greatest losses. Its 
inceptional case was based on Anna O.'s overcoming the trauma of her 
father's death, and Freud himself was enabled to write The Interpreta­
tion of Dreams by working through the loss of his own father. There 
is something comparable to the Christian art of dying in Freud's 
poignant, yet scientifically dispassionate, accounts of death and the 
guilt feelings of survivors. 
At its highest point of revelation, in moments in some way analo­
gous to Augustine's divine epiphany, psychoanalysis confers upon its 
subjects an anthropological epiphany. As a scientist and not a theolo­
gian, the analyst brings the patient face-to-face with his or her human­
ity. When the analysand acknowledges his Oedipus complex, he is 
witness to one of nature's laws in his life. Like the hero of Sophocles' 
play, the analysand is forced to confront nature: "Like Oedipus, we live 
in ignorance of these wishes, repugnant to morality, which have been 
forced upon us by Nature, and after their revelation we may all of us 
well seek to close our eyes to the scenes of our childhood" (4:297). 
Freud further naturalizes if not divinizes this moment of analytic 
epiphany when he declares that "there must be something which 
makes a voice within us ready to recognize the compelling force of 
destiny in the Oedipus" (4:296). This humanistic and natural transcen­
dental moment of recognition is what distinguishes psychoanalysis 
most profoundly from Christian confession. Yet it is a recognition not 
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without certain affinities to religious experience, as Mark Edmundson 
has recently stated in a passage rich in other observations about the 
effects of reading Freud and becoming a Freudian subject: 
This self-reading is often accompanied by the sensation of pene­
trating depths, but it may in fact be the action by which those 
supposed "depths" of the psyche are brought into being. This 
"penetration" and these "depths" assume a quasireligious aura 
when they are experienced in what one might call a "descend­
ental" act. The moment is no less a religious one by virtue of the 
reversal in which we value demystifying "depths" rather than 
conventional transcendent heights. (30) 
I will take the occasion of these references to Freud's reading of 
Oedipus Rex to return to the origins of psychoanalysis and a consider­
ation of Freud's debt to literature. The literary history of confession 
will turn out to have contributed to Freud's founding case. Anna O.'s 
theatrical performance of hysteria and Freud's treatment of it would 
not be conceivable without the literary history of confession, with its 
eschatological dramas and neoclassical stagings. The critical position 
of psychoanalysis within my work will be similar to that described by 
Stephen Greenblatt in a recent essay on psychoanalysis and Renais­
sance culture: "Psychoanalytic interpretation seems to follow upon 
rather than to explain Renaissance texts. If psychoanalysis was, in 
effect, made possible by (among other things) the legal and literary 
proceedings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then its inter­
pretive practice is not irrelevant to those proceedings, nor is it exactly 
an anachronism" (Curse 142). 
By demonstrating in a few specific instances the debt of psychoanal­
ysis to the literary and religious history of confession, I believe that 
we can fruitfully make use of a discourse that has always seemed so 
promising for literary studies yet has often been used to foreground 
entities of dubious interest: the psyche of the author or the reader, the 
psychopathology of characters, the Oedipal struggle of one text with 
its precursors, or the deconstruction of patriarchy by oppositional fem­
inine voices within the text. Of these approaches, it is perhaps the last 
one that has the most merit in my eyes because, like the historical 
approach I intend to follow, it contests the scientific validity and objec­
tivity of psychoanalysis and focuses attention on those passages in 
Freud that are the most open to a relativizing historicist critique. 
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THE OEDIPAL MOUSETRAP: FREUD AND 
RENAISSANCE DRAMATURGY 
As far as I know, Freud never commented on the works of Corneille 
or Racine or used them as a foil for psychoanalysis; so if we are to 
involve Freud in the "literary proceedings of the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries," we must first look at the literary genealogy in The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), which begins with Virgil and Sophocles 
and culminates with a famous work written in 1600. As everyone 
knows, Freud uses Hamlet to demonstrate the universality of the most 
important assumption of psychoanalysis: the incestuous desire every 
human being experiences as a child for the parent of the opposite sex 
and the murderous impulses this first love inspires. Freud makes one 
of the strongest and most influential literary interpretations in history 
by proposing that both Oedipus and Hamlet, separated by immense 
cultural and temporal distance, are the expression of an Oedipal con­
flict that every person experiences. The plays continue to move modern 
audiences because they represent a crime all men harbor in their 
hearts. Like Claudius and Gertrude, we are all caught in a timeless 
and universal Oedipal Mousetrap. 
Freud's interpretation claims to undercut both Oedipus Rex and 
Hamlet. His reading uncovers an anthropological, ahistoric truth 
that the poets were only dimly aware of and that has lain dormant 
for twenty-five centuries to be discovered and formulated in all of its 
scientific exactness by Sigmund Freud. However, Freud's originality 
vis-à-vis the text of Sophocles is not so great as it appears. Freud fails 
even to mention the one character (Tiresias) who insists, with all the 
dogmatism of an analyst, on Oedipus's guilt: "You yourself are the 
pollution of this country.... You, with both your eyes, are blind: / You 
can not see the wretchedness of your life" (18, 21). As Mark Edmund-
son has recently observed, "By eliminating the seer from his account, 
Freud removes the figure whose presence can provide some of the 
same insight into the play's action that he himself wishes to claim" 
(38). Freud strategically neglects the figure of analytic authority in the 
text in order to insist on his own originality. Thus psychoanalytic au­
thority and originality at the expense of literature is less absolute than 
it seems. Psychoanalytic insights and positions are already there in the 
texts Freud interprets. 
Edmundson even finds in Sophocles strong suggestions of another 
important contention of Freud's: that the desire of Oedipus represents 
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a universal human condition. It is my impression, however, that Freud 
borrowed as much if not more from Hamlet in the construction of his 
main thesis and that his very interpretation of Oedipus Rex was itself 
derived from the Renaissance dramaturgy present in Hamlet. 
The idea that guilt resides in the spectator's conscience comes from 
the Mousetrap play. The idea that all men share the same kind of guilt 
is a variation on the Christian theme of Original Sin. Ubiquitous in 
Hamlet, this notion is nowhere to be found in Oedipus. The word sin 
appears in Freud's text when he evokes the different civilizations that 
produced the two plays: "Thus the loathing which should drive him 
on to revenge is replaced in him by self-reproaches, by scruples of 
conscience, which remind him that he himself is literally no better than 
the sinner whom he is to punish" (4:299, emphasis added). 
The play shows how the reworking and restaging of a myth or fic­
tive drama can be used to "catch the conscience of the King," an apt 
expression for the subjectivizing potential of drama. Hamlet also con­
tains an allegory of Freud refashioning Sophocles to create his own 
myth. By altering the Gonzago revenge play, as Freud creatively inter­
prets Oedipus and Hamlet itself, Hamlet gains cultural and analytical 
power over his adversaries, who immediately following the play are 
reduced to probing their own consciences and seem to have caught 
Hamlet's disease. In short, it is my belief that Hamlet was the real blue­
print for the Oedipal theory and the "private theater" of psychoana­
lytic technique. 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud compares the work of psycho­
analysis to the movement of the plot in Oedipus Rex: "The action of the 
play consists in nothing other than the process of revealing, with cun­
ning delays and ever-mounting excitement—a process that can be lik­
ened to the work of a psycho-analysis—that Oedipus himself is the 
murderer of Laïus" (4:295). But if psychoanalysis is like a play, it is 
more like Hamlet than Oedipus, more like a Renaissance drama of indi­
vidual consciences that turns guilt inward rather than a collective 
scapegoating that culminates in the sparagmos of the sacrificial victim. 
When Freud compares the cure to a play, and when Anna O. speaks of 
her private theater, they can both be talking only about Hamlet, a play 
written in the age when theater became private. 
Same Soil, Changed Treatment 
To examine these contentions further, let us begin with Freud's opening 
comments about the play: "Hamlet has its roots in the same soil as 
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Oedipus Rex. But the changed treatment of the same material reveals 
the whole difference in the mental life of these two widely separated 
epochs of civilization: the secular advance of repression in the emo­
tional life of mankind" (4:298). The "two widely separated epochs" are 
marked not only by a "secular advance of repression" but also by the 
arrival of Christianity As the tension between Freud's "same soil" and 
"changed treatment" suggests, there are genealogical similarities and 
archaeological differences to be respected. To read Hamlet attentively 
is to be immediately aware that the play unfolds in a Christian atmo­
sphere of universal guilt. All of the characters in the play are marked 
by this state of unhappy consciousness, to which Hamlet gives the 
most acute expression in his speech to Ophelia: "I am very proud, 
revengeful, ambitious, with more offenses at my beck than I have 
thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to 
act them in. What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth 
and heaven? We are errant knaves all; believe none of us" (3.1.124-29). 
To say of this state of affairs that civilization is marked by a secular 
advance of repression is to state only half of the truth: it is also charac­
terized by a secular advance of confession. The play that inspires 
Freud's Oedipal theory is a tragedy of surveillance and confession, a 
new kind of tragedy in which Greek anagnorisis has been displaced by 
Christian aveu.5 
"Confess yourself to heaven" 
To convince oneself of this new insistence on confession, one has only 
to listen to the play's first sustained speech by the Ghost. The spirit 
of Hamlet's father comes from a world similar to Dante's Purgatorio. 
"Confined to fast in fires" until the guilt for his sins is "burnt and 
purged away," the Ghost could tell a tale "whose lightest word / 
Would harrow up thy soul" (1.5). As is the case with several of Dante's 
sinners, Hamlet's father must expiate sins that his sudden death de­
prived him the opportunity of confessing. He died "Cut off even in 
the blossoms of my sin, / Unhouseled, disappointed, unaneled," (1.5), 
that is, denied the sacraments of communion, confession, and extreme 
unction. Thus the impetus for all of the play's action stems from the 
Ghost's first confession and admonition to his son. 
The rest of the plot is marked by the main characters' attempts to 
make their adversaries confess. Hamlet is spied upon by Rosenkrantz 
and Guildenstern: "But with a crafty madness keeps aloof / When 
we would bring him on to some confession" (3.1); Hamlet exhorts 
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Gertrude, "Confess yourself to heaven" (3.4); Claudius is saved from 
being murdered when he attempts to "try what repentance can," and 
Hamlet postpones his revenge. Hamlet is thus a world where action is 
inhibited as much by confession as by, as Freud claims, repression. 
Consciences are acutely aware of possibilities for action but stymied by 
inward-turning attempts to understand their own motives and those of 
others before acting. 
The Mousetrap 
Hamlet manages to break out of the confessional network tightening 
around him. He understands that by altering a cultural spectacle, by 
adding a scene to the revenge play, he can unsettle the political and 
moral forces of Denmark. He outlines his dramaturgical principles in 
this speech: 
. . . I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaim'd their malefactions; 
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak 
With most miraculous organ. I'll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle: I'll observe his looks; 
I'll tent him to the quick: If 'a do blench, 
I know my course. The spirit that I have seen 
May be a devil: and the devil hath power 
T' assume a pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy, 
As he is very potent with such spirits, 
Abuses me to damn me: I'll have grounds 
More relative than this: the play's the thing 
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King. 
(2.2. 617-34) 
This speech is really in an important sense the "germ cell of psycho­
analysis." Hamlet assumes analytic power, a new secular position, 
which displaces both the religious power of the Ghost and the political 
power of the king. The spirit or the devil "hath power / T assume a 
pleasing shape," but Hamlet, the new rational spirit, the Wittenberg­
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educated Renaissance man, will pierce the courtly, imaginary world of 
contrived appearances, and "murder, though it have no tongue, will 
speak." A fictive creation, "something like the murder of my father," 
something like Oedipus Rex, will focus guilt in the conscience of a spec­
tator and force the king to proclaim his malefactions. 
Hamlet's words are illustrative not only of Freud's debt to the dra­
maturgy and the world outlook of the Renaissance but also of the po­
tential of psychoanalysis to both found and dismantle "the Oedipal 
representation of things," to use Tambling's phrase. By this play, Ham­
let breaks with the patriarchal past represented by his father's ghost 
and the king; he uses literature to find the real guilty parties at court 
and to liberate himself from the weight of the past. But Freud also used 
this passage, in conjunction with Oedipus Rex, to project a universal 
crime upon all mankind. Reading Freud à rebours with Hamlet reveals 
that consciences are fictive projections and that man is free, ultimately, 
by an act of mythopoesis to alter the master texts of conscience. 
"ACHERONTO MOVEBO" 
The Divine Comedy can also be studied for its adumbrations of psycho­
analysis. I have included Dante's masterpiece in this study primarily 
because it echoes, structurally, the great watershed event in the history 
of confession, the Lateran decree of 1215. In the figure of Minos stand­
ing "horrible, snarling" ("orribilmente, e ringhia") at the gates of Hell 
and imposing confession on all who enter ("tutta si confessa"), Dante 
has created a myth of the specifically Christian discourse of confession 
and profoundly altered the Greek and Roman scene of the judgment 
of the dead.6 Homer and Virgil's Minos, revered king and lawgiver of 
the Underworld, has been turned into a vindictive demon. Like the 
medieval inquisitors, he uses confession and torture to mete out divine 
justice. The myth of Minos also links Dante to Racine, whose greatest 
heroine was "la fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé" and whose conscience 
is burdened with the idea that "Minos juge aux enfers tous les pâles 
humains." 
There are also generic affinities between Dante and the great drama­
tists of the seventeenth century. On the dramatic aspect of the Comedia, 
G. H. Grandgent has written: "In dealing with the individual, the dra­
matic method is preferred. The author lets his characters reveal them­
selves by their own words and deeds. From the time of the ancient 
Greeks to the age of Shakespeare, no playwright equaled Dante in 
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dramatic feeling or dramatic skill. For this reason, the epithet 'Com­
edy/ applied by the writer to his poem, has for us an appropriateness 
unsuspected by the giver" (305). 
Dante's explicit model for his spiritual odyssey is in fact book 6 of 
Virgil's vast epic. This section of the Aeneid recounts the catabasis, the 
descent into Hades, where Aeneas meets his fallen comrades and con­
sults with the shade of his father. The Comedia is not an epic of national 
destiny, like the Iliad or the Aeneid, but rather a compilation of confes­
sions. In The Divine Comedy, because of the universal obligation to con­
fess, every human being's life is subjected to narrativization. All men 
and women, not just epic heroes, have a story worth telling. The Divine 
Comedy is a "drama of selfhood," to use Thomas M. Greene's sugges­
tive formula. 
The link with psychoanalysis is not as direct, but Freud's use of a 
line from the Aeneid—"Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronto mo­
vebo"—as an epigraph for The Interpretation of Dreams invites a com­
parative look at Dante. In a genealogical sense, Freud's Acheron, which 
he equates with the unconscious, shares certain crucial features with 
Dante's Underworld. If Freud's use of Hamlet implicates him in the 
literary proceedings of the seventeenth century, his reference to Virgil 
opens up another set of literary allusions that in the West runs through 
Dante. If Tiresias is the hidden figure of psychoanalytic authority in 
Oedipus, Dante's Minos is the implicit, unmentioned figure of analytic 
authority in Freud's Acheron. 
"If I cannot bend the High Powers, I will move the Infernal Re­
gions." These are Juno's words after failing to gain the gods' support 
for her vendetta against Aeneas. If her Olympian peers will not second 
her efforts, she will stir up Acheron against the Trojan hero. Freud 
used this line both as an epigraph for The Interpretation of Dreams and 
as a model of dream formation near the end of the same work. The 
dream-thought is like Juno; denied access to conscious mental life, it 
must move the Underworld, find expression in the compromise forma­
tions of dreams and symptoms. 
Jean Starobinski has recently explored all the richness of this single 
line from Virgil to bring out Freud's use of the text as a model for the 
psyche. By using this line as an image of intrapsychic conflict, Freud 
went beyond the neurological and dynamic models of mental process 
prevalent in his day and invented a linguistic model of the mind. Virgil's 
movere suggests both "physical movement and a dramatic plot" for Star­
obinski ("Acheronta" 286). The psyche is structured like a play because 
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its inner struggles do not function like the reflex arc but, rather, like the 
slow delaying tactics employed by Juno, which are narrative in nature. 
The unconscious evades censorship and expresses its desires by a con­
tinual plotting against the higher powers of consciousness. 
The map of the mind that Freud developed thus owes more to tex­
tual analogies than it does to physics, as is stated in the Studies on 
Hysteria: 'The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead 
nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of 
mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of 
imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological 
formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that 
affection" (2:160-61). 
Starobinski begins his essay on Freud and Virgil by citing a letter 
from Freud to Wilhelm Fliess on the plot of The Interpretation of Dreams: 
The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. 
First comes the dark wood of the authorities (who cannot see the 
trees), where there is no clear view and it is easy to go astray. 
Then there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my read­
ers—my specimen dream with its peculiarities, its detail, its in­
discretions and its bad jokes—and then, all at once, the high 
ground and the open prospect and the question: "Which way do 
you want to go?" ("Acheronta" 273) 
The literary critic notes the epic overtones of this passage ("The prog­
ress, in epic poetry, moves toward a discovery, the founding of a city, 
by means of difficult stages and combats" [273]) and then goes on to 
discuss the Virgilian intertext. But how can one not be struck by the 
parallel between Freud's "dark wood" where it is "easy to go astray" 
and Dante's selva oscura? The cavernous defile of the specimen dream 
corresponds to Dante's passage through Hell and Purgatory culminat­
ing in the equivalent of the specimen dream—his own confession at 
the end of the Purgatorio, which leads all at once to high ground, to 
mastery over self and the text. In the end, both Freud and Dante 
emerge as original authors confirmed in their poetic gifts after having 
risked their own subjectivity and included it in the matter of their 
work. 
If, as Starobinski convincingly argues, the dream-thought behaves 
like Juno in moving Acheron, is not the psychoanalyst most like the 
figures who oversee the Underworld: Minos who sits in judgment, and 
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Dante who records the cases he sees for posterity? Perhaps we have in 
these two figures, Dante and Minos, two faces of analytic authority, the 
despotic classifier of deviance and the poetic creator of a new self, to 
which I will add a third and final possibility: Beatrice, to whom Dante 
confesses at the end of the Purgatorio. 
THE VOICE OF BEATRICE 
In a departure from church practices in his day, Dante confesses his 
transgression to a woman. Perhaps such liberating moments would 
have been more frequent in the pages that follow—and perhaps the 
Oedipal, patriarchal mold would have been shattered more often—if 
there were more gender reversals in confessional scenes like this in 
Western literature. Perhaps there is a maternal confessional scene that 
offers alternatives to the grip of Minos. 
The confession of the pilgrim at the end of the Purgatorio is the cul­
minating event of his spiritual and poetic journey. He too must un­
dergo confession before crossing over into Paradise. It is during this 
confessional scene at the end of the Purgatorio that he sees Beatrice for 
the first time. The first word that the voice of Beatrice addresses to the 
poet is his own name, "Dante, because Virgil leaves thee, weep not, 
weep not yet7' [Dante, perché Virgilio se ne vada, / non pianger anco, 
non piangere ancora] (30.55-56). For the first time, the poet is actually 
called by the name of Dante and his precursor-guide leaves him. It is 
thus through this noncanonical confession that the poet claims a name 
for himself as author of the Divine Comedy. The Christian ritual of self-
accusation gives access to a source of inspiration unknown to the pa­
gan poets. 
Dante is called by his proper name and not the repressive, castrating 
nom du père. Beatrice then admonishes Dante to look straight at her 
and likewise announces her own proper name: "I am, I am indeed 
Beatrice" [Ben son, ben son Beatrice] (30.73). The exchange of names 
that begins Dante's confession is a promise of renewed hope. Dante's 
name signifies his birth as an author, and Beatrice's name shows the 
regenerative potential of the self from earthly beauty to heavenly glory. 
But in his shame Dante cannot sustain her gaze and looks down­
ward, where he catches sight of his reflection in a pool: "My eyes fell 
down to the clear fount, but, seeing myself in it, I drew them back" 
(30.76-77). From rapt identification with the mother to narcissistic self-
contemplation in the fountain, the self seeks a refuge that comes only 
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when its imaginary, visual identifications give way to entry into the 
Symbolic order. Dante makes this painful entry into language with a 
barely audible yes: "Confusion and fear mingled together drove forth 
from my mouth a Tes' such that to hear it there was need of sight" 
(31.13-15). A yes that needed eyes to be read. The maternal gaze reads 
the lips of the son as he passes into language, intuits a yes, not a 
no, a first lesson that there is a language of the self that heals and 
transfigures. 
The pilgrim then makes his actual confession: "Weeping, I said: 
'Present things with their false pleasure turned my steps as soon as 
your face was hid'" (31.34-36). After verbalizing his sin, he is washed 
in the river Lethe, which confers forgetfulness of past mistakes. Tears, 
the melting heart, and the cleansing, amnesic waters of Lethe signify 
a return to the maternal waters of birth. 
The reader will recognize here Freudian and Lacanian themes of the 
progress of the ego from total identification with the mother, through 
narcissism, to the acquisition of a proper name. The maternal, poetic 
name, the barely audible yes, seems to offer creative, Utopian alterna­
tives to the nom du père. 

1 
IN THE GRIP OF MINOS, 
AT THE GATES OF PURGATORY 
All the faithful of both sexes, after they have reached the 
age of discretion, must confess all their sins at least once a 
year to their own parish priest. 
CANON 21, FOURTH LATERAN COUNCIL, 1215 
At the dawn of the thirteenth century, Scholastic theologians had 
reached a consensus that there were seven sacraments, among them 
confession. In 1215 Pope Innocent III, a former student of the Parisian 
schools where the theory of the sacraments had been elaborated, is­
sued a decree making annual confession obligatory (he also declared 
that women and laymen could no longer hear confessions). The pope 
and his bishops, assembled at the Lateran Council, had decided that 
the sacraments, and confession in particular, were the best means to 
sanctify the population at large and preserve it from the dangers of 
heresy. Annual confession, it was thought, would rekindle religious 
fervor and at the same time allow the parish priest to assess the beliefs 
of his flock. At the yearly confession sins were forgiven, but the peni­
tent was also sounded out about his beliefs. If the priest detected wide­
spread heresy, the Inquisition, which Innocent also instituted, was 
summoned. When the tribunal arrived, heretics were given a grace 
period within which they could recant and confess; following this, de­
nunciations and interrogations began. This meant that in the small, 
closely knit parishes of medieval Europe, a new obligation was placed 
on every man, woman, and child above the age of reason: he or she 
had to confess once a year or risk excommunication, social oppro­
brium, and suspicion of heresy. 
One historian has called this development "the most important leg­
islative act in the history of the Church" (Watkins 1:622). H. C. Lea, in 
his monumental study of auricular confession, claims that, by this 
means, the Church "secured the control of the minds of its subjects to 
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a degree which no other body has enjoyed" and that "the Europe of 
the Middle Ages and the faithful of Latin Christianity today are what 
the teaching of the confessional has made them" (2:414). These are 
large claims. Today, one might think that social justice, peace, and bio­
ethics are areas where Church decisions are more momentous. An an­
cient decree about confession seems a remote issue in Church history 
and even more so in world history. 
Furthermore, self-expression and self-analysis are so much a part of 
the air we breathe that we assume them to be instinctive. "Know thy­
self," "To thine own self be true," and "Get it off your chest" seem like 
the wisdom of the ages woven into the fabric of modern life. From the 
Delphic oracle to Shakespeare through Freud and beyond, the impera­
tive to self-knowledge seems part of human destiny. Beliefs and civili­
zations may change, but we assume that man has always felt the need 
to discover the truth about himself and speak it to others. Such a self-
fulfilling activity seems eminently compatible with democratic and hu­
manistic institutions. We hardly suspect that our habits of self-analysis 
have a very particular history or that the search for personal truth 
could be a political engagement. How could the cultivation of the self 
be linked to power? And what possible link could exist between our 
broadest principles of psychological hygiene and an episode in the 
history of "sacerdotalism"? 
Perhaps we need the imagination of a Georges Duby or a Michel 
Foucault to restage the Lateran decree as a crucial moment in the ac­
quisition of these moral habits, which could be as consequential to 
history as more conventional political events: "Qu'on s'imagine com­
bien dut paraître exorbitant, au début du XIIIe siècle, l'ordre donné à 
tous les chrétiens d'avoir à s'agenouiller une fois l'an au moins pour 
avouer, sans en omettre une seule, chacune de leurs fautes" (Hist. Sex. 
1I81).1 For Foucault, the habit of self-analysis and all the various mod­
ern institutions that employ confessional techniques—psychology, ed­
ucation, criminology, political autocritique, and even confessional 
literature—depend to some degree upon the universalization of the 
obligation to confess. What is now considered instinctive was first pro­
grammed into Western man by the Lateran decree. 
Christian confession has specific features, and it is Foucault's con­
tention that since Western man learned the language of confession 
from the Church, these features are still to be found in all its secular 
descendants. Our "Know thyself" is not the Delphic oracle's. By the 
vicissitudes of history, all of our modes of self-analysis pass through 
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the Christian experience. In an interview discussing The History of Sexu­
ality , Foucault once stated that Freud's analytic techniques are essen­
tially the same as those used by confessors and spiritual directors all 
the way back to patristic times. In the West when we confess, recline 
on the analyst's couch, or write autobiography we are repeating a ges­
ture that runs "de Tertullien à Freud" ("Jeu" 77). Lateran marks the 
point at which confessional discourse became an obligation for all, and 
its influence can still be felt today. 
For the theorist of "power/knowledge," such a phenomenon is just 
as decisive as any law or political decision; it could well be "the most 
important legislative act in the history of the Church." The Lateran 
decree is an example of a new and subtle form of power exercised for 
the first time on a massive scale, what Foucault calls pastoral power, 
the "government of individuals by their own verity" {"Omnes" 240). 
Unlike a conventional political act, the obligation to confess does not 
repress or limit any particular freedom, but its effects are all the more 
pervasive to the extent that it is not recognized as a law. The normal 
language of law is the restriction of freedoms—the peasant can't leave 
his land, the bourgeois can't bear arms—and the instance of enuncia­
tion of the truth is the sovereign body: the king or the pope declares 
that a tax must be paid or that a certain dogma is true. A law enjoining 
confession reverses this process; a subject is not restricted; on the con­
trary, he must express his or her inner thoughts and desires, and in­
stead of accepting a truth, he produces a truth of which he is the sole 
guarantor. 
In Western civilization, confession has become habitual, instinctive; 
speaking one's desires, it is assumed, is a liberating if not revolutionary 
activity. That is why the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 
1970s thought sexual and political revolution were on the same 
agenda: both were a matter of raising a repressed voice. Foucault's 
historical work on the origins of confession and analytical discourse 
calls for a réévaluation of such assumptions. 
Of course, it would be imprudent to accept only one historical 
scheme from a notoriously iconoclastic thinker without examining it 
in detail and comparing it with other historians' work on confession. 
The history of confession has inspired a vast literature, and its authors 
are far from unanimity on the subject of the evolution of the sacrament. 
Church historians tend to stress continuity when treating the sub­
ject and to deemphasize the Lateran decree: "II [the Lateran decree] 
n'apporte aucun changement dans la discipline de l'Eglise . . . il n'offre 
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rien qui ne soit conforme à la discipline de l'Eglise, telle qu'elle s'était 
développée au cours des siècles par une évolution progressive" 
(Vacandard 893). For the orthodox historian, the sacraments were insti­
tuted by Christ, and the Church has merely worked out the implica­
tions of these divine foundations; nothing can change or deviate too 
far from the founding moment, and these moments can be found in 
the Bible. This position was clearly stated at the Council of Trent con­
cerning penance: "Rien dans le régime actuel de la pénitence ecclésias­
tique n'est étranger à l'institution du Christ" (Vacandard 833). 
But even the orthodox "continualist" must admit that Lateran was 
a watershed that inspired a "vaste travail de révision dont les canons 
et déclarations du concile de Trente seront le terme d'aboutissement 
normal, l'expression officielle et définitive" (Vacandard 894). 
Protestant and republican historians like H. C. Lea and Michelet, 
anxious to dissociate their own ideologies from the abuses of the con­
fessional, emphasize the Lateran decree as an aberrant departure that 
was corrected by the Reformation and the Enlightenment. For Lea, as 
for Foucault, Lateran is a radical departure, a coup d'état for sacerdo­
talism. But according to Lea, the confessional epoch is over in enlight­
ened Protestant countries, which have abandoned the confessional, 
eliminated the priest as guardian of the conscience, and made man 
once again "directly related to God." 
Michelet is also sure that auricular confession belongs to a barbaric 
Dark Ages. Commenting on the plight of a young priest trying to hear 
confessions in modern France, he observes: 
Les manuels qu'on met entre les mains du jeune confesseur s'ap­
puient sur les casuistes que Pascal a enterrés. Quand même l'im­
moralité de leurs solutions n'eût pas été démontrée, daignez donc 
vous rappeler qu'Escobar, Sanchez, posaient des questions pour 
une époque horriblement corrompue dont, grâce à Dieu, nous 
sommes loin. Leur casuistique à son origine s'adresse au mode 
écumeux, fangeux que laissèrent après elles les guerres de reli­
gion. Vous trouvez là tel crime qui peut-être ne fut jamais commis 
que par les affreux soldats du duc d'Albe, ou par les bandes sans 
patrie, sans loi, sans Dieu, que traînait Wallenstein, vraies So-
domes errantes dont l'ancienne eût eu horreur. (Du Prêtre 222) 
Michelet's young confessor is supposedly out of touch morally with 
his clientele. His confessants are not the depraved creatures of the six­
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teenth century, and their consciences have no need of his intervention. 
They have not committed the horrendous crimes listed in the priest's 
manual, or else they lead complicated lives of sexual and financial 
corruption which the priest's seminary education is incapable of deci­
phering. Foucault's thesis, however, is that the confessional tradition 
continued unabated into modern times, not only in the Church but in 
other institutions as well, where the behavior to be analyzed was no 
longer treated as "sin." Nonetheless, any number of psychological and 
sexual aberrations were subject to essentially the same confessional 
mechanisms. Even the extreme criminal material of Michelet's casuists 
was as contemporary as ever in the annals of nineteenth-century foren­
sic medicine and psychiatry. And on the level of fantasy, is not Michelet 
himself catering to a reader who very well imagines the crimes and 
confessions of the "affreux soldats"? Literature is always ready to ex­
ploit a confessional vein, to overhear in fiction what was intended only 
for the priest's or the doctor's ear. 
Further evidence for Foucault's thesis is present in the same work 
by Michelet cited above. Continuities between the corrupt sacerdotal 
system and modern institutions become apparent. Michelet still finds 
a need for confessional dialogue but thinks it should be restored to the 
family. The father must recover the power of the priest, he says, and 
obtain total confidentiality from his wife and children. The priest is 
everywhere denounced as a parody of the father, but this is only be­
cause confessional discourse should flow between the husband and 
his guilty wife: "Le mal avoué, connu, est plus près d'être guéri" (xxiv). 
Troubling continuities between the sacerdotal confessional system 
and modern, enlightened society are evident in Lea as well. At the end 
of his study, when a few counterexamples are offered of societies with 
higher moral standards than Latin Christianity, there are disturbing 
parallels to the system previously denounced. A common feature of 
the ethically superior society is always a surveillance apparatus com­
parable to the Catholic confessional system. Lea mentions approvingly 
the police who maintain discipline in Britain; the cast system in Brah­
manism, with its "close supervision over every act"; and the Soci­
ety of Friends, characterized by a "watchfulness exercised over its 
members" (2:432). 
The difference, then, between Foucault, on the one hand, and Lea 
and Michelet, on the other, is that although he agrees with them that 
the Lateran decree inaugurated a new chapter in the development 
of Western consciousness, he sees that epoch as still continuing. 
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Confessional discourse wears various secular disguises in our Enlight­
enment institutions. 
Other modern historians, less polemically engaged for or against 
confession, have drawn other lessons from its study than the abuses of 
sacerdotalism or the unfolding of a divine plan. They too point to the 
Lateran decree as significant: 
It was not the first legal act to require confession to the priest 
and it can in no sense be said to have invented the necessity of 
confession. Nevertheless it was momentous; and even if it was 
originally designed as a disciplinary canon to allow pastors to 
know their parishioners and watch for heresy, its effects were in 
fact broader. For the requirement of yearly confession now had 
the authority of Pope and council, who had prescribed powerful 
religious sanctions to back it up. (22) 
For Thomas Tentler, whose opinion is here cited, obligatory annual 
confession is important because it increased the power of the clergy, 
who used confession to regularize sexual conduct. Their aim was to 
stabilize the institution of marriage, insure the legitimacy of offspring, 
and assure legal property transfer. Tentler assigns the Church a major 
role in shaping the institutions of medieval society. In addition to its 
role of social engineer, the Church also provided a sense of hope and 
relief; for Tentler the effect of confession was to "discipline and con­
sole." So there is a dimension to confession other than power, and the 
Lateran phenomena must be understood as a response to a real need 
of the population—the need to be reassured about salvation. The repe­
tition of absolution fulfilled this need. 
Tentler is an authority in the field, and few scholars can fault his 
findings, but debate remains whether the Church was initiating social 
policy through the confessional or merely following in the wake of 
wider social change. For example, one critic suggests, "L'Eglise est la 
garante d'un ordre social avant d'en être l'inspiratrice" (Lemaître 143). 
A broader study of the confessor's manuals and lists of sins which 
Tentler used in his work can lead to the conclusion that the Church 
was merely enforcing the collectivist morality of feudalism rather than 
embarking on its own program of mastery of the individual con­
science. The importance of particular sins varied from place to place. 
In some localities, confession seemed to focus more on issues of vio­
lence and respect for property than on sexual behavior, suggesting that 
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the Church was still concerned with the ills of feudal society rather 
than with cultivating a new private, urban ethic of chastity. 
This debate leads in two directions, one a simple matter of chronol­
ogy: at what point did confession start to focus on sexuality and incul­
cate a more private morality? Tentler and his followers in the Groupe 
de la Bussière say it was between the thirteenth and early fifteenth 
century, culminating in the work of Jean Gerson (1363-1429), who 
wrote the summa of the new morality.2 John Bossy, however, sees this 
development as coming later; he characterizes medieval confession as 
focusing on sins against the social order and argues that it wasn't until 
the sixteenth century that confession became an instrument of interior 
discipline for the individual as opposed to the earlier objective of collec­
tive behavior. This question could be a matter of the penetration of the 
new morality to the level of widespread practice. The adversaries in 
this debate agree upon the terms, private versus collective morality, 
the post-Lateran phenomena of the interest in sexuality and the com­
plication of sins. It is a question of periodization: when does the 
Church become more preoccupied with sexuality than violence and 
other threats to the fabric of feudal society? There is no absolute chro­
nological answer to this question, and the reply one offers will always 
be influenced by the milieu that is being analyzed. The upper echelons 
of society were first to be influenced by the new, more private morality. 
It encountered more resistance from the rural population than from 
the urban elite. 
The other, wider question raised here is the role of religion in gen­
eral and confession in particular in the evolution of society. Is confes­
sion merely an expression of the prevailing ideology, or can it take the 
lead in defining a new morality, and can that morality be anything 
but coercive? 
In response to these kinds of questions, some historians are willing 
to extend even further Tender's limited approval of confession. No 
longer simply "discipline and consolation," penance is defined by one 
as a "sacrament de la liberté" (Sot 20). This historian's frame of refer­
ence is strictly the actual sacrament of confession, but he does raise an 
issue with which Foucault's theory must contend, and that is whether 
a discourse like confession allows for any freedom of the subject. 
Foucault implies that anything a subject does or says ensnares him 
or her in a power structure. Doubtless he is right to demystify the 
pseudo-freedom of many forms of confession and analysis, but is con­
fessional discourse from beginning to end necessarily caught up in a 
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conspiratorial web of power? It can be argued that ideology does not 
have that firm a grip on human expression. Fredric Jameson, for ex­
ample, has criticized the excessively pessimistic and systematic out­
look of Foucault and proposed the dual principle of "ideology and 
Utopia" for analyzing social practices and cultural productions: "Even 
hegemonic or ruling-class culture and ideology are Utopian" (Political 
291). He opposes Foucault's one-dimensional vision of societies as 
predatory networks of opportunistic power structures that recuperate 
and manipulate all forms of subjectivity. Instead, he emphasizes the 
contradictory nature of cultural forms, which never simply confirm 
prevailing ideology but instead draw it backward and forward toward 
the "affirmation of collective solidarity." He sees religious forms not 
simply as the instruments of class domination but as forces expressing 
genuine liberating and Utopian aspirations.3 
I will retain Foucault's notion of "pastoral power" in my analysis 
but remain open to the Utopian possibilities of confessional discourse. 
The development of confession marks an expansion of human con­
sciousness; it carries with it the threat of the tyranny of conscience, but 
it also allows man to gain some mastery over evil. The perspective of 
redemption appears, of a second chance, of a verbal repetition and 
working through of transgression. On the collective level, we see the 
Utopian ideal of a society of permanent truth, where the transparency 
of consciences allows the group to function with one mind. Even in the 
most oppressive uses of confession, curious reversals occur: scaffold 
confessions arouse the sympathy of the crowd, the scapegoat becomes 
a hero. Repeated confessions of the flesh teach the laity a new lan­
guage of passion as penance gives way to pleasure. Finally, in our own 
day, the spread of psychoanalysis has had several unforeseen conse­
quences, with their Utopian and ideological aspects: sex becomes a 
commodity and Freud's "perversions" are skillfully marketed in a con­
sumer society. The language of psychoanalysis is taken up by various 
excluded groups to combat their sexual marginalization, and Freud 
himself becomes the object of a vigorous critique. Foucault does point 
out some of these reversals, but his analysis dwells upon the negative 
examples; he tends to see any use of confessional discourse as im­
plying power and entrapment. I would seek to go beyond this perspec­
tive. Can't the words of the self be Utopian or revolutionary? Doesn't 
the dream worker ultimately defeat the analyst? 
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THE ORIGINS OF CONFESSIONAL DISCOURSE 
To appreciate the singularity of the Lateran decree, it will first be nec­
essary to trace briefly the history of confession. The key changes that 
emerge are the shifting of emphasis from a sacrament of penance to a 
sacrament of confession; the imposition of a single, coherent definition 
of confession based on the Scholastic notions of matter and form and 
the ex opere operato definition of the sacraments; the development of a 
more subjective form of religion founded on contrition and inferiority; 
and the extension of power by the Church to the domain of the individ­
ual conscience and the use of this disciplinary power to combat heresy 
and control sexual morality. After discussing the historical evolution 
of confession, we will then examine our first literary example of con­
fessional discourse: Dante's Inferno and Purgatorio. 
From Penance to Confession 
With the imposition of the Lateran decree, a sacrament of penance— 
chiefly fasting and other ascetic works of atonement—was replaced by 
a sacrament of confession. As a modern theologian explains it; "The 
shame of the avowal becomes the expiation of what is confessed" 
(Rahner, "Penance" 397). The theologians whose opinions were to pre­
vail on the subject of confession had decided that the words of the 
priest and the confessant were the essential part of the sacrament. In 
Scholastic terms, the sacramental sign consisted of the acts of the peni­
tent (his sins, his contrition, and his words) as the matter of the sacra­
ment, while the absolution formula pronounced by the priest was the 
form. Together the two elements formed a sacrament that functioned 
ex opere operato, "by the work done." Under a kind of speech act theory 
it was held that the sacrament itself conferred forgiveness, and not the 
sinner's contrition alone. The actual words, "Ego te absolvo," were not 
declaratory on the part of the priest but judicial or performative, hav­
ing operative power in themselves. 
Expressive Signs: "Propter Meritum Erubescentiae" 
From a political point of view, the Scholastic definitions emphasized 
the importance of the priest, but they also made the words of the peni­
tent more important. St. Bonaventure says that confession must be spo­
ken out loud because this increases the shame: "Tenentur proprio ore 
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dicere propter meritum erubescentiae" (qtd. in Vacandard 920). Ac­
cording to St. Thomas Aquinas, each sacrament uses expressive sym­
bols to signify what it accomplishes, and since the essence of 
confession is to submit sin to the judgment of God, the human voice 
is both the appropriate means and symbol for self-inculpation. Thus 
in order to express outwardly the nature of the sacrament, confession 
should be "full of shame." 
Secundem quod est pars sacramenti, habet determinatum actum, 
sicut et alia sacramenta habent determinatam materiam. Et sicut 
in baptismo ad significandam interiorem ablutionem assumitur 
illud elementum cuius est maximus usus in abluendo, ita in actu 
sacramentali ad manifestandum ordinate assumitur ille actus 
quo maxime consuevimus manifestare, scilicet per proprium ver­
bum. (Suppl. q. 9, a. 3) 
In so far as it is part of a sacrament, it [confession] has a determi­
nate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. 
And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we 
employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the 
sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally 
make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the 
purpose of manifestation, vis. our own words. 
Est autem confessio actus virtutis poenitentiae. Quae quidem 
primo initium sumit in horrore turpitudinis peccati. Et quantum 
ad hoc, confessio débet esse verecunda: ut scilicet non se jactet 
de peccatis propter aliquam saeculi vanitatem admixtam. 
(Suppl. q. 9, a. 4) 
Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it 
takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shame­
fulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be full of 
shame, so as not to be a boastful account of one's sins, by reason 
of some worldly vanity accompanying it. 
The sigillum, or seal of secrecy, is another aspect of confession that 
Thomas saw as signifying the sacrament's inner reality: "God hides the 
sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also 
should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the 
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sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden" 
(Suppl. q. 11, a. 1). Like a seal stamped on a letter, the confessional 
sigillum is an engraved mark that signifies an absence, an effacement. 
Extended further, the idea of sigillum suggests that a confession al­
ways conceals as much as it reveals and, more generally, that signs 
have about them a seal-like quality that allows one message to be read 
while another is hidden or repressed. Pursuing further and generaliz­
ing Aquinas's idea of the sigillum, one could arrive at a very modern 
theory of the sign reminiscent of Heidegger's etymological meditation 
on the truth as alethea, which is both "unconcealment," the "opening 
which first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and for 
each other" (68), and concealment: "Lethe belongs to a-lethe, not just as 
an addition, not as shadow to light, but rather as the heart of aletheia" 
(71). If sigillum belongs to confession, not just as an aftereffect or an 
act of professional discretion but as a hiding and an unknowing that 
are integral to the act of revelation itself, then perhaps the normal im­
pediments to confession (guilt, shame, forgetfulness) are secondary to 
an intrinsic, formal difficulty. Confession will never be complete: not 
on account of moral shortcomings, but because the signs by which it 
is proffered always conceal other signs. 
Within a metaphysics and a theology of presence lies a kind of signi­
fying that "hides sins from the face of the living God" [occultatio pec­
catorum ab oculis Dei viventis] (Quodlib. q. 12, a. 18). It is consistent 
with metaphysics that this negative kind of signifying, this dark side 
of the sign, be confined to writing and that the voice be privileged as 
the instrument of God's grace and the sinner's sacramental act (we re­
call St. Augustine's commentary on Lazarus). However, the idea that 
every revelation is an occultation is also suggested by the movement 
from voce to sigillum. Speech reveals not only the inner nature of the 
sacrament but also, as sigillum effaces sin from the soul and hides the 
spiritual transformation, the return to life and Being effected by 
confession. 
The Scholastic definitions were adopted as the official positions of 
the Church during the Council of Trent, and it was held that this sort 
of verbal confession had been instituted by Christ and had always been 
a part of tradition. As we look back to the origins of confession in early 
Christianity, we will see that a far different sort of penance existed. 
To situate the Christian practice of penance correctly, it is necessary 
to invoke the precedent of the Old Testament. Admission of one's sin­
fulness to God is a fundamental experience in the Judeo-Christian 
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tradition. Exhortations to confess can be found throughout the Old 
Testament. From the Psalms comes this typical passage: 
I acknowledged my sin unto thee, 
And mine iniquity did I not hide: 
I said, I will confess my transgression unto Jehovah; 
And thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin. 
(Ps. 32.3-5) 
The sinner feels that he has violated a personal bond with a God who 
takes an interest in his life, and that the way to make amends for his 
transgression is to admit his guilt. The point is not that one reveals a 
fault to an omniscient Being who knows it already, but that the admis­
sion of guilt is operative in obtaining forgiveness. The other important 
aspect of this confession is that it is made directly from the sinner's 
heart to God; there are no human intermediaries. 
In the New Testament, there are instances of confession to other 
men. The Epistle of St. James commands: "Confess therefore your sins 
one to another." John the Baptist's penitents were "baptized of him in 
the Jordan confessing their sins" (Matt. 3.6), although it is not clear that 
there was auricular confession here. The Church interpreted Christ's 
granting of the "power of the keys" as a commission to hear confes­
sions and loose or bind men to their sins. But even Catholic apologists 
do not maintain that there are clear-cut references to auricular confes­
sion in these passages: "Aucun passage des écrits apostoliques n'af­
firme avec certitude l'existence et la pratique de la confession 
auriculaire au temps des apôtres" (Mangenot 838). The same uncer­
tainty prevails during the first three centuries of Christianity. There 
was a rite of penance, but its essence was not auricular confession. 
Public Penance 
In the beginning, Christianity was a total lifelong engagement, a single 
definitive conversion like the experience St. Augustine describes. The 
practicing Christian in the earlier days had no need of a sacramental 
confession. As Vacandard notes, "Saint Augustin ne s'était vraisembla­
blement jamais confessé de sa vie" (892). One either tried to live up to 
the Christian ideal, or one left the community. To commit a grave sin 
such as adultery or murder was to quit the fellowship. At most, the 
early Christian was given one chance to rejoin the community. In the 
 39 IN THE GRIP OF MINOS
words of St. Ambrose (A.D. 340-97): "Sicut unum baptisma, ita una 
paenitentia" (Vacandard 860). The first reference to a repeatable pen­
ance occurs in St. John Chrysostom (A.D. 340-407). 
Public penance was reserved for three grave sins—murder, adultery, 
and idolatry—that would be notorious enough to make auricular con­
fession unnecessary. But this consideration does not suffice to explain 
the essential difference between this form of penance and the auricular 
confession of Lateran. Although we find during this period a few scat­
tered references to people revealing their sins in private to a spiritual 
counselor before the ceremony, it was only for exceptional circum­
stances: an adulteress might be allowed to do private penance for fear 
that public knowledge of her sin would lead to her death; a man might 
reveal his sin to a bishop to ask whether it was grave enough to merit 
public penance. Verbalization was only an incidental part of this rite; 
its essence was the doing of penance, agere paenitentiam. 
The technical name for this early penance was exomologesis. The first 
detailed description comes from Tertullian's (A.D. 160-220) De paeniten­
tia. He speaks of the need for the sinner to manifest his sin externally: 
"So that it may not be only borne upon the conscience within, but may 
be also exhibited by some outward act. This act, which finds better 
and more frequent expression under its Greek name, is exomologesis, 
by which we confess our sin to the Lord, not because He knoweth it 
not, but inasmuch as by confession satisfaction is ordered" (qtd. in 
Watkins 1:115). Confession is made within the heart to God, and in 
order for exomologesis to be complete, the sin must be manifested out­
wardly by the body through a long period of public penance. Tertullian 
explains that one must "exchange the sins which [one] has committed 
for severe treatment" (qtd. in Watkins 1:115). The period of severe 
treatment was prolonged from several months to years, depending on 
the case. At the end of this period the sinner was brought into the 
church and allowed to rejoin the community. Again Tertullian provides 
us with a description of such a scene: 'And you, introducing the peni­
tent adulterer into the church to entreat the brotherhood, prostrate him 
in the midst all in hair-cloth and ashes, arrayed in disorder and repul­
siveness, before the widows, before the presbyters, laying hold of the 
garments of all, licking the footprints of all, clasping the knees of all" 
(qtd. in Watkins 1:124). It was only at the conclusion of this ceremony 
that primitive penance was complete. The long ascetic manifestation 
of the body of the sinner is what accomplished forgiveness. Foucault 
comments that behind this experience is the model of martyrdom, of 
40 IN THE GRIPOF MINOS 
union with God through loss of life and renunciation of the self. The 
penitent was dramatizing his state of sin and his desire to "get rid of 
his own body, to destroy his own flesh, and get access to a new spiri­
tual life.... In the ostentatious gestures of maceration, self-revelation 
is at the same time self-destruction" ("About the Beginnings" 214-15). 
In Christian confession, one is obliged by divine injunction to simulta­
neously reveal and renounce the self. 
Other philosophical schools have practices that resemble Christian 
confession and asceticism, but they aim at mastery over the forces of 
mind and body, which are considered fundamentally natural and 
good, not their systematic elimination and replacement by a divine 
principle. There is a unique note of alienation of the body and the 
mind by sin in the Christian tradition, and there is a unique solution 
to the problem: the obligation of the Christian to analyze and dramatize 
his sinful condition. 
Sozomene, one of the Fathers of the Church, says that exomologesis 
is like confessing one's sins tamquam in theatro (qtd. in Vacandard 859). 
It is a public acting out of sin before the assembly of believers. Like 
the theater in ancient Greece, this ritual served as a social contract 
for the community. It drew the primitive Church together around the 
representation of certain sacred realities. The ideological and Utopian 
possibilities of this dramatization are several: it can be a joyous rite of 
inclusion or a ritual of exclusion separating the individual from the 
community. It can manifest a uniquely Christian concern for the indi­
vidual, expressed in the parable of the Good Shepherd leaving his 
flock to look for the one lost sheep, or it can produce a similarly unique 
culpabilization of the single scapegoat. 
The rite of public penance has taken both forms through the centu­
ries. It has been an occasion for collective renewal and forgiveness; the 
celebration of the carnival is founded upon public penance. But it has 
also produced ugly rites of exclusion like the auto-da-fé and the 
show trial.4 
Repeatable Private Penance and Monastic Exagoreusis 
The practice of more frequent confession did not become widespread 
until monastic congregations spread their confessional practices to so­
ciety at large. This happened in the East during the eighth and ninth 
centuries and in the West, with the generalization of Celtic monastic 
penance, as early as the sixth century. The word penance is still the key 
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notion to these practices because, although it could now be undergone 
more than once in a lifetime and involved the private revelation to a 
priest of secret sins, the emphasis was still on the work of penance to 
be performed to expiate sins. Penance remains an infrequent practice 
at this period and has yet to assume any canonical regularity. The liter­
ature of the period shows us saints still confessing their sins directly 
to God; men confess to other men when in need, or even to their horses 
or their sword (Beriou 77). Pilgrimages, almsgiving, and entry into a 
monastery are considered more significant ways of atoning for sin 
than confession. 
Repeatable private penance was an adjustment of the old system to 
new social realities. The Christian populace was growing, and moral 
standards were necessarily lowered to accommodate a larger popula­
tion that was not as fervent as the first Christian communities; allow­
ances had to be made for people who repeatedly fell into serious sin. 
The anonymity of sin in a larger group also made auricular confes­
sion necessary. 
This period is referred to technically as the stage of "tariffied" pen­
ance because it produced the first penitentials, books that established 
an exact penance for each type of sin. The classification of sins and a 
sort of penitential economy are starting to emerge at this period. It 
would be interesting to study the relation of this economy to that of 
feudalism. One can sense the ideological and Utopian aspects of this 
system; it was "communist" to the extent that all penitential "laborers" 
had equal access to a divine means of production, but its ideological 
function was to postpone the just rewards of labor to the next life while 
leaving the social order intact. Chaucer's pardoner is an example of an 
entrepreneur willing to translate the system into an actually function­
ing economy. He is a sort of protomercantilist who plies his trade be­
tween Rome and Canterbury. 
Compared to later developments, this regime of penance seems to 
take an excessively quantitative, mechanical attitude to sin with little 
attention paid to the subjective aspect and the interior disposition of 
the confessant. 
But alongside this kind of rare, severe penance for the population 
at large, there was a tradition originating in the Eastern Church of 
a more sophisticated monastic spiritual direction, the exagoreusis ton 
logismoi or "manifestation of thoughts" to a spiritual director. The tech­
nique involved a more rigorous search for sin in its mental, uncon­
scious origins. The novice revealed his thoughts, not just his sins, to 
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an experienced elder gifted in the "diacritical" science of discerning 
thoughts. The aim was to render the soul entirely lucid to itself and to 
extirpate evil inclinations in their unconscious roots. 
Reading Evagrius or Cassian, one enters a completely different spir­
itual world from that of the early Christian communities. Instead of 
the social ritual of exomologesis, we find the solitary battle of a monk 
against his evil thoughts. In this spiritual arena, the community is no 
longer threatened by adultery or violence; rather, a man striving for 
perfection is assailed by demons who send him tempting thoughts and 
illusions. They are legion. Although invisible, they can be detected by 
the truly gifted: St. Anthony can actually smell their presence; Evagrius 
warns that the demon of fornication lives by water; Cassian tells stories 
of the most virtuous ascetics laid low by false demonic visions, one 
monk's temptations even culminating in "Judaism and circumcision" 
(Collationes 2:8). Each demon wages an incessant war against the monk 
by sending him wicked thoughts, logismoi. Those who lead lives in the 
world are tempted by physical objects, whereas the monk is called 
upon to fight a more difficult, psychological battle, the "immaterial 
war" (kata dianoian) against evil (Evagrius 610). The spiritual analysis 
of thought was the chief resource of the holy man in this battle. 
There were several principles at work in monastic analysis. One as­
sumption was that the devil worked best in secret. He could inspire a 
wicked thought, but if the thought were revealed and brought out in 
the open, he would be defeated. The novice monk never knew whether 
a thought was inspired by God or by the devil; the most objectively 
meritorious idea, such as undertaking a long fast, could hide a second­
ary, wicked intention like personal vanity. The way to get to the root 
of the thought was to expose it to a spiritual director. 
According to Cassian, who describes monastic analysis in his Colla­
tiones and Institutiones, the verbalization of a thought would reveal 
whether it arose secretly from God, the self, or the devil. Confession 
thus had moral as well as epistemological merit; it delivered the soul 
from the secret suggestions of the devil, and it clarified the subject's 
thought process to himself. A passage from Cassian dramatically illus­
trates the power of confession to free the sinner from Satan's grasp and 
reveal the truth. A young monk, Serapio, has stolen a loaf of bread 
because he can no longer endure a fast. The following day his spiritual 
director, Theonas, delivers a homily on the importance of honesty. Ser­
apio removes the loaf from under his cloak and confesses his sin; im­
mediately, "a burning lamp burst from his chest and filled the room 
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with the smell of sulfur." The elder explains: "The Lord has made vis­
ible the truth of my words; He wanted you to see with your own eyes 
how the devil, who suggested the sin to you, was thrown out of your 
heart by your salutary confession, and how, once discovered, will have 
no hold over you any longer" (qtd. in Guy 30). 
The actual words of the confession are the center of the story. Nei­
ther the petty crime of stealing the bread nor the revelation of the 
crime to the community is important; what counts is the interior drama 
of hiding a sin and then revealing it. God produces the miracle to 
dramatize for the monk his moral state and the merit of confession; the 
actual words of confession vanquish Satan and produce a miraculous 
revelation of self-knowledge. The text also shows the importance of 
confessing to an authority; it is not enough that the monk feels contri­
tion in his heart. The elder interprets the meaning of the confession 
and miracle. One assumes that the symbols of the burning lamp and 
the sulfur were clear enough, but this is a relatively easy, straightfor­
ward case. God does not always intervene so dramatically to show the 
demon at work. 
The monastic texts mention several hermeneutic principles involved 
in the interpretation of confessions. One is an attention to the physical 
manifestations that accompany the avowal: "The Fathers say it is the 
universal and evident sign that a thought is from the devil when we 
blush in admitting it to our spiritual director" (Cassian, Institutions 49). 
Cassian discusses at length methods for deciding whether a thought 
is from God, the devil, or the self. Certain analogies are used for the 
process of discerning thoughts. The novice and his spiritual director 
stand watch as "sentinels" over the doors of consciousness, preventing 
any untoward thought from entering. In the Collationes he makes three 
comparisons of interest: a miller who selects only certain grains to be 
ground, a centurion inspecting his troops, and a money changer who 
rejects some coins and accepts others. 
The fundamental principles of the Fathers' science (gnostike) of dis­
cernment (Gk. diacrisis, Lat. discretio) are quite similar to psychoanaly­
sis if one replaces the demonic terminology with Freud's scientific 
language and familial mythology. Like the analyst, the spiritual father 
pays attention to the material and structural aspects of thoughts to 
decipher their unconscious meaning. The devil possesses an art, a 
techne, by which he disguises his temptations, much as the dreamwork 
disguises repressed desires. Therefore, the mental signifier must be 
scrutinized in all its aspects to uncover its true meaning. Evagrius goes 
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straight to the object represented to look for clues: the face of someone 
who has injured our pride is the sure sign that a hidden devil is trying 
to produce a movement of anger. For Cassian, in a curious reversal of 
the Freudian associative pathway, an image of the mother is the 
demon's way of leading the mind on to libidinous thoughts of other 
women. 
The comparison between the spiritual analyst and the money 
changer is perhaps the most suggestive; it is one of Freud's models of 
the censorship process, although what Freud's preconscious does and 
what the spiritual director does are opposites. Freudian censorship 
only allows the successfully disguised wish to pass through to con­
sciousness, whereas Cassian's money changer pierces the disguise and 
sends the evil thought away (Foucault, 'About the Beginnings"). 
The money changer image is also the most complex image of the 
discernment of thoughts. The thoughts of the confessing monk are 
treated like coins, which, unlike the miller's grain and the passing sol­
diers, are symbolic objects. A complete poetics of thought interpreta­
tion emerges in Cassian's prolonged discussion of this comparison. 
Again we are struck by the attention to the material aspects of the 
signifier: Is the coin-thought made of gold, that is, is it authentically 
Christian or is it contaminated by pagan ideas? Does the coin bear the 
image of the True King or the tyrant? Even the true image might be a 
counterfeit; in other words, an overtly pious thought or inspiration 
might conceal a sinful ulterior motive like vanity. The apparently true 
effigy is also compared to the temptation of false biblical readings: the 
devil misleads the monk in his reading of the Bible and this is the 
source of sinful acts. 
Cassian thus paints a thoroughly modern picture of the insistence 
of the unconscious in mental life. Dreams, he believed, were the avenue 
of the unconscious; they revealed secret vices that the monk had not 
yet eradicated from his soul (Institutions 275). Choices of action, read­
ing, even the most altruistic behavior can all be done to satisfy uncon­
scious desires. 
The analytic activity of the money changer also reveals a linguistic 
model of the psyche. Consciousness and the unconscious are levels of 
meaning to be deciphered in a constant poetic war between the spiri­
tual father and the demon. One image from Cassian is particularly 
striking in this regard. He concludes his discussion of discretio by say­
ing that hidden in the corner of the soul are the tracks or traces of 
demonic beasts, "bestia, vel leo vel draco, pertransiens perniciosa ves­
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tigia latenter impresserit" (Conférences 106). These vestiges show the 
way to other "beasts"; evil has left its mark in the unconscious, and 
these pathways are waiting there to be reactivated. Discretio is the art of 
perceiving and eradicating these evil traces and substituting a sacred 
writing in its place. With the "plow of the Scriptures" (evangelico arato), 
the monk traces a new message into his soul. This linguistic model 
of the psyche is remarkably similar to one of Freud's models, precisely 
the one that is now considered the most sophisticated and that has 
kept Freud at the center of postmodernist thought.5 
There are other obvious parallels between psychoanalysis and mo­
nastic direction. The intervention of the spiritual director is much like 
that of the analyst; both are intuitive, yet both also involve certain her­
meneutic principles. Furthermore, the monks had already developed 
a somatic theory like Freud's "drives." For them, human behavior was 
dominated by eight unconscious inclinations or logismoi, which sprang 
from two hidden somatic drives: gluttony and libido. These two forces 
in turn were aspects of philautia, a self-love akin to Freud's primitive 
narcissism (Hausherr 1028). The Desert Fathers theorized the instinc­
tual foundations of mental life long before Freud; the psychotextual 
territory was already there, psychoanalysis merely changed the place 
names. 
Both practices rely on a mysterious heart-to-heart insight into the 
unconscious of the other. The Freudian analyst, like his monastic pre­
decessor, must suspend his rational faculties, cease note-taking, and 
"bend his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the emerg­
ing unconscious of the patient" (12:115). Likewise, the elder relied 
upon an "illiterate" (aggramatoi) gift of discernment to read the 
thoughts of his monks (Hausherr 1026). There was a science to his 
methods, as we have seen, but ultimately he relied upon an infused 
perspicaciousness. His own rational faculties were supported by a 
spirit within him. Barsanulphe, one of the Fathers, explains how spiri­
tual direction works: "Saints do not speak on their own authority, it 
is God who speaks in them as He will, sometimes in veiled fashion, 
sometimes clearly" (Hausherr 1049). The only proper preparation for 
either science is a long apprenticeship that teaches the adept how to 
read the perverse rhetoric of the mind. The spiritual authors make a 
distinction between the enlightened reading of the Bible and the inter­
pretation of thoughts; the most gifted confessor could be an idiota in 
this regard (Hausherr 1026). 
Freud led his subjects along a verbal pathway to the recognition of 
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their Oedipus complexes; the monks wandered a literal and figurai 
desert in search of the Father. In the words of Ignatius of Antioch, this 
journey was guided by an inner voice: Deuro pros ton Patera, which the 
Dictionnaire de spiritualité translates as: "Viens ça, vers le Père" (Haus­
herr 1012). In the Rule of St. Benedict, the monastic vocation is con­
firmed by the joyous acclamation of the name of the Father; the monk 
cries out in recognition to his abbot: "Accepistis spiritum adoptionis 
filiorum, in quo clamamus: Abba, Pater!" (chap. 2). The inadvertent 
Lacanian language of the Dictionnaire helps us cast the genealogy of 
psychoanalysis back to patristic times. From the Desert Fathers to La-
can, there has always existed this paradoxical Father who solicits the 
voice of the unconscious and promises to restore meaning to the sub­
ject: "Viens ça, vers le Père." 
Awareness of this continuity between analysis and confession will 
give rise to a more relative, historic use of psychoanalytic terms. By 
constantly provoking a confessional echo to the rhetoric of analysis, I 
hope to gain insight into another sort of paternity and power that 
Freud's method was blind to methodologically because it never es­
caped this kind of monastic fatherhood. Beyond the provisional role 
of transferential father, the analyst permanently plays the role of the 
Desert Father who breaks through repression and enjoins speech. The 
name of this father is not synonymous with negation. If I may be al­
lowed a Lacanism myself, a homophonic pun that sounds like 
Nietzsche's "Ja-schaffende," the analytic father does not temporarily 
occupy the place of the "nom(n) du père" but rather exercises an unre­
linquished paternity by a "ouï-dire du père."6 
Phonetically, the word suggests a discursive order and a power that 
are the opposite of the "non," and, as the dictionary definition sug­
gests, "ce qu'on ne connaît que pour l'avoir entendu dire"—the only 
truth available in analysis is a heard truth. And finally, hearsay and 
rumor are opposed to juridically verifiable evidence. Paternal power is 
normally associated with the law, all desire coming up against the pa­
ternal law, and the paternal act par excellence consisting of the enunci­
ation of the repressive law. But this "ouï-dire" or rumor of the father 
operates differently from this kind of law. Psychoanalysis and spiritual 
direction both deal with unverifiable evidence. At the core of the 
dream material lie primal scenes that may or may not be literally true, 
and in the depths of the monastic soul are true and false messages 
from God, the self, or demons. Only God himself can see the soul in 
its entirety. Both the analyst and the confessor receive a hearsay mes­
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sage that passes through them; the rumor is never verified, just re­
peated. The name of the father is invoked, but it is not synonymous 
with repression. The name and the law of the pastoral father is not 
silence, but speech. A final quote from one of the Desert Fathers ex­
plains how confession is essential to maintaining spiritual paternity in 
the monastic community: "Nothing is more important than the combat 
of confession [exagoreusin agonisma] and the heroic exploits of obedi­
ence: by these two exercises the soul is enlightened, and the will is 
mortified; by these two means are obtained the perfect unity of the 
spiritual child [gegennemenou] with the spiritual father [gegennekota]" 
(Migne, PG 99.812). The "agon" of confession is essential to holding 
the monastic community together; it forms the discursive bond be­
tween spiritual father and son. This is a paternal regime, and there is 
still an essential link between desire and paternal power, but this 
power is not juridical in nature; it is not a prohibitive law but rather a 
positive call to an "agon" of self-statement. War is the absence of law; 
it calls for rapid adjustments to a changing dynamic situation and the 
exploitation of the enemy's force. The monks' battle for control of the 
soul is an active process in which desire is forced to speak, not be 
silent. The monk's desire is engaged, encountered, not simply sup­
pressed. This war of self-statement is a unique Christian feature that 
must be taken into account in any phenomenology of power in the 
West. Power is not just the negative law of the father; it is also this 
verbal call to arms of desire which founds the analytic cohort of fathers 
and sons. 
Did Freud know anything of his monastic precursors? The father of 
psychoanalysis insisted that his practice was different from confession: 
"In confession the sinner tells what he knows, in analysis the neurotic 
has to tell more" (20:189). But we have seen that many of Freud's tech­
niques were already in use in monastic confession. One wonders 
whether ignorance or deliberate deception on Freud's part could ex­
plain this omission. Certainly Pierre Janet, one of Freud's mentors and 
the coinventor of the talking cure, was aware of the precedent of spiri­
tual direction.7 
In comparing monastic exagoreusis to public penance, several paral­
lels and divergences are apparent. The goal of both practices is the 
same—the simultaneous revelation of man's sinfulness and self-
renunciation, the abneget semetipsum of asceticism. Public penance 
accomplished this through the symbolic destruction of the body; mo­
nastic confession achieved similar results by a total surrender of the 
48 IN THE GRIPOF MINOS 
thought process to a spiritual director. One was an exceptional process 
for reconciling grave sinners to the community, the other a technique 
for exercising continuous control over a committed member. With the 
imposition of the Lateran decree, private confession became the sacra­
mental rite of penance, but the other form persisted for some special 
circumstances—public sinners and, most notably, the hapless victims 
of the Inquisition, who were subjected to a sort of theater of the sinful 
body which hearkens back to exomologesis. 
The general tendency was toward the monastic type of confession. 
Lateran was the first step in generalizing a monastic, psychological type 
of religion that responded to and, to some extent, helped create the 
modern individual. From Lateran onward, confession became more 
frequent and progressed logically toward spiritual direction, a process 
that would reach its full development in the seventeenth century with 
the popularization of spiritual direction. 
DANTE: "TUTTA SI CONFESSA" 
We will now consider a literary text based on the same discursive prin­
ciples as the Lateran decree. The Divine Comedy uses obligatory confes­
sion to create a total vision of humanity governed and punished by its 
own verity. As the lost souls enter Dante's Inferno, they must pass be­
fore the Judge of the Underworld, Minos, and confess their sins: 
Stavvi Minôs orribilmente, e ringhia: 
essamina le colpe nell'entrata; 
giudica e manda secondo ch'avvinghia. 
Dico che quando l'anima mal nata 
li vien dinanzi, tutta si confessa; 
e quel conoscitor delle peccata 
vede quai luogo d'inferno è da essa; 
cignesi con la coda tante volte 
quantunque gradi vuol che giu sia messa. 
(5.4-12) 
There stands Minos, horrible, snarling, examines their offenses at 
the entrance, judges and dispatches them according as he girds 
himself; I mean that when the ill-born soul comes before him, it 
confesses all; and that discerner of sins sees what is the place for 
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it in Hell and encircles himself with his tail as many times as the 
grades he will have it sent down. 
It is not enough that the souls are justly condemned according to God's 
justice, they must enact their damnation in their own words. Their 
confessions are the basis of their punishment; Minos translates their 
guilty words into a degree of corporal punishment by encircling him­
self a certain number of times with his tail. He initiates the punitive 
mechanism of Hell, which consists in turning the condemned into 
cruel illustrations of their sins. Their bodies become an ironic, vengeful 
representation of their confessions. 
The Purgatorio is also founded on confession, if we are to believe the 
Dante scholar Edward Moore, who says, "It can hardly be doubted that 
the white marble [of the first step of the Gates of Purgatory] represents 
candid Confession; the dark and calcined stone cracked in all directions, 
broken-hearted Contrition; and the flaming red porphyry, burning 
Love" (47). The first step one takes in either of Dante's vast penitentiar­
ies involves avowal; the confessing subject is either in the grip of Minos 
or at the gates of Purgatory.8 
The very architecture of Hell and Purgatory is like the deployment 
of a medieval confession manual. The various cornices and boglia of 
Hell and Purgatory are based on the Schoolmen's classification of sin 
into Seven Deadly Sins, plus certain notions borrowed from Aristotle 
and Cicero (Moore 152-208). Furthermore, the successive confessions 
of the sinners are an essential narrative device of Dante's work, the 
bulk of which is devoted to recording the confessing subjects he en­
counters.9 On another level, the confession of the pilgrim himself at 
the end of the Purgatorio is the culminating event of his own spiritual 
journey; he too must confess before entering Paradise. 
In conceiving his vast confessional empires, Dante combined ele­
ments of the classical mythological Underworld with different confes­
sional practices of the Church. Different methods were appropriate to 
different spheres, from the crudest, most external forms of confession 
to establish objective guilt to the more refined forms of mental 
purgation. 
In Purgatory, the penitents are afforded the benefits of canonical 
penance, involving contrition, confession, absolution, and satisfaction. 
Having availed themselves of the sacrament of penance in life, symbol­
ized by the white marble gates of Purgatory, the redeemed sinners 
50 IN THE GRIP OF MINOS 
can begin the process of eradicating the "memoria del peccato" and 
preparing their minds for God (Purg. 28.128). They lead a quasi-
monastic life: celibate, ascetic, immersed in the liturgy, and freely con­
fessing their sins. Witness the lustful souls of the seventh circle, who 
joyfully call out their sins before entering the purifying flames: 
sopragridar ciascuna s'affatica: 
la nova gente: "Soddoma e Gomorra"; 
e l'altra: "Nella vacca entra Pasife, 
perche '1 torello a sua lussuria corra." 
(26.39-42) 
Each of them strives which shall the loudest cry. "Sodom and 
Gomorrah" the new-comers shout. The rest, "Pasiphaë enters the 
cow that the bull may run to her lust." 
The atmosphere is one of a medieval pilgrimage or an Ash Wednesday 
procession. We know that Dante was familiar with the liturgical manu­
als governing penance and pilgrimages. Meersseman maintains that 
the presentation of confession in the Purgatory was directly inspired 
by such literature.10 
In Hell, by contrast, confession leads only to classification of sin and 
punishment. The redeemed souls in Purgatory are saved by Christian 
mercy, whereas the lex talionis of Jehovah and the contrapasso of St. 
Thomas Aquinas fall vengefully upon the naked souls of the damned. 
"If Thou shouldst mark iniquities, O Lord, who should stand?" 
(Ps. 129).11 
The damned are in some respects like the victims of the nascent 
Inquisition, and some of them, like Farinata, were actually condemned 
by the Holy Office. Having refused the grace period of life and the 
opportunity of canonical penance, they are subject to the "question" 
and forced to confess. The public punishment of their sin hearkens 
back to exomologesis, but it is a vindictive parody of public penance. It 
is not the meritorious asceticism of the contrite body but rather the 
ignominious humiliation of a recalcitrant flesh that, malgré lui, will be 
made to signify the reality of sin. 
Dante's didactic intent was certainly to show the ease and generos­
ity of confession within the Church as opposed to the terrible justice 
that awaited the unrepentant. Dante's work is an expression of the Lat­
eran age in that it treats confession as a necessary antidote to sin, but 
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one that still meets with great resistance. Many of the souls in the 
Inferno are there because they postponed confession for too long, and 
the Purgatorio abounds in stories of in extremis confessions that save 
the sinner from damnation. 
MINOS 
When one compares Dante's Minos with that of his Greek and Latin 
sources, the radical difference between the Christian and pagan view 
of the afterlife becomes apparent. The unique role of confession in the 
Christian scheme of divine justice and punishment is also evident. Let 
us briefly review the myth. 
Minos was the son of Zeus and Europa and unfaithful husband to 
Pasiphaë, whose own union with the sacred bull of Poseidon produced 
the Minotaur. In revenge for his son's murder at the" hands of the 
Athenians, Minos imposed a cruel annual tribute on their city. Seven 
young men and women were fed to the Minotaur, whom he had im­
prisoned in the depths of the Labyrinth at Knossos. The hero Theseus, 
incarnation of Athenian law and reason, traveled to Crete and de­
stroyed the Minotaur, thus ending the religious and political oppres­
sion of Mycenaean Athens by the rival and alien Minoan Crete.12 
However barbarously he may have treated the Athenians, Minos 
was revered by Homer, whose hero Odysseus evokes his memory in 
the nineteenth book of the Odyssey: "Here lived King Minos whom 
great Zeus received every ninth month in private council—Minos, the 
father of my father, Deucalion." Odysseus also encounters the legend­
ary king in the Underworld: "There then I saw Minos, the glorious son 
of Zeus, golden scepter in hand, giving judgment to the dead from his 
seat, while they sat and stood about the king through the wide-gated 
house of Hades, and asked of him judgment" (bk. 11). Because of his 
reputation for justice on earth, Zeus made him judge of the Under­
world. In the Homeric legend, we are still far removed from Dante or 
even Plato: "Homer says that Minos gives laws to the dead but does 
not act as judge" (Ringgren 206). There are a few great transgressors 
in Homer's Underworld—Tantalos, Sisyphos, and Tityus—who are 
punished for exceptional crimes against the gods, but there is no idea 
of an individual judgment awaiting all mankind followed by reward 
or punishment for the deeds of earthly life. Homer's nekyia describes 
a shadowy mournful existence where the dead regret their lives on 
earth.13 
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It was the Orphies and the Pythagoreans who moralized the myth 
and installed Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aikos as judges of all souls 
entering the afterlife, sending them to the Isles of the Blessed or Tar-
taros. This is the version we find at the end of the Gorgias, with the 
added stipulation that the judges of the Underworld must use their 
own souls to pass judgment on the dead: "And the judge must be na­
ked too and dead, scanning with his soul itself the souls of all immedi­
ately after death" (523e). 
Virgil's Aeneid describes a similar, although less mystical, judgment 
scene in which "Minos sits on judgment with a jury / chosen by lot 
and bids the silent gathering / Listen to evidence of their lives and the 
charges / Preferred against them" ("quaesitor Minos urnam movet, 
ille silentum / consiliumque vocat vitasque et crimina discit") (6.432­
33). Virgil uses the vocabulary of the Roman court to describe Minos; 
he is a quaesitor convening a concilium.1'1 His function is confined to 
hearing the cases of souls unjustly condemned to death, and no men­
tion is made of confession. If there is a source for Dante's "tutta con­
fessa" in Virgil, it would be the description of Rhadamanthus, who, 
at the gates of the iron tower of Tartaros (ferrea turns), interrogates 
the wicked: 
Gnosius haec Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna,

castigatque auditque dolos subigitque fateri,

quae quis apud superos, furto laetatus inani,

distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem.

(6.566-69) 
Rhadamanthus of Knossos rules this place 
With an iron hand: hearing each case of deceit 
And fitly condemning it he compels each victim 
To confess to the gods those crimes whose expiation 
They had postponed in life—in their fatuous self-
congratulation at having concealed them—and death 
came too late. 
Dante has radically altered these images of the just judges of antiquity. 
First, he has combined the roles of Minos and Rhadamanthus. Second, 
in typical medieval fashion he has transformed a quasi-divine charac­
ter from pagan mythology into a demon, complete with the tail of 
a snake. 
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The confession that Dante's Minos extorts is not the same as that 
which Rhadamanthus demands. Virgil's "fateri" has none of the sacra­
mental connotations of "confessa." Virgil's judge is a Roman quaesitor, 
whereas Dante's is a "conoscitor delle peccata."15 In Virgil's Avernus, 
as in the Rome of his day, confession is not a universal moral obligation 
but an exceptional juridical procedure reserved for certain deceitful 
criminals. 
More important, Virgil is not really interested in the avowals that 
Rhadamanthus hears; his hero, Aeneas, does not record a single con­
versation with Rhadamanthus's clients. In Dante's Hell and Purgatory, 
on the other hand, every single soul must confess. It is a decisive act 
of the greatest spiritual significance, in malo for the damned and in 
bono for the saved. It is the focus of Dante's whole poem; for the first 
time in Western literature, every single human being has a story that 
demands narration. 
The pagan gods do not insist on man's confession. There is a steady 
increase in moral obligations to truth and justice as we move from the 
Homeric world to Plato, but nowhere can one find the ritual obligation 
to tell the truth about oneself. The oracle is the ritual by which pagan 
gods and men communicate; the god speaks the enigmatic truth about 
man. In Christianity, the verbalization of the truth must come from the 
individual, in this life or in the terrible encounter with Minos. 
A look at the iconography of Minos through the ages confirms the 
different interpretations he was subject to. Figure 1 is a restored fresco 
of the priest-king of Knossos, whom Sir Arthur Evans identifies with 
the legends of Minos: "Here we recognize Minos himself in one of his 
earthly incarnations" (779). This is presumably as authentic a represen­
tation of the Cretan Minos as we possess. His crown is inscribed with 
the symbols of "the Snake Goddess of the Delta" and the "Minoan 
sacred flower" (776). 
Recent scholarship, however, has challenged Evans's reconstruction 
and interpretation of the priest-king fresco. In The Chalice and the Blade, 
Riane Eisler describes Minoan Crete as a "prepatriarchal civilization," 
and notes the preponderance of female imagery in its art: "At the great 
palace of Knossos it is a woman—the Goddess, her high priestess, or 
perhaps, as Hawkes believes, the Cretan queen—who stands at the 
center while two approaching processions of men bear tribute to her" 
(31). Citing the work of the anthropologist Ruby Rohrlich-Leavitt, 
Eisler contests Evans's interpretation of the fresco: "It is modern ar­
chaeologists who have dubbed the young man just described the 
Figure 1. Priest-king from Knossos, identified by Sir Arthur Evans as Minos. Re­
printed with permission of Art Resource, New York. 
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Figure 2. Silver tetradrachm from Knossos, c. 200 B.C., depicting Minos; 
reverse shows square labyrinth. Reprinted with permission of the British 
Museum. 
'young prince' or the 'priest-king/ when in fact, no single representa­
tion of a king or a dominant male god has yet been found" (37). In 
some sense, then, Evans's The Palace ofMinos prolongs later Mycenaean 
myths about Crete. The Victorian archaeologist was looking through 
male, European eyes when he saw Minos in the frescoes of Crete.16 
This study is concerned only with the Greek legend of Minos and 
its Christian reinterpretations, but it is enlightening to know that one 
of the distortions of the Greek myth is the suppression of a matriarchal 
civilization. According to Eisler, "Minoan Crete was the last, and most 
technologically advanced, society in which male dominance was not 
the norm" (39). Perhaps this explains why the Theseus legend portrays 
Minoan sexuality as bestial and depraved. The myth encodes an anx­
iety of matriarchy, the repression of maternal Crete by patriarchal 
Athens. 
Figure 2 shows the idealized lawgiver imagined by the mainland 
Greeks many centuries later. All authentic Cretan elements have disap­
peared, and we see a bearded Hellenistic ruler. This representation is 
in conformity with the dignity of Homer's and Virgil's Minos. Figures 
3 and 4, a fifteenth-century illumination and Doré's nineteenth-century 
illustration, represent Dante's demon of confession preying upon the 
souls of the damned. Figuring prominently is the tail that Minos wraps 
around himself, the precise number of times corresponding to the 
circle where the condemned soul will be hurled. This is the one detail 
that clearly demonizes Dante's figure.17 
Much critical ink has been spilled over the meaning of this tail.18 In 
search of a source, Luciani discusses a case of serpent divination in 
the Odyssey and a passage from Servius's commentary on the Aeneid 
in which a snake forms seven coils with its body to indicate that 
Figure 3. Inferno 5.4-8, Ferrare illuminated manuscript, detail, 1474. Re­
printed with permission of the Biblioteca Vaticana. 
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Figure 4. Gustave Dorés Minos, 1861. From Dante Alighieri, L'Enfer avec les des-
sins de Gustave Doré. Paris: Hachette, 1861. 
Aeneas is about to begin his voyage to Averno (50). Perhaps Dante 
remembered the story of Laocoôn when he created this image of con­
striction and fatality or he could have been influenced by Virgil's Tisi­
phone, who pounces on Rhadamanthus's subjects as soon as they have 
been judged, brandishing in her left hand a "tangle of snakes."19 
Above all, the tail must be seen as a bestial sign of perdition, like 
the "bestial segno" alluded to in Inferno 32.133. On that occasion, the 
pilgrim is appalled to see Ugolino gnawing on the head of Ruggieri, 
and he calls out to him: "O tu che mostri per si bestial segno / odio 
sovra colui che tu ti mangi" [O thou who by so bestial a sign showest 
thy hatred against him thou eatest]. Ugolino silently chewing on the 
head of Ruggieri is a bestial parody of normal communication. Instead 
of proffering speech, the mouth consumes human flesh. All communi­
cation in Hell gravitates toward this regression to the bestial. 
This is in keeping with Dante's linguistic doctrine expounded in the 
De vulgari eloquentia. There he contends that speech is the distinguish­
ing characteristic of man: "Only to man was it granted to speak" (49). 
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Human beings communicate by signs that are at the same time "ratio­
nal" and "sensible": 
Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandas inter se con­
ceptiones suas aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere: quia, 
cum de ratione accipere habeat et in rationem portare, rationale 
esse oportuit, cumque de una ratione in aliam nihil deferri possit 
nisi per medium sensuale, sensuale esse oportuit. Quare, si tan­
tum rationale esset, pertransire non posset; si tantum sensuale, 
nee a ratione accipere nee in rationem deponere potuisset. (46) 
Hence for communicating its thoughts mankind had to have 
some rational and sensible sign: for it had to be rational, since it 
must receive from reason and transmit to reason; and it had to 
be sensible, since nothing can be transmitted from the reason of 
one to the reason of another except by a sensible medium. Hence 
if it were only rational, it could not pass between them; if only 
sensible, it could not receive from reason nor deposit in reason. 
The purely sensible sign is how animals communicate; Minos's tail is 
such a sign of the beast. 
In Inferno 27.124-27, Dante adds a picturesque detail that under­
scores the role of the tail as beastly sign. Minos has just heard the 
confession of Guido da Montefeltro, and as he renders his sentence he 
bites his own tail: "A Minôs mi porto; e quelli attorse / otto volte la 
coda al dosso duro; / e poi che per gran rabbia la si morse, / disse: 
'Questi è de' rei del foco furo' " [He carried me to Minos, who coiled 
his tail eight times about his rough back and after biting it in great 
rage said: "This is one of the wicked for the thievish fire"]. Even when 
Minos does speak, he inexplicably bites his own tail as though he 
could not escape a compulsive and bestial rage, as though his speech, 
like Ugolino's, had to be embedded in a bestial sign. The "sign" of 
Ugolino can also be read as a parody of the Eucharist. He chews on 
the head "as bread is devoured for hunger" (Inf. 32.127), a grisly liter­
alization of the Sacrament, the "Bread of angels."20 
A similar sacramental irony is intended in Minos's bestial tail. Con­
fession is being parodied; instead of the healing words of forgiveness 
and the power to release from sin which Jesus commissioned the Apos­
tles to do through confession (Matt. 16.19, 18.18), we have only the 
silent, menacing binding of the tail. As we imagine the scene, the 
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sinner tells his or her story while Minos's tail slowly inscribes on his 
own body the descending spiral of catabasis, the narrative of descent 
to the Underworld. 
INFERNO: "PAROLE E SANGUE" 
Confession and punishment are closely related in both the Inferno and 
the Purgatorio. As we have observed, entry into either realm is predi­
cated upon confession, and once inside, enforced verbalization plays a 
key role in the punishment of the condemned and the reformation of 
the contrite. All the inhabitants of Hell must relate their crimes to the 
two poets on command. As Vanni Fucci makes clear, "Io non posso 
negar quel che tu chiedi" [I may not refuse to answer thy question! 
(24.136). In addition, the manner of confession has special significance 
for the sin and its punishment. What is said of Cavalcante, that he was 
recognizable by his voice and his mode of penance, "Le sue parole e '1 
modo délia pena" (10.64), is true of all the sinners. In fact, the voice 
and the mode of punishment are one. Voice is, according to St. Thomas 
Aquinas, the "determinata materia ad significandam" of confession 
(Suppl. q. 9, a. 3) and, as we have seen, of particular significance for 
Dante. Thus each confessant has a particular speech impediment or 
inflection of voice that signifies his or her crime and its punishment. 
At almost every station of the pilgrim's journey through Hell, a simi­
lar protocol is observed: Dante asks of his guide, "Who are they?" or 
"What was his or her crime?" ("Maestro, chi son quelle / genti che 
l'aura nera si gastiga?" [5.50]; "Chi è colui, maestro?" [19.31]). To which 
Virgil usually replies that the condemned souls must explain their 
crimes in their own words: "da lui saprai di se e de' suoi torti" (19.36). 
Dante frequently describes in great detail the prise de parole of the sin­
ners, and their speech is always marked by a particular difficulty re­
lated to their crime. Their entry into the Symbolic causes literal 
mutilation and castration; their confessions are "parole e sangue" 
("words and blood"). Let us consider some of the more striking cases. 
Paolo and Francesca's tale must be told quickly during a moment's 
respite from the infernal wind that blows the Lustful about, and al­
though it affords them some peace, the telling of the tale cannot be 
separated from its punishment. Francesca's speech is at the same time 
a weeping and a saying: "dirô come colui che piange e dice" (5.126), 
and it causes Paolo to suffer in exactly the same way: "Mentre che 
l'uno spirto questo disse, / l'altro piangea" (5.139-40). Nevertheless, 
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their confession is a moving, noble form of suffering compared to that 
of the souls in the lower circles. 
The Wrathful, for example, are submerged in slime, and their sighs 
cause the surface of the water to bubble: "Sotto l'acqua ha gente che 
sospira, / e fanno pullular quest'acqua al summo" (7.118-19). Their 
confession, which they sing collectively as a "hymn," must pass 
through the water: "Quest' inno si gorgoglian nella strozza, / chè dir 
nol posson con parola intégra" [This hymn they gurgle in their throat, 
for they cannot get the words out plainly] (7.125-26). 
The formal aspects of the voice are particularly important in Piero 
della Vigne's confession. His voice speaks plaintively from the 
branches of the tree that imprisons his soul: 
Come d'un stizzo verde ch'arso sia 
dall'un de' capi, che dall'altro geme 
e cigola per vento che va via, 
si della scheggia rotta usciva inseme 
parole e sangue;... 
(13.40-44) 
As a green brand that is burning at one end drips from the other 
and hisses with the escaping wind, so from the broken splinter 
came forth words and blood together. 
Here is perhaps the clearest illustration of a confession that is itself a 
specific form of punishment related to a sin. "Words and blood" issue 
from the broken branch like the hissing sound of gas escaping from a 
burning stick. Because through suicide Piero showed no respect for his 
body, his soul has been humiliated by being cast into a tree. His spirit 
is now at the mercy of a baser form of body. He has lost control of his 
bodily functions, chief among them speech. When Dante breaks the 
branch, Piero's voice and blood escape uncontrollably to punish him 
for the deliberate taking of his own life. Significantly, he is unable to 
stop his speech, "non posso tacere" (13.56). 
The uncanny atmosphere of the barren wood and the bizarre, pitiful 
confession of the "spirito incarcerato" have a haunting, dreamlike 
quality about them that evokes the mystery of suicide and the tragedy 
of della Vigne's career. His imprisonment in a tree is such a powerful, 
expressive condensation of so many aspects of his life. It is related to 
his very name, "Vigne," as though in the unconscious, in the Under­
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world, his name had become a thing.21 We know that délia Vigne was 
"of humble origins" (Sinclair 177), and this rustic sounding name 
seems to predestine him, however high a state he achieved in life, to a 
catastrophic fall from power. Anthony Cassell has observed that such 
wordplay appealed to the medieval mind, and, in fact, Vigne's name 
had already been subjected to imaginative puns.22 
The imagery of the mournful voices in the branches and the idea of 
a man's spirit imprisoned in a tree seem to revive primitive, animistic 
beliefs about the mobility of human life within nature. Perhaps Freud 
was right that there is such a thing as the death wish, Thanatos, and 
that it would be fitting for Dante's suicide victim to inhabit a tree, since 
he was ultimately moved by a desire to return to the vegetative if not 
the inorganic state.23 
Confession has a specific signification in the case of Vanni Fucci as 
well. He was known as a brute and a brigand, but in life he managed 
to hide an even more serious sin by letting another man be hanged for 
a crime he committed, the robbery of a sacristy. Thus he must endure 
the shame of owning up to this sin for the first time: 
'Piu mi duol che tu m' hai colto 
nella miseria dove tu mi vedi, 
che quando fui dell'altra vita tolto. 
Io non posso negar quel che tu chiedi: 
in giu son messo tanto perch' io fui 
ladro alla sagrestia de' belli arredi, 
e falsamente già fu apposto altrui. 
(24.133-39) 
I suffer more that thou hast caught me in the misery in which 
thou seest me than when I was taken from the other life. I may 
not refuse to answer thy question. I am put down so far because 
I was a thief in the Sacristy of the Fair Ornaments and then it was 
laid falsely on another. 
Fucci is further punished, or at least forced to accomplish the opposite 
of what he passed his life doing, by prophesying—telling the truth 
about the future of Florence. 
Confession is directly parodied in the circle of the Simonists, where 
Dante, "like the friar confessing one fixt in the earth for treacherous 
homicide," listens to the confession of a pope who is stuck upside 
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down into a baptismal font. This scene is emblematic of all confessions 
in the Inferno. It is an ironic reversal of canonical penance; it brings no 
relief but rather mocks the sinner and intensifies his punishment. Here 
the sinners are thrust into the earth; their speech is reduced, literally, 
to dirt. 
ANALYSIS WITH A VENGEANCE 
Everywhere in Hell one is struck by the vengeful materiality of the 
punishments. The sinners are unable to rise above the Real to the Sym­
bolic; instead, the very words of their confessions are dragged down 
into materiality and subjected to a perverse sort of analysis. Each sin 
appears as a corporeal hieroglyph imposed by divine justice and de­
ciphered by Dante and his guide, Virgil. Like hysterical or catatonic 
symptoms, these mute bodily signs are made to "join in the conversa­
tion" of the sinners' confessions. But the scenes of confession and anal­
ysis in the Inferno are deliberate failures of the cure. Minos uses the 
sinners' words merely to decide in which circle they belong, and the 
poet-confessor's interventions cannot alleviate the suffering of the lost. 
The symptoms can be understood, as they are to varying degrees by 
the condemned themselves, but no one can relieve repression or un­
bind desire from its destructive fixations. 
Freud himself used the metaphor of the Underworld to refer to the 
unconscious and primary process, quoting a line from Virgil, "If I can­
not bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions," to de­
scribe how the dream state is the kingdom of repressed desires and 
primary process, which are otherwise unable to breach consciousness 
(5:608). 
Such a comparison could be of assistance in understanding the 
means of representation employed in the Inferno. There, the con­
demned express the most primitive, brutal desires of mankind; their 
psychic energy is "unbound" as it flows unimpeded toward its imme­
diate expression, employing the rhetoric of the unconscious to arrive 
at its ends: displacement, condensation, and overdetermination. But 
simultaneously, their desires are subject to a terrible censorship pro­
cess; the very means of expression of their impulses turns against 
them. The words and gestures at the disposition of the damned assure 
that their desires will always be reduced to a brutish immediacy and 
that they will never be able to understand the nature of their wants or 
sublimate their needs. 
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Censorship is really the wrong word to describe the punitive mecha­
nism of Hell because the process is set in motion by Minos's extorted 
confessions, and it continues in the dialogues between Dante and the 
sinners. Hell is being forced to state one's desires in a hostile code 
subject to an abusive hermeneutic authority, to be imprisoned in pri­
mary process with only Minos for an analyst. 
The rhetoric of punishment in Purgatory is, to pursue the analogy, 
closer to secondary conscious figuration. In distinction to the damned, 
the penitents have access to the signification of their symptoms. They 
can read traced upon their foreheads the seven Ps, corresponding to 
the Seven Deadly Sins, which are progressively effaced as the soul 
purges its guilt (9.112). 
There is a long association in the Judeo-Christian tradition between 
sins as unconscious, guilty writing and forgiveness as effacement: 
"They that depart from me shall be written in the earth, because they 
have forsaken Jehovah" (Jer. 17.13). Christ writes in the sand to dis­
perse the crowd that has gathered to stone the adulteress (John 8.4-10). 
St. Augustine says that, as a result of Christ's death on the cross, "the 
handwriting which was contrary to us was blotted out" {Confessions 
113). St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) comments on a line from Psalm 
50: "'And blot out all my iniquities,' to make the pardon a lasting, 
permanent one, for he that turns his face away from a piece of writing, 
may look on it again and consider the matter of it, but when the writing 
is destroyed, 'blotted out,' it can no longer be read, a proof that when 
sin is forgiven it is thoroughly forgiven" (158). 
John Freccero has studied the ironic use of writing which character­
izes punishment in the Inferno. Calling it "mimesis with a vengeance," 
he draws a convincing parallel between Dante's uses of writing and 
that theorized by St. Augustine in the De genesi ad litteram. For Au­
gustine, there were three kinds of vision: the corporeal, the spiritual, 
and the intellectual: 
Corporeal vision was vision in the ordinary sense through the 
organs of the body. By spiritual vision, Augustine meant imagi­
native vision, whether stimulated directly by the senses or indi­
rectly by writing, memory, or dreams. Finally, intellectual vision 
was of the highest order, bringing total understanding with it . . . . 
The vision represented in the Inferno is clearly corporeal; the 
souls of sinners are to be seen and even touched by the pilgrim. 
(93) 
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Augustine's prime example of "corporeal vision" is the story of the 
handwriting on the wall which King Nebuchadnezzar could see corpo­
really but was unable to read spiritually. The prophecy of his own 
doom was inscribed in all its materiality on the walls of his palace, but 
he could only perceive it as a thing, an icon, not a sign. For Freccero, 
this same type of material, ironic signification is the basis for all repre­
sentation in Hell, starting with the gates, whose inscription calls atten­
tion to itself as a thing, and continuing with the bodies of the damned, 
which are vengeful material reductions of the soul. There is a deliber­
ate frustration of spiritual signification. 
For me, this process is especially visible in the speech of the 
damned, where what is most distinctively human and promises the 
greatest liberation is deliberately and cruelly reified. The contrapasso 
attacks what for Dante is most human in man, his speech, and reduces 
it to guilty materiality. 
To return to our study of the expressivity of confessions in the In­
ferno, we take up the case of Ulysses. His narration starts out according 
to the same principles as the ones cited above. From within the flame 
he shares with Diomed, he is compelled to speak. Dante notes how 
the infernal flames that imprison Ulysses are stirred up and burst forth 
in epic discourse: 
Lo maggior corno della fiamma antica 
cominciô a crollarsi mormorando 
pur come quella cui vento affatica; 
indi la cima que e là menando, 
come fosse la lingua che parlasse, 
gittô voce de fuori, e disse: "Quando 
mi diparti' da Circe, . . . " 
(26.85-91) 
The greater horn of the ancient flame began to toss and murmur 
just as if it were beaten by the wind, then, waving the point to 
and fro as if it were the tongue that spoke, it flung forth a voice 
and said: "When I parted from Circe, . . .  " 
This, along with the tale of Paolo and Francesca, is perhaps the most 
ambiguous of the confessions in the Inferno because the crime suppos­
edly being expiated—false counsel and seductive speech—is actually 
reenacted by Ulysses' stirring tale of his final voyage in search of 
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knowledge and experience. Like his companions, who were beguiled 
by his words and sought to transgress the ordinary limits of human 
knowledge and civic obligations, we can't resist the sway of Ulysses' 
words: "Li miei compagni fec'io si aguti, / con questa orazion picciola, 
al cammino" [My companions I made so eager for the road with these 
brief words] (26.121-22). 
Even in Hell, confession can produce a stirring narrative; the aes­
thetic provides momentary relief from the torment of enforced self-
statement. Like Camus's Sisyphus rolling the rock up the hill, some 
infernal confessants seem to gain a measure of meaning and dignity 
by their avowals. Their poetic discourse offers a respite from desire 
and torture. One is reminded of Schopenhauer's idea that only art de­
livers man from the infernal cycle of desire and torture: "This is the 
painless condition that Epicurus praised as the highest good and the 
condition of the gods; for a moment we are delivered from the vile 
urgency of the will; we celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of 
volitions; the wheel of Ixion stands still!" (qtd. in Nietzsche 105). 
No such ambiguity concerns the confessions of three sinners from 
the deepest circles of Hell: Bertran de Born, Nimrod, and Brutus. The 
mutilated, inarticulate, and, in the last case, silent manner of their 
avowals can but produce horror. 
Bertran is among the "seminator di scandalo" (28.35) whose insinu­
ating words have torn apart medieval society's most sacred bonds: reli­
gion (Mahomet), the political order (Piero da Medicina, and Mosca 
dei Lamberti), and, worst of all, that between father and son (Bertran 
himself). Because they have threatened the organic unity of society, a 
unity expressed in the king's body or the Mystical Body of Christ, their 
own bodies are horribly mutilated. Bertran has been decapitated; in 
order to make his confession he must lift up his head to bring his 
words to Dante, "per appressarne le parole sue" (28.129). The manner 
of his confession dramatically signifies his crime. For having incited 
Prince Henry of England to the Oedipal crime, Bertran is beheaded 
instead of being blinded. The contrapasso severs his vocal cords and 
topples his mouth from its position of authority above the body, as 
though, for Dante, the Oedipal crime was a sin against speech rather 
than an offense against reason and vision. 
As the pilgrim makes his way to the pit of Hell, he encounters Nim­
rod the giant, one of the "sons of the earth" ("figli della terra") (31.121), 
who serve as Lucifer's bodyguards. He speaks to Dante and Virgil in 
totally meaningless sounds: "Raphèl mai amècche zabi almi" (31.67). 
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According to legend, it was Nimrod who tempted men to build the 
Tower of Babel, and hence he is responsible for the confusion of lan­
guages sent by God as a punishment. In Hell he is reduced to an imbe­
cile incapable of understanding any languages and whose own speech 
means nothing. It is pure material signifier, an inert message which 
might tempt the most skillful psychoanalyst to unravel it, but which 
for Dante and Virgil signifies merely that Nimrod is plunged into a 
prediscursive, infantile state of stupidity. 
Only Brutus is more bereft of humanity, deprived absolutely of 
speech as he suffers: "vedi come si storce e non fa motto" [See how he 
writhes and utters not a word] (34.66). 
PURGATORIO: "I BUON SOSPIRI" 
One of the first souls the pilgrim encounters in the Ante-Purgatory is 
Manfred, son of the emperor Frederick, who was killed in the battle of 
Benevento. He is as mutilated as any of the lost souls of the Inferno, 
with his eyebrow cleft in two, but the manner of his speech immedi­
ately reveals that he lives under a different regime of self-revelation: 
"sorridendo disse: 'Io son Manfredi, . . . ' " [smiling he spoke: "I am 
Manfred"] (3.112). He narrates the story of his life, which is not without 
its grave sins, with a smile because he avoided damnation de justesse 
with a last-minute act of repentance. 
Such is also the case of Belacqua, whose story likewise produces a 
smile, this time that of the poet: "Li atti suoi pigri e le corte parole / 
mosson le labbra mie un poco a riso" [His lazy movements and curt 
speech moved my lips a little to a smile] (4.121-22). Belacqua suffers 
from the sin of sloth, but he also escaped Hell with a last-minute con­
fession. He must wait a long time in the Ante-Purgatory because, as 
he explains, "io indugiai al fine i buon sospiri" [I put off good sighs to 
the last] (4.132). The good sighs of repentance and confession have 
saved Belacqua, and in the Purgatorio this is the mode of confession— 
speech that promises relief from suffering and progress toward self-
understanding. 
Dante drives home the lesson of the merit of last-minute repentance 
with one more story, that of Buonconte da Montefeltro, who relates 
with great pathos the end of his life and his last moments of con­
sciousness. Mortally wounded in battle, he stumbled to the edge of a 
remote stream: "fuggendo a piede e 'nsanguinando il piano. / Quivi 
perdei la vista e la parola; / nel nome di Maria fini'" [with the throat 
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deeply cleft, fleeing on foot and bloodying the grass. There I lost sight 
and speech. I ended on the name of Mary] (5.99-101). Here again 
bodily mutilation is transcended by speech; the last whispered name, 
the final fleeting thought saves him. The Devil is so angered by this 
last-minute escape that he sends a flood to wash Buonconte's body 
away so that it is never found. But he cannot harm the dead soldier's 
soul, which has escaped the punishments of Hell by pronouncing the 
miraculous name. 
When Dante enters Purgatory proper, he beats his breast three times 
to show contrition, and the angel inscribes the seven Ps, representing 
the Seven Deadly Sins, on his forehead. Unlike the inscriptions of sin 
in Hell, these signs of sin are visible and readable; they can be effaced 
by the meritorious suffering and speech of the penitents. 
The salutary shame of confession is especially evident in the case 
of Guido Guinicelli, Dante's poetic "father," who explains to the poet 
what sin his group is expiating: "perô si parton 'Soddoma' gridando, / 
rimproverando a se, com' hai udito, / ed aiutan l'arsura vergognando" 
[therefore they go off crying "Sodom," as thou has heard, in self-
reproach and by their shame they aid the burning] (26.79-81). Guido 
and his group are atoning for the sin of homosexuality; by their loud 
vocal confessions they deliberately fan the flames they endure. The 
operative principle of this confession is the same, literally, as that de­
scribed by Thomas Aquinas: "vergognando" (verecundia). 
The culminating event of the Purgatorio is Dante's own confession 
in cantos 30 and 31. Like those noted above, it occurs in a similar col­
lective and liturgical setting: the pageant of revelation which occupies 
the whole of canto 29. Matilda's words, "Beati quorum tecta sunt pec­
cata," are an intimation to the poet that he cannot join the Church 
Triumphant until he has undergone penance himself. When Beatrice 
appears, she renders Matilda's message explicit: "God's high decrees 
would be broken if Lethe were passed and such a draught were tasted 
without some scot of penitence and shedding of tears" (30.142-45). 
The pageant has momentarily come to a halt, and Dante, who is di­
rectly named by Beatrice, is called upon to make a personal revelation 
of sin. 
Sinclair has seen the importance of the break between the pageant 
and the personal religious experience that follows: "The twenty-ninth 
canto is occupied with revelation and the Church; it is all public and 
impersonal. The next two cantos are the most intimately personal in 
the Divine Comedy" (411). The whole poem has reached an important 
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historical turning point, which, according to Georges Duby, was pre­
pared gradually by the twelfth century and culminated in a radical 
change in mentality between 1300 and 1350: 
Les marques évidentes des conquêtes d'une autonomie person­
nelle se multiplient dans le cours du Xlle siècle.... 
. . . L'idée prend corps, bouleversant, parmi les savants qui 
méditent sur le texte de l'Ecriture, que le salut ne s'acquiert pas 
par la seule participation à des rites, dans une passivité mou­
tonnière, mais se 'gagne' par une transformation de soi-même. 
C'est une invite à l'introspection, à l'exploration de sa propre 
conscience, puisque la faute n'apparaît plus résider dans l'acte 
mais dans l'intention, qu'elle est censée se blottir dans l'intimité 
de l'âme. A l'intérieur de l'être, dans un espace privé qui n'a plus 
rien de communautaire, se transportent les procédures de régula­
tion morale. On se lave de la souillure par la contrition, par le 
désir surtout de se rénover, par un effort sur soi, de raison, dit 
Abélard, d'amour, dit saint Bernard, l'un et l'autre d'accord sur 
la nécessité d'un amendement personnel. ("Situation" 505,506-7) 
The Scholastic reinterpretation of the sacrament of penance with its 
insistance on confession is symptomatic of the change that Duby here 
describes. The progression from collective pageant to personal sacra­
ment which we observe in the Purgatorio marks the emergence of a 
new form of religious subjectivity. 
As we have already seen, confession is a fundamental discourse of 
the Comedy, but here its importance and modernity are particularly 
striking because it is the poet himself who is obliged to confess. His 
individuality is more strongly asserted than that of any other subject 
in the poem because he alone makes a confession entirely alone, with­
out the collective backdrop of a group of sinners. His individual spiri­
tual experience stands out most pointedly from the collective liturgical 
form of religion. 
As many commentators have observed, Dante is in exact conformity 
with the Scholastic definitions of the sacrament as consisting of con­
tritio cordis, confessio oris, and satisfactio operis. As remorse wells up 
within his heart following Beatrice's accusation, he experiences contri­
tion. Three metaphors express this emotion: the melting of ice, the 
shattering of a crossbow that has been cranked up too far, and the 
uprooting of a tree. These images seem to be an almost etymological 
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meditation on the word contritio, which means "to break." Apropos of 
the crossbow, Singleton states: "The simile is one that finds its allusive 
relevance in being precisely one of a 'breaking/ the literal meaning of 
contritio, so that contrition of the heart is here continued into the act 
of confession" (Commentary 2:758). As with all the other personae in 
the Comedy, Dante's own confession is as significant in its expressivity 
as in its content: 
Dopo la tratta d' un sospiro amaro, 
a pena ebbi la voce che rispose, 
e le labbra a fatica la formaro. 
Piangendo dissi: "Le presenti cose 
col falso lor piacer volser miei passi, 
tosto che '1 vostro viso si nascose." 
(31.31-36) 
After heaving a bitter sigh I had hardly the voice to answer and 
the lips shaped it with difficulty; weeping, I said: "Present things 
with their false pleasure turned my steps as soon as your face 
was hid." 
He has been accused of betraying the spiritual desire inspired in him 
by Beatrice for that object "beyond which there is nothing to be longed 
for" (31.24). His actual confession is generic and perfunctory: "Present 
things with their false pleasure...." There is no detailed account of 
every sin ever committed, no casuistical weighing of mental states and 
degrees of assent; that will be the product of a later period that will 
continue what Dante and his age have begun here. It is more important 
that words express outwardly the inner transformation wrought by 
contrition. The voice breaks, and weeping signifies the inner melting 
of the heart, "piangendo dissi." Words must become motivated signs 
by the performative power of the sacrament and participate in the 
great order of similitude which is spiritual reality: 
. . . Le cose tutte quante 
hanno ordine tra loro, e questo è forma 
che l'uni verso a Dio fa simigliante. 
(Par. 1.103-5) 
All things whatsoever have order among themselves, and this is 
the form that makes the universe resemble God. 
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These words are the beginning of Beatrice's lesson to Dante in Paradise 
about the order of the universe. They express the ultimate theological 
basis of medieval semiotics, the idea that all of creation is a divine 
book held together by a hidden order or resemblance ("simigliante"). 
Sacramental signs, aided by grace, are those that come closest to ex­
pressing man in his "real" presence to the world. This is why for Dante 
the form of confession is inseparable from its content. 
Only absolution remains for Dante's confession to be complete, and 
this is signified by his immersion in the waters of Lethe by Beatrice. 
The heavenly chorus chants Psalm 50, familiar to Dante as one of the 
most beautiful hymns of the liturgy: "Asperges me hyssopo et munda­
bor; lavabis me, et super nivem dealbabor." 
Like Virgil's Lethe described in the Aeneid, the river that separates 
Paradise from Purgatory completes the purgative process by erasing 
from memory events from a sinful past life. But as was the case with 
the judgment scene of Minos and Rhadamanthus, this Virgilian ele­
ment reveals as much about Dante's originality and historical specific­
ity as it does about his borrowing from a classical source. Dante's 
confessional scene contains many echoes of Virgil, but significantly 
Virgil himself, Dante's "dolcissimo patre," has left him. This is because 
Dante-the-epic-poet, named by Beatrice, has become Dante-the­
confessant, and his narrative has shifted from the story of a heroic 
voyage to that of a sacramental confession. This is why his epic guide 
and precursor disappears just before Dante begins his confession. The 
great pagan poet can be of no assistance when Dante turns sacramental 
discourse into literature. 
Many of the key Virgilian symbols are given a final reinterpretation 
in this scene. Tears, the "lacrimae rerum" (Aen. 1.462), become the tears 
of contrition. Memory, the anticipated consolation of Aeneas, "forsan 
et haec olim meminisse juvabit" (Aen. 1.203), becomes the salutary rec­
ollection of sin, something entirely different. And finally the Lethe it­
self acquires a totally different meaning in the Christian eschatological 
scene. In Virgil it prepares men for reentry into history, and it allows 
the Latin poet to prophesize and glorify the "imperium sine fine" of 
Rome. Dante, on the contrary, crosses Lethe to discover Paradise, the 
permanent abode of Christian saints who dwell in a medieval Utopia 
of eternal familiarity with God.24 
 71 IN THE GRIPOF MINOS
THE SIMPLICITY OF CONFESSION 
Most confessions in The Divine Comedy lack the detail that confession 
in the West would eventually acquire, with Lateran acting as the cata­
lyst for more and more detailed confessions. At the dawn of the age 
in which man became a "bête d'aveu," in Foucault's words, confession 
was still a simple narration of one's sins, often told only once in a 
lifetime. 
Following the imposition of annual confession, the Church em­
barked on a pedagogical mission to educate priests and the laity 
regarding their duties to confession. A vast literature of Summa confes­
sorum, Modus confitendi, and Summa de casibus conscientiae followed in 
the wake of Lateran and brought the exacting, scrupulous distinctions 
of the Schoolmen to the population at large. But this was a slow devel­
opment that did not really get into high gear until the invention of 
printing and the spread of vernacular editions of the casuists. The 
works of Jean Gerson (1363-1429), Angélus de Clavasio (author of the 
Angelica, 1480), and Andreas Escobar (d. 1427) were not "publishing 
phenomena" until the sixteenth century (Tender 28-46). 
The refined dissection of sin and the scrupulous conscience were 
products of a later age. In Dante's era the pedagogy of confession was 
conducted largely by sermons, and the faithful were taught to analyse 
their sins according to a simple rhetorical formula: "Quis, quid, ubi, 
quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando." An authority on such litera­
ture summarizes the popular attitude that priests hoped to foster 
among the faithful: "L'image du péché reste encore très objectivée. On 
se limite aussi, semble-t-il, à une conception stricte de la confession" 
(Beriou 88). This succinct representation of sin and guilt is consistent 
with Dante's own laconic confession in the Purgatorio and the terse 
confessions throughout his work. 
Of course, a work of art would not presume to be as frank as a real 
confession, since it would give scandal. A real confession was pro­
tected by the sigillum or confessional seal of secrecy. But the simple 
description of sin is not explainable by prudishness or the censorship 
of art; medieval literature was much less controlled by rules of 
"bienséance" than later forms of expression and is typically much less 
inhibited or "repressed" in its treatment of sexuality and violence. The 
Inferno especially will not be found lacking in explicit cruelty. 
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ONE FLESH

To a large extent, if sexuality in The Divine Comedy is not as florid and 
tortured an affair as in later works, it is because in actual life it had 
not yet been so complicated. The teaching of the moral theologians 
had not been extended to the population at large; obligatory annual 
confession was the instrument by which a more complicated sexuality 
would be disseminated. In Dante's great seduction scene, for example, 
the lovers Paolo and Francesca submit to their passion with an almost 
natural resignation; there is no prolonged resistance and inner drama. 
Their passion as it is lived seems to lack the dimension of guilt which 
only comes after the fact. The act itself hardly seems worthy of men­
tion; Francesca simply says, "We read no more that day." For Dante 
and his age, sexuality was not yet the complex affair it was to become. 
The tragic couple are guilty above all of transgressing the laws of 
marriage. The real evil that ensues is of a social nature—adultery leads 
to jealousy and murder. For the laity, sexuality must simply be made 
to conform to the laws of Christian marriage. It is treated first and 
foremost as a threat to the fabric of personal relations upon which 
feudalism rests. The Paolo and Francesca story illustrates the violent 
results of adultery, as does the "source" of the lovers' behavior, the 
story of Lancelot and Guinevere. The idealized society of the Round 
Table was brought down by Lancelot's transgression of the feudal bond 
of personal loyalty to King Arthur. 
As I have mentioned above, the "sexual" content of Dante's story is 
almost nonexistent. For the laity, sexuality is not yet haunted by all the 
deviations and pathologies of a later age. Doubtless the monks had 
already been waging a more complex and solitary war of analysis 
against sexuality, but mandatory confession and spiritual guidance 
were only beginning to spread these notions to the population at large. 
At this juncture, "sexuality" had not yet arrived on the scene. What 
does exist in Dante's text are the "peccator carnali," and their sins of 
the flesh are quite different from our notion of sexuality. 
Attention to the details of the lovers' narrative reveals some of the 
key features of the concept of the flesh. The first noteworthy aspect of 
their narration is the prevalence of "we" and "us" throughout their 
story: "Noi udiremo . . . Amor condusse noi ad una morte . . . Noi leggi­
avamo un giorno per diletto . . .  " (Inf. 5.95,106,127, emphasis added). 
All the sinners in this circle appear in pairs, and Francesca tells us 
that Paolo "may never from me be separated more" (5.135). The early 
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Christian idea of the flesh implies that sexuality forms an irrevocable 
bond between two people. The subtext here is doubtless St. Paul's com­
mentary upon marriage: "et erunt duo in carne una" (Eph. 5.22). 
This explains why the lovers appear together and their entire con­
fession is in the first person plural. From beginning to end, their carnal­
ity has been an intersubjective experience. It starts with an intimate 
joint reading. Side by side the young wife and her husband's brother 
follow the tale of Lancelot and Guinevere until the moment when "that 
smile, so thirsted for, was kissed by such a lover" (5.133-34). At this 
point, the word of the romance becomes flesh as Paolo kisses Francesca 
and the book is put aside: "We read no more that day" (5.138). Medi­
eval carnality is based upon an easy transitivity between the word and 
the flesh. Books become people, the text has been a "Galahalt" to the 
couple, and literary kisses become actual ones, as the two lovers be­
come caro una. Whether it be a narrative of sin or of redemption, sexu­
ality and textuality are unitive experiences within this culture. 
It is interesting to note that, for Freud, the kiss hearkens back to 
infantile sexuality and the autoeroticism of the oral stage. The kiss is 
a sign of the "erotogenic significance of the labial region" (7:182). This 
"perverse" origin of adult sexuality threatens to reassert itself as cer­
tain types become "epicures of kissing," resort to "perverse kissing," 
or drink and smoke in excess. 
Dante's transgressive kiss is of a different nature. It is the moment 
of an illicit unification of the flesh which threatens the social order, but 
it carries with it no sign of a disorder within sexuality itself. The kiss 
can stand unproblematically as a synecdoche for the whole unitive 
carnal experience, whereas Freud singles it out as an emblem of the 
autoerotic curse hanging over adult sexuality. In the Middle Ages, 
reading, carnality, and confession are still shared experiences, and the 
word evokes total human presences in the flesh. 
The notion of the flesh was about to undergo certain profound 
changes, however. The clerics who shaped the consciousness of medi­
eval Europe were hard at work elaborating their theories and ponder­
ing cases of conscience. A few years before Dante wrote the Comedia, 
Albert the Great had carefully analyzed what positions were licit for 
sexual intercourse, and confessors were being instructed to interrogate 
their married penitents closely on such matters (Tentler 189). In the 
centuries following Lateran, the casuists would develop ever more 
elaborate lists and nuances in sexual deviations. Hervé Martin ob­
serves: "Les moralistes, dans leur hantise du sexe, établissent une 
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échelle de gravité très détaillée des péchés de la chair. Dans la Brève et 
Générale Confession, ils sont répartis en seize catégories par ordre de 
gravité, depuis le baiser impudique jusqu'à la zoophilie" (124). Confes­
sion in The Divine Comedy is a relatively straightforward declaration 
because it was such in actual practice. As the centuries passed, confes­
sion would grow in complexity and refinement. The unitive experience 
and discourse of la chair would give way to the solitary passions of the 
soul. The great chain of "simigliante" would be broken by the theory 
of representation. 
2 
THE AGE OF THE CONFESSIONAL 
Anchorage in space is an economico-political form which 
needs to be studied in detail. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT 
Du 17e siècle, âge d'or de la direction spirituelle . . .

DICTIONNAIRE DE LA SPIRITUALITÉ

"Le Confessionnal" is the title of a dramatic chapter in Alfred de Vig­
ny's Cinq-Mars, a historical novel about the d'Effiat conspiracy (1641­
42). The denouement is set in motion by a fateful rendezvous of the 
protagonists in a confessional in the church of St. Eustache. The lover-
conspirators, Marie de Gonzague and Cinq-Mars, kneel on either side 
of the penitential stall, separated by their counselor and spiritual direc­
tor, Abbé Quillet. But their fate is sealed when a hostile confessor, Père 
Joseph, chief of Richelieu's spy network, slips secretly into the box and 
overhears their confession of an outlawed betrothal and a plot to over­
throw Richelieu. The young Cinq-Mars will be beheaded for treason, 
and Marie married off to the king of Poland to solidify one of Riche­
lieu's European alliances. 
The episode is reminiscent of a common theatrical scene, the con­
cealed eavesdropper who listens en cachette to a conversation, but it 
also points to a historically specific scene of truth, desire, and surveil­
lance, for the confessional was invented in the sixteenth century and 
introduced in France precisely during the period Vigny evokes. An art 
historian gives this account of the appearance of the new church fur­
nishing: 
L'histoire du Confessionnal débute ex abrupto avec l'époque que 
nous envisageons: elle n'a pas de préface médiévale. Jusqu'à la 
Réforme, le prêtre, assis dans une cathèdre ou dans une stalle du 
choeur, entendait les aveux du fidèle agenouillé devant lui ou à 
ses côtés; désormais, les deux interlocuteurs seront séparés par 
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des grilles ou par des panneaux ajourés. C'est au milieu du 
XVIième siècle qu'apparaît le meuble nouveau. (Fierens 28) 
The confessional is an architectural expression of the Counter-
Reformation's insistence upon the sacrament of penance, which had 
been attacked by Luther and other Protestants. Confession and its vo­
cal counterpart, preaching, were the twin disciplines by which the 
Church hoped to reestablish itself after the Reformation. The confes­
sional and the pulpit, or "chaire de vérité," were innovations of ba­
roque church architecture. In some churches an attempt was even 
made to unite them physically, in a single artistic composition. Such 
was the link between these two instruments of rhetorical conquest. 
Even today, contemplating an ornate baroque confessional or pulpit 
in a Jesuit-style church, one can almost hear the echoes of a sermon 
from the great age of sacred oratory: "Qu'est-ce donc que ma sub­
stance, ô grand Dieu? J'entre dans la vie pour en sortir bientôt" (Bos-
suet). Or perhaps this vision of Lazarist missionaries at work might 
suggest itself: "Ils prononcent leurs sermons les plus pathétiques le 
soir, à la lueur vacillante des flambeaux, invitant parfois la foule à 
crier 'Miséricorde!'" (Dompnier 209). Thus aroused by the sermon, the 
faithful are then led to the darkness and privacy of the confessional to 
declare their sins. The whole scene unfolds like a baroque painting, 
drawing its emotional effect from oppositions of light and darkness, 
public sermon followed by private confession. 
These pastoral techniques, typical of the seventeenth century, were 
the creation of new proselytizing orders like the Jesuits and Lazarists, 
imbued with the spirit of the Council of Trent (1545-63). Theologically, 
the council did little else but reaffirm long-standing Scholastic formu­
las and condemn Protestant departures from doctrine. The subject of 
confession was treated during the council's fourteenth session, and 
Scholastic terminology such as "matter and form" and ex opere operato 
was used to define the sacrament. Against Luther and other Protes­
tants who had declared auricular confession of human origin and re­
cent date, the council declared: "To anyone claiming that confession is 
not a necessary part of the sacrament of penance for the remission of 
sins, according to divine law . . . anathema sit" (Vacandard, 919, my 
translation). 
But pastorally, the council helped define a new style of religion fo­
cused upon the ascetic, the subjective, and the personal. It provided 
an impetus for the counterattack against the Reformation and drew 
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its strength from the quasi-military discipline of the Jesuits and the 
individualizing spirituality of the Oratory. Artistically, the council 
moved against the neopagan spirit of the Renaissance and inspired the 
baroque style of masters such as Rubens and Bernini, whose works 
owe much to the new spirituality. Bernini, for example, was an assidu­
ous practitioner of the Spiritual Exercises, and his paintings, like Loyo­
la's book, make a direct appeal to the sensibility and imagination of 
the Christian. In the words of Emile Mâle, the sublime, classicizing 
Church of the Renaissance gave way to one that was "ardente et pas­
sionnée qui connaît l'angoisse, la lutte, et le martyre" (9). Church art 
represented and fostered these exalted spiritual states. 
The role of confession in this reform within the Church was to refine 
the conscience and strengthen the bond between the priest and his 
community. As opposed to the Lateran Council, which simply re­
quired the sacrament annually, Trent asked for more detail: "Let each 
individual, after carefully examining and exploring all of the corners 
and folds of his conscience, confess his sins" (Session 14). Confession 
also became more frequent; leading spiritual authorities, like St. Fran­
çois de Sales, demanded weekly, and some writers even called for 
daily, confession. A new casuistry sprang up to guide confessors, and 
it too reflected a new relationship between the Church and the world: 
Après le concile de Trente, une nouvelle casuistique moins juri­
dique fleurira inspirée par un autre esprit. Le droit canon appor­
tant des réponses de moins en moins adéquates à des situations 
nouvelles nées de la transformation de la société. Les références 
se feront non plus seulement à des lois écrites mais aussi à une 
loi morale inscrite dans la conscience; se développera en même 
temps la notion des circonstances atténuantes. (Delumeau, Péché 224) 
The accent was upon developing an acute conscience capable of disci­
plining itself in the changing circumstances of the modern world. 
Heretofore the individual had looked to religious authorities to lay 
down what was right and wrong; now a more subtle and efficacious 
discipline converted the believer into his own inner lawgiver. 
Confession at this time also led to spiritual direction for an elite 
who, for the first time in the history of Christianity, were not exclu­
sively members of the clergy. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, 
the methodology of direction goes back to the Desert Fathers, but the 
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seventeenth century marks the period when these techniques were first 
introduced to the lay population at large. In his Introduction à la vie 
dévote (1608), St. François de Sales says that his intention is to instruct 
those who live "es villes, es ménages, en la cour, et qui par leur condi­
tion sont obligés de faire une vie commune quant à l'extérieur" {Oeu­
vres 23). He paraphrases St. Teresa of Avila and, before her, the Desert 
Fathers on the scarcity of good spiritual directors: "Choisissez-en un 
entre mille, dit Avila; et moi je dis entre dix mille" {Oeuvres 40). To the 
"dirigé(e)," the voice of the director comes directly from God: "Vous 
le devez écouter comme un Ange qui descend du ciel pour vous y 
mener. Traitez avec lui à coeur ouvert" {Oeuvres 39). "Dévotion," which 
is de Sales's new concept of a mysticism for all states of life, can im­
prove any human relation; the ideal husband, for example, is "confit 
au sucre de la dévotion, car l'homme sans dévotion est un animal sé­
vère, âpre et rude" {Oeuvres 239). 
The confessional, then, is the emblem par excellence of post-
Tridentine spirituality. Borrowing Fierens's phrase, we could say that 
the ex abrupto appearance of this device signals a qualitative and quan­
titative change in the mode of confession and, beyond that, a new con­
figuration of the self in the early modern world. The confessional is a 
monument to the age of spiritual direction, casuistry, the Jesuit-
Jansenist controversies, and the Inquisition. As an ecclesiastical artifact 
it represents the beginning of a new age in pastoral techniques when, 
as Foucault says, Western man became "une bête d'aveu." Like the 
baroque emblem, it is both image and language; its physical disposi­
tion and artistic decoration impose a new order of discourse on the 
practice of confession. 
The man who actually invented and promulgated the confessional 
was St. Charles Borromeo, prime mover at the Council of Trent and 
reforming bishop of Milan. Figure 5 shows a confessional bearing his 
statue alongside that of St. François de Sales, a fitting place for these 
two rivals in praise from the severe Arnauld: "II semble que Dieu avait 
donné des grâces particulières à M. de Genève pour conduire les 
bonnes âmes à la perfection de la vertu par la mortification de l'esprit, 
et à S. Charles pour ramener les grands pécheurs à la vertu, par la 
mortification de leur chair et de leurs sens" (522). The passage is from 
Arnauld's De la fréquente communion, in which the Jansenist theologian 
advocated a return to less frequent communion and severe penance 
involving suspended absolution. The inventor of the confessional is 
credited with chastening the flesh, and the popularizer of spiritual di­
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Figure 5. Confessional from church of St. John, Malines, Belgium, by Nicholas van 
der Verken, 1703. Depicted from left to right are St. Charles Borromeo, St. Roch, St. 
Augustine, and St. François de Sales. Reproduced with permission from the Institut 
Royal du Patrimoine Artistique, Brussels. 
rection is praised for mortifying the spirit. Arnauld interpreted the 
writings of de Sales and Borromeo in the most rigorist fashion possible, 
but it is interesting to note that confession and spiritual direction were 
essential to both the Jansenists and their "laxist" opponents, the Jesu­
its. All forms of Catholic spirituality paid homage to the figures carved 
into this Belgian confessional. 
Borromeo gives an exacting description of the confessional in his 
Instmctionum fabricae ecclesiasticae. So concerned was he with unifor­
mity that some editions of his book even contain a line drawn to the 
exact length of the cubit to be used in building the structure. Figure 6 
represents a model drawn to his exact specifications. Figure 7 shows 
a page from a French translation of his influential Instructions to 
Confessors. 
The author of the Instmctionum is concerned that the confessional 
should keep the sexes apart: "In every parish church two confessionals 
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Figure 6. Model of confessional drawn to Borromeo's specifications. From A. Serville, 
"De la construction et de l'ameublement des églises par S. Charles Borromée." Bulletin 
des métiers d'art 4 (1905): 360. 
should be set up so that men are not mixed with women or stand too 
close together" (67). The function of the crates, the small perforated 
window separating the priest and the penitent, is to limit all possible 
contact between the two. It is stipulated that "the perforations should 
be the size of peas. On the side of the confessor, a thin veil of serge 
cloth or linen should be hung in front of the window" (70). Until Trent, 
confession was a face-to-face affair, as can be seen in figure 8, which 
represents a scene from the late Middle Ages. There were some prece­
dents for Borromeo's box, however. Women were required to veil their 
faces when confessing in order to maintain propriety during a poten­
tially embarrassing moment for the penitent or a dangerous occasion 
of scandal for the priest. 
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Figure 7. Format for keeping account of parishioners from French translation of Bor­
romeos Instructions to Confessors. Reprinted with permission of the Yale Divinity 
School Library. 
Schlombs maintains that the probable origin of the crates was the 
grill that separated cloistered nuns from the outside world and that 
allowed their confessions to be heard by a priest. The illustration in 
figure 9 shows that, in this particular case, the grill served to divide a 
women's cloister from the men's. This underscores the confessional 
grill's signification as a barrier between the sexes. Christianity exalts 
the ideal of virginity, and some authorities even claim that sexual dif­
ference is a result of the Fall. As early as the fourth century, St. Atha­
nasius had said: "God's first intention was not that man be born out of 
marriage and corruption, but by the transgression of His command­
ment, Adam's iniquity led to the necessity of sexual union" (qtd. in 
Delumeau, Péché 333). From this perspective, desire itself is a result of 
the Fall, a punishment for the first act of disobedience. 
The confessional grill is emblematic of a peculiarly Christian dis­
course in which the opposite sex is unattainably other as a result of 
Original Sin. The confessional dramatizes the fact that the two sexes 
are divided and that discourse separates as it unites the lovers. Pen­
ance is the verbal acknowledgment of this state of fallen desire. This 
is implicit in Vigny's Cinq-Mars, where the lover's discourse in the con­
fessional consecrates an inseparable distance. 
In a concrete, historical sense, then, the confessional is a piece of the 
cloister in the world at large, and it served to generalize the core of 
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Figure 8. Woodcut depiction of confession by A. Vérard, 1486. Reprinted with permis­
sion of the Bibliothèque Nationale. 
cloister spirituality—confession and spiritual direction—with all its 
implications of an alienated, fallen, human sexuality that could only 
be transcended by a talking cure. 
But there is something peculiar and arresting about confessing to 
an unseen voice of authority. Separation of a female penitent from the 
priest is not the only ascetic connotation of the confessional, since men 
also confessed in this manner. H. C. Lea describes the confessional as 
"a box in which the confessor sits, with a grill in the side, through 
which the kneeling penitent can pour the story of his sins into his 
ghostly father's ear without either seeing the face of the other" (1:395). 
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Figure 9. Grill separating men's from women's cloister. From Wilhelm Schlombs, Die 
Entwicklung des Beichstuhls in der Katholischen Kirche. Diisseldorf: Schzvann, 
1965. 
The grill symbolizes the chaste separation of the sexes and the mortifi­
cation of the body, but it also institutes a strange conversation with a 
"ghostly father." As such, it is characteristic of a religion that was shift­
ing from a physical semiotics of the flesh toward a hidden spiritual 
reality, from an askesis of the body toward one of the soul 
This is evident if we consider the evolution of the grill itself within 
the symbolism of penance. Figure 10 is Cesare Ripa's allegorical repre­
sentation of "Penitenza." The accompanying commentary reads: "An 
exhausted woman, with emaciated face, melancholy and poor dress, 
looking very intently towards Heaven, and holding with both hands a 
grill ('una craticola') which is used as a sign of true penance by the 
holy Theologians, for as the grill stands between the thing being 
cooked and the fire, so penance is midway between the sinner's pains 
and the love of God which causes those pains." The allegory, the "soul 
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Figure 10. Allegorical figure of Penance from Ripa's Iconologia, 1611. Reprinted with 
permission of the British Library. 
of the Baroque," represents penance as an exhausted woman carrying 
a grill. The ascetic symbolization of the grill here is one of bodily morti­
fication, but it is a grill that punishes by signifying. It is not simply 
a tool for maceration but rather an instrument that separates the sin­
ner from God and transforms her suffering into a sign of God's love. 
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Penance is painful/pleasurable separation from God by means of a 
"sign." 
Borromeo's grill institutes the "ghostly" conversation; it is character­
istic of a spirituality that increasingly insists on the disposition of the 
soul and on language as the true means of mortification. Borromeo's 
grill puts a barrier between the Imaginary, face-to-face encounter be­
tween priest and penitent and reduces the encounter to the Symbolic.1 
Spiritual authors from this time often insist on the soul as the real 
object of mortification and not the body. The Jesuit Bourdaloue calls 
for a more refined sort of "severity" for the will and the passions, not 
just for the body, like the older sort of mortification represented by 
Ripa's illustration. Bourdaloue is much more impressed with a morti­
fication of the passions than with exterior asceticism: 
Voilà où la sévérité devroit être appliquée: à se comporter avec 
plus de ménagement, avec plus de condescendance, avec plus de 
retenue et plus de douceur, à prendre un empire absolu sur soi 
même, pour agir toujours selon la religion, selon la raison, et ja­
mais selon la passion. Voilà où la sévérité auroit à remporter de 
plus grandes victoires: Une passion à combattre lui donneroit mille 
fois plus de peine que toute autre mortification à pratiquer. 
(2:39, emphasis added) 
For the medieval regime of "la chair," we find substituted the world 
of "les passions," an intermediate realm, between the senses and the 
intellect, beneath the surface of the flesh, operating invisibly, expressed 
alternatively in physical and spiritual metaphors. Instead of Dante's 
system of differing punishments for groups of sinners, we have a new 
vision of Hell where a single punishment seeks out each individual 
sinner according to his passions. From a Lazarist sermon comes this 
passage: "Le feu infernal... saura distinguer la malice de chaque 
péché pour punir rigoureusement la partie du corps et la faculté de 
l'âme qui auront concouru à un plus grand péché, et leur fera ressentir 
une plus vive douleur qu'à celles qui n'ont pas été si criminelles.... Il 
distinguera un parricide d'avec un meurtre, un inceste d'avec un adult­
ère" (Delumeau, Péché 424). 
Descartes will propose a purely somatic description of the passions, 
but in literature they remain poetically imprecise. Sometimes they are 
clothed in classical allegories—Venus's spells or Cupid's arrows— 
sometimes they are represented physiologically as humors or 
86 THE AGE OF THE CONFESSIONAL 
elements. However represented, the Council of Trent had declared 
them "good in themselves." How to manage them is the constant con­
cern of all moralists writing at this period. 
The confessional, by its occultation of the physical body, sets up the 
interior combat against the unruly passions, and spiritual direction 
furnishes the verbal arms for gaining mastery over these forces and 
turning them toward their proper goal, as human eros is transformed 
into spiritual ecstasy: "Nous devons jouir des choses spirituelles et 
seulement user des corporelles" (243, emphasis added). St. François 
has employed a key word in the Lacanian vocabulary, and we are again 
invited to pursue analogies between spiritual direction and analysis. 
BAROQUE SPIRITUALITY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
This time the encounter is even easier to produce. Lacan himself has 
enthusiastically recognized his own image in baroque spirituality: 
"Mon discours participe du baroque" (Encore 102). Studying the spiri­
tual ecstasies of St. Teresa and other female mystics, he comes to the 
conclusion that their behavior is not to be explained simply as frus­
trated and displaced sexual gratification. Unlike Charcot and Freud, 
he doesn't think mystics, or hysterics for that matter, are women who 
could be "cured" and restored to psychological unity by recognition 
of their symptoms and a return to genital sexuality.2 One must not 
"ramener la mystique à des affaires de foutre. Si vous y regardez de 
près, ce n'est pas ça du tout" (Encore 71). Lacan is not a physiological 
positivist. According to Lacanian theory, human sexuality is based on 
symbolic exchange; there is no such thing as a purely harmonious sex­
ual act: "II n'y a pas de rapport sexuel" (Encore 14). The mystics are 
not examples of an aberrant sexuality; they are the female and, ulti­
mately, the human condition of desire. 
Rather than reduce the mystical experience to the physical, Lacan 
explores the tortured love of the mystics in search of a fuller under­
standing of human desire. Their mystical marriage to God, which is 
never consummated physically, is an image of what remains unsatis­
fied, "en plus," in human sexuality Beyond the specific love object, 
which Lacan designates as '"Vautre," there is another, unattainable 
Autre. This Other is the mark inscribed on all objects by the work of 
the unconscious, and for Lacan that work is essentially linguistic: the 
unconscious is structured like a language. Thus all human sexuality is 
"underwritten" by the impersonal, linguistic activity of the uncon­
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scious; there is no such thing as a purely somatic encounter between 
two lovers. Their union is mediated by a cultural code, and the true 
"object" they seek is a mosaic of unconscious images and socially pre­
ordained figures. Human sexuality is a form of communication for 
Lacan, and as such it exchanges absences as much as presences, signi­
fiers and never signifieds. 
In the baroque mystics and artists Lacan sees a kind of eroticism 
that illustrates the physical constrained by the semiotic. Like many 
others, he sees "jouissance" on the face of Bernini's St. Teresa, but she 
is not just a case of hysterical sexual gratification. Lacan remarks that 
all baroque art is "obscène," meaning that it blatantly exhibits the sex­
ual body, but also that actual intercourse is never represented, it re­
mains out of the picture, obscène. For Lacan, this illustrates the idea 
that sexuality is sustained by a relation to an Other, in abstraction to the 
other, and that this absence or "hole" is inscribed in sexuality by lan­
guage: "II y a là un trou, et ce trou s'appelle l'Autre en tant que lieu où la 
parole... fonde la vérité, et avec elle le pacte qui supplée à l'inexistence 
du rapport sexuel" (Encore 103). St. Teresa does "jouit des choses spiritu­
elles" (François de Sales, Oeuvres 243), not because her body is hysteri­
cally somatizing a sexual act, but because her soul is meditating on the 
words of the beloved yet impersonal and unconscious Other. 
Human love is essentially communicative, founded on a linguistic 
exchange that ceaselessly attempts to supplement the fundamental 
lack of rapport between the sexes. This is represented in the material 
we have examined so far by the cloistered separation of the sexes and 
especially by the lovers' rendezvous in the confessional in Vigny's 
novel. As Lancelot and Guinevere were separated by the sword in the 
forest, Cinq-Mars and Marie de Gonzague are separated by the confes­
sional grill, which represents language as barrier and bond between 
the couple. 
Lacan feels an affinity for the baroque mystics because they had 
discovered this truth about human love. But the extent of Lacan's belief 
in religion is that it insists on the truth of desire: "Vous allez être tous 
convaincus que je crois en Dieu. Je crois à la jouissance de la femme 
en tant qu'elle est en plus" (Encore 71). For Lacan, religion is a version 
of the truth about human desire; it even facilitates human sexuality by 
insisting on the presence of the Other. Lacan also reveals here the idea 
that this dimension of sexuality is historically associated with female 
desire. "La jouissance de la femme" is never satisfied; her sexuality is 
determined primarily as a lack of the Phallus. But the discourse of 
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female desire reveals the scandal that the male doesn't "have" the Phal­
lus either. It is a symbol, not an organ; it belongs to the Other. To 
paraphrase de Sales, "On ne peut jouir que spirituellement." 
Reading the spiritual directors of the seventeenth century does con­
firm Lacan's view that mystical discourse is cast in the metaphor of 
female desire. The soul of both man and woman aspires to be the 
"épouse du Fils de Dieu" (François de Sales, Oeuvres 244). The spiritual 
journey is a gender crossing that transcends the earthly phallic dichot­
omy. Man or woman adopts the "en plus," and the "obscene" of femi­
nine desire as a means of intuiting the highest form of spiritual love, 
the love to come at the end of history when the world is remade and 
human relations are made perfect. 
Lacan's reading of the baroque makes more evident the historical 
link between Christian confession and psychoanalysis, but what is 
missing from his recognition scene with the baroque is some commen­
tary about the most preanalytic phenomenon from this period: spiri­
tual direction. Lacan recognizes among the mystics his own theory of 
desire, but the applicability of his ideas to the baroque is upheld by a 
similar production of desire within both cultures. Both are marked by 
a theory of civilization as repression and a practice of confession. In 
each case, one observes the same principles at work: the coexistence 
of representations of civilization as repression (Arnauld's "mortifica­
tion de l'esprit" and "mortification de la chair," for example; Lacan's 
"non du Père") with the injunction to confess or obedience to the "fun­
damental rule." 
In both cultures, desire is an error and a disappointment, but an 
illusion that must be verbalized to produce a higher truth. In Christian­
ity this is the truth that human desire is but a weak allegory of divine 
love; in psychoanalysis it is, ultimately, knowledge of the Symbolic, 
insight into the signifying veil that covers the object of desire. In both 
cases the frustrating story of the impossible relation with the other 
leads to a vision of the Other. 
Both practices involve the intervention of an analyst whose herme­
neutics will deliver the unconscious truth back to the subject. The form 
of that intervention took a decisive turn toward the Symbolic and the 
linguistic with the invention of the confessional and has remained 
there since. Consider, for instance, the similarities between St. François 
de Sales's description of spiritual discourse and that of Freud's account 
of analysis: 
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II faut que nos paroles soient enflammées non pas par des cris et 
actions démesurées, mais par l'affection intérieure; il faut qu'elles 
sortent du coeur plus que de la bouche. On a beau dire, mais le 
coeur parle au coeur, la langue ne parle qu'aux oreilles. 
("Lettre" 321, emphasis added) 
[The analyst] must bend his own unconscious like a receptive 
organ towards the emerging unconscious of the patient, be as the 
receiver of the telephone to the disc. As the receiver transmutes 
the electric vibrations induced by the sound-waves back again 
into sound-waves, so is the physician's unconscious mind able 
to reconstruct the patient's unconscious, which has directed his 
associations, from the communications derived from it. (12:115) 
In both instances, direction and analysis, the interpersonal encounter 
is reduced to its purely verbal dimensions. Language itself is then so­
licited for a hidden meaning that appears almost intuitively and poeti­
cally to the analyst. In the chatter of "la langue," a deeper message 
emerges. 
In the seventeenth century, the confessional itself was emblematic 
of this reduction to the Symbolic. For Freud, the telephone was the 
proper metaphor. The analyst's unconscious acts as receiver; it decodes 
the patient's unintelligible signals into sound waves. With all Lacanian 
puns intended, analysis is a kind of "obscene" telephone call to the 
Other: two people, their faces hidden from one another, conduct a 
strange conversation whereby one vents his desires to the other, who, 
by his office, tries to identify the incognito caller at the other end of 
the line. From Borromeo's confessional, through Freud's telephone 
booth, to Lacan's commentary on St. Theresa runs a similar practice of 
discourse and desire. Both are tour à tour coercive and erotic. 
Behind the confessional looms the inquisitorial listener, but also an 
opportunistic jouisseur. Parallel to the emphasis on confession, there 
was also an erotic and comic exploitation of avowal. Mme de Longue­
ville, returning from confession, meets her lover, the author of the Let­
tres portuguaises. She says that "elle s'y serait bien ennuyée, si elle 
n'avait trouvé moyen d'y parler de lui" (Guilleragues 5). The lover, 
Guilleragues, is inspired by the incident to write "La Chanson du con­
fiteor," a parody of confession in which a betrayed mistress compla­
cently makes "l'aveu d'une passion qui fut toujours tendre et sincère, 
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etc" (6). The same Mme de Longueville had the poet Sarasin compose 
for her "Le Directeur," a mock letter of spiritual direction at the end of 
which "le faux directeur cède au véritable amant" (Sarasin 390). The 
story behind Vérard's illustration (fig. 8) concerns an adulterous wife 
confessing to her husband disguised as a priest. Later illustrations of 
the tale make use of the confessional to enhance the disguise. Sade 
puts Justine in the confessional to stage his complex transgressions: 
"Ainsi il entend la confession de sa fille et il voit son cul tout à la fois" 
(qtd. in Barthes, Sade 149). 
Judging from contemporary events, our pleasures and pains are still 
in the age of the confessional and its electronic equivalent.3 In our 
culture people pay to receive obscene phone calls and to confess to 
answering machines.4 
THE VOCABULARY OF CONFESSIONAL DISCOURSE 
The secularization of confessional discourse led to the development of 
a new term to cover all the various kinds of sacred and profane con­
fessing that went on. The new term, which bore all of these meanings 
during the seventeenth century, was the word "aveu." One can get a 
sense of the semantic evolution of the word by comparing its feudal 
meaning, which Perrot describes in his Institutions publiques et privées 
de France, with the meanings from Furetière's seventeenth-century Dic­
tionnaire universel. 
L'INVESTITURE. De suite après le port de foi et d'hommage, le 
seigneur "relevait" l'homme agenouillé devant lui, l'avouait pour 
son vassal, lui donnnait sur la bouche le baiser de paix et lui 
remettait le fièf. (Perrot 214, emphasis added) 
ADVOUER. Reconnaître la vérité. Il faut advouer que la Provi­
dence divine est merveilleuse. 
Signifie encore en matière de dettes et de crimes, confesser, 
reconnaître sa faute. Ce criminel a tout advoué à la question. 
SE CONFESSER. Signifie, déclarer à un Prestre ses péchez, à des-
sin d'en recevoir l'absolution. On dit en ce sens qu'un péché con­
fessé est à demi pardonné. (Furetière) 
The oldest meaning of "avouer" refers to the feudal ceremony in 
which the vassal pledged faith to his lord and took possession of his 
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fief. During the seventeenth century the word came to mean "reconnaî­
tre la vérité." So the word itself shifted in meaning from an objective 
verification process whereby someone was vouched for by a superior, 
to a subjective process in which one established the truth about oneself. 
This evolution is suggestive of the change from a feudal society, in 
which identity was conferred by another, to the classical age, in which 
the individual mind became the custodian of truth. 
These definitions also make it clear that the word "avouer" can 
mean either sacred or profane discourse, whereas "se confesser" has 
a narrow religious meaning. "Aveu" is the more neutral term appro­
priate for legal, philosophical, medical, and amorous confessions.5 
Legally, avowal replaced proof by ordeal and oath toward the end 
of the thirteenth century. The new legal procedure (inquisitio) was di­
rected toward confession as the ultimate form of proof: "Tous les ef­
forts de l'instruction tendirent à obtenir de l'inculpé un aveu qui 
simplifiait tout" (Perrot 515). These techniques were borrowed by secu­
lar courts from the courts of the Inquisition and the Dominican order, 
which had pioneered them in the struggle against heresy In the secular 
and ecclesiastical courts, avowal and submission to "la question" con­
tinued to be the cornerstone of justice. The burden of proof rested 
upon the accused, who could either prove the charges by confessing 
or effectively disculpate himself by surviving the torture and refusing 
to confess. If he was convicted, his punishment involved a final pub­
lic confession. 
Before the Inquisition, this involved the notorious auto-da-fé, where 
the convicted heretic, freethinker, or sexual deviant was given one last 
chance to confess and recant and thus be spared or, if a recidivist, at 
least strangled before being burned. In the secular courts, a capital 
offense was punished by a public "supplice" and the "amende honor­
able" in which the condemned man confessed and proclaimed his 
crime. The three aspects of a trial—preliminary "question," "amende 
honorable," and "supplice"—complemented each other. They all 
raised the subject to a position of absolute verifier of the accusation, 
and they compelled him to verbalize this truth, first in private while 
undergoing "la question," next in public both verbally and physically. 
As Michel Foucault explains, the significance of this spectacle is that it 
"publie la vérité du crime dans le corps même du supplicié" (Surveiller 
59). All of this was considered an edifying spectacle for the general 
public and, more important, for the king and his court. As the illustra­
tion shows (fig. 11), the auto-da-fé was an important display of royal 
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Figure 11. Auto-da-fé in Madrid. From Elias Amezaga, Auto-da-fe en Valladolid. 
Buenos Aires: Graficas Ellacuria, 1966. 
power. The same could be said of the "supplice," where the king was 
always present, at least symbolically, as a witness to the criminal's 
avowal and punishment. 
It is important to bear in mind these juridical scenes of avowal and 
torture when we encounter the words "aveu" and "supplice" in litera­
ture. As we saw in Vigny's passage, the lover's avowal has meaning on 
several levels; it is spiritual, sexual, and political. The importance of 
avowal was derived from confession, but the practice soon invaded 
almost every important intersubjective relationship—hence Michelet's 
irritation that he can hardly distinguish between the language of love 
and that of spiritual direction: "Si vous écoutiez, témoin invisible, la 
conversation des belles ruelles, vous ne sauriez pas toujours distinguer 
qui parle, de l'amant ou du directeur" (Du Prêtre 69). Whether in the 
whispered discourse of lovers and spiritual directors or in the terrible 
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sentences of inquisitors, one finds the same vocabulary of confession, 
and the same paradigm of the confessing subject announcing his truth: 
"L'aveu est un rituel de discours où le sujet qui parle coïncide avec 
le sujet de l'énoncé'' (Foucault, Surveiller 51). As we have seen, the 
confessional is the model for a phenomenological reduction of the self 
to a "sujet qui parle." 
It is characteristic of a century that made some of its strongest state­
ments in the first person. From Descartes's "cogito" to Louis XIV's pu­
tative "L'Etat, c'est moi," the classical age invested heavily in the ideal 
of an introspective subject capable of reaching indubitable truths and 
speaking them in the first person. The paradox of this total wager on 
the subject's ability to perceive the truth and represent the state was 
that, ironically, it creates a fragile subject at once omnipotent but en­
dangered. Descartes's subject is threatened by the possibility of total 
delusion if the "malin génie" exists, and the monarchical self is main­
tained only by the machinery of Versailles, which enslaves Louis as 
much as it assures his power. Perhaps this explains the modernist inter­
est in the classical self: it is a distant parable of the blindness and in­
sight, the force and the impotence, of the ego. 
The power and the veracity of confession were also enhanced by the 
fact that, as Foucault says, it was a "rituel de discours." In law, in reli­
gion, and in the code of love, it was a solemn speech act.61 will now 
make some observations about how and why this ritual was woven 
into the fabric of society in seventeenth-century France. 
CONFESSION AND COURT SOCIETY 
The use of confessional discourse did not spread uniformly through­
out society in the seventeenth century. As a religious practice, frequent 
confession and spiritual direction were more widespread among the 
privileged. The masses were reluctantly led to make summary annual 
confessions to the parish priest. The bourgeois, and especially their 
wives, preferred more frequent appointments with mendicant confes­
sors; princes and kings had their own private directors for confession 
at will. The mystical renewal in France, with its emphasis on spiritual 
direction, took place chiefly in aristocratic circles in Paris. The litera­
ture of avowal we will be studying was also written for aristocrats and 
reflected their consciousness. So far, I have stressed the importance 
of the Counter-Reformation and the monastic model in the spread of 
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confession to all aspects of human life. What needs to be examined 
now is how confession became an integral part of elite culture during 
the classical age. 
The myths and pageantry of divine right monarchy were pro­
foundly Catholic—the anointing of the king, the idea that the nation 
was embodied in the king's mystical body the sacrificial ideal, all of 
those rituals which were founded on the notion of "le roi-prêtre."7 But 
the reality of political relations hardly conformed to these images. 
Norbert Elias tells us that the strategy of the absolutist ruler is to di­
vide, not to unify, his subjects: "The observation of tensions and dis­
cord between his subjects is especially important to a conserving king 
in the situation of Louis XIV. The unification of his subjects threatened 
the king's existence." Elias then cites a passage from Louis's advice to 
his son that shows that the king was perfectly aware of the need to 
disunify his subjects: "You must divide your confidence among sev­
eral. The jealousy of one holds the ambition of the others in check" 
(Court Society 129). 
In addition to this deliberately maintained division, the court aris­
tocracy was subject to an erosion of their financial and military power. 
They had contempt for money matters and did not understand the 
dynamics of the new bourgeois order. Their fortunes were based on 
land rent and agricultural production, both of which were poor invest­
ments in a mercantilist economy. Advances in technology and merce­
nary armies made their military services less and less important. From 
Richelieu onward, it was royal policy to disarm the nobles and destroy 
their fortifications. More and more the aristocrat was cut off from the 
base of his "natural" sense of superiority over other men. Far from his 
ancestral land, no longer a soldier by trade, his whole sense of worth 
would be won or lost at court. 
According to Elias, the Frankfurt school historian of "court society" 
(hofische Gesellschaft), this political system is based on personal relations. 
The courtier must endlessly cultivate personal contacts at court to fur­
ther his career. All aspects of his public and private life are caught up 
in his personal intrigues. There is no absolute division between his 
professional and private life in the modern sense of the word. He lives 
in the king's household at Versailles; his position or rank at court is 
dramatized by his part in the complicated etiquette revolving around 
the king's daily activities. The highest ranking courtiers are admitted 
to the royal "lever"; others have ceremonial titles associated with the 
king's hunting, his eating, his "garde-robe, etc." The meaning of this 
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elaborate etiquette is not the personal vanity of the king; rather, it is a 
way to enslave the powerful aristocrats by making them completely 
beholden to the king. The nobility are carefully arranged according to 
a subtle hierarchy controlled by the king. The system is an attempt to 
organize rationally a potentially dangerous opposition into carefully 
balanced factions. 
The mentality this structure fosters is that of the reserved social 
actor capable at all times of concealing his true motives and mastering 
his impulses. Elias has studied in detail how court society gave rise to 
a whole array of restraints associated with "civilized" behavior. It was 
at the princely courts of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
Europe that table manners, toilet etiquette, modesty regarding sexual 
conduct, and the notions of the "bienséances" were developed. In an 
apparent paradox, the dominant class of society imposed the strictest 
norms of "autoconstraint" on itself instead of enforcing this repressive 
model on the masses. Restraint is thus an elite conduct, a tactic the 
upper class uses to manage its own sexuality, not repress the prole­
tariat. 
In some sense, for Elias, the courtiers are pre-Victorians, passing on 
their repressive model of civilization to the bourgeoisie, who devel­
oped an even stricter regime of public restraint and private emotional 
life. Elias sees present-day society as one where "hommes et femmes 
sont assurés que de fortes autocontraintes et des règles strictes de 
savoir-vivre limitent l'initiative des individus" (272). We have inherited 
the courtly heritage of restraint. But as we shall see, and in keeping 
with a major theme of this study, the courtly ethic is heavily influenced 
by confession; repression is only half of the picture. The courtiers are 
our ancestors, but they were confessed, not repressed. 
Despite his theme of "autocontrainte," Elias does mention confes­
sion and confidentiality in his study of court society. On one level, 
confession is a dangerous practice: to reveal one's secrets or weak­
nesses to another is potentially suicidal. The accomplished courtier is 
a master of dissimulation, as evinced by La Bruyère's description of 
the man at court: "Un homme qui sait la cour est maître de son geste, 
de ses yeux et de son visage; il est profond, impénétrable; il dissimule 
les mauvais offices, sourit à ses ennemis, contraint son humeur, dé­
guise ses passions, dément son coeur, parle, agit contre ses senti­
ments" (221). 
But, paradoxically, the best training for dissimulation was to prac­
tice a form of self-observation. "Just as he [the courtier] is forced to 
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seek the true motives of others behind their controlled outward behav­
ior, just as he is lost if he is unable to unmask the affects and interests 
of his rivals behind their dispassionate facade, he must know his own 
passions if he is to conceal them effectively" (Elias, Court Society 105). 
The difficulty was to find a reliable "confident" with whom one could 
be frank and trust one's secrets. 
But beyond this strategic use of confession as a means of training 
in dissimulation, court society produced a longing for moments of true 
sincerity. Religious confession presented itself as a haven from the con­
tinual falsehood of secular life and as a reprieve from the dire conse­
quences of confession in the world. Bourdaloue makes this distinction 
between the jeopardy of worldly confession and the benefit of religious 
confession: "Dans la justice des hommes, la procédure est bien diffé­
rente: ils ne punissent que ce que l'on découvre; mais dans la justice 
divine, il n'y a de châtiment et de punition que pour ce que l'on 
cache" (2:125). 
The confessional should be added to the list of "refuges de l'inti­
mité" which Orest Ranum discusses in the Histoire de la vie privée as the 
obverse of the oppressive publicity of court life (211-65).8 Like the al­
cove, the ruelle, and the garden, the confessional was a private space 
where one could put down the social mask and reveal the "true" self. 
These private spaces are thus paradoxical by-products of court society, 
and they receive their potential truth value from the prevailing stan­
dard of false appearances. In a society whose "professional" ethic was 
emotional masking and the suppression of spontaneity, the passions 
retreat to these private domains. 
In addition to confession in the strictly religious sense, court society 
engendered a practice of guidance that closely resembles spiritual di­
rection. La Rochefoucauld, whose links with Augustinian spirituality 
have been documented by Lafond, constantly denounces dissimula­
tion in his Maximes and describes an ideal relation based on sincerity 
and confidentiality and founded on the same sort of truth obligations 
as confession: "La sincérité est une ouverture du coeur, qui nous mon­
tre tels que nous sommes; c'est un amour de la vérité, une répugnance 
à se déguiser, un désir de se dédommager de ses défauts, et de les 
diminuer même par le mérite de les avouer" (116). This is the same 
verbal rapport, expressed in the same terms, which de Sales recom­
mends that Philotée strive for when she speaks to her spiritual direc­
tor: "Traitez avec lui à coeur ouvert.... Le grand remède contre toutes 
tentations grandes ou petites, c'est de déployer son coeur et de com­
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muniquer les suggestions, ressentiments et affections que nous avons 
à notre directeur" (39, 266). The remedy for the constraints and false­
hoods of social life is a behind-the-scenes, heart-to-heart conversation, 
a private verbalization of one's faults. La Rochefoucauld says that by 
this sort of lay confession, "nous nous assujettissons volontairement," 
and that one who hears such secrets is bound by a law of secrecy much 
like a priest. 
Thus confessional discourse, in either its religious or secular form, 
had a particular meaning in court society It was the offstage voice, the 
private confidence of the player in the court drama. It was one-half of 
a duplicitous, double-talking self, the "tout-dire" side of the repressed 
"rien-dire" public self. St. François de Sales expresses both halves 
of this double injunction. Public discourse consists of "paroles nettes, 
civiles et pudiques. Quant aux choses indécentes et folles, l'Apôtre ne 
veut pas seulement qu'on les nomme" (Oeuvres 206); but to the confes­
sor, as we have already seen, one must "déployer son coeur." 
The overall picture of court society that emerges with this double 
injunction is thus difficult to reconcile with a purely repressive model 
of civilization. For Elias, confession can be viewed as part of the civiliz­
ing tendency toward "autoconstraint," but I prefer Foucault's insis­
tence on the difference between confession and repression. Society 
does not proceed simply by exclusion and censuring; that defines only 
the negative, juridical aspect of morality. The other half of socialization 
is the command to verbalize one's feelings. If we sought a succinct 
word to summarize this aspect of the civilizing process, perhaps the 
technical term for the confessional secret, sigillum, would offer some 
possibilities. It literally means "seal"; the secrets of confession are cov­
ered by a seal of secrecy. But a seal is a sign as well, a paradoxical sign 
that signifies silence. Society proceeds against the passions by repres­
sion, but also by sigillum—obliged verbalization followed by a sign 
of silence. 
This new perspective allows one to evaluate all the positive, solici­
tous aspects of a civilization which bind men to particular power struc­
tures. Any discursive system like psychoanalysis or confession in some 
sense spreads the disease it promises to cure. Practices of avowal are 
apprenticeships in a language of the passions; they teach the subject 
to reconstruct his or her experiences according to a certain vocabulary, 
and they bind one to those expert in that vocabulary. The very idea of 
the "passions" had to be invented and inculcated by moralists in order 
for it to be lived, transgressed, and avowed. "La passion" was a disease 
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that could only be caught and enunciated in aristocratic circles. We 
have only to think of scenes from Molière in which uninitiated women 
like Charlotte (Dom Juan) or Agnès (L'Ecole des femmes) encounter aris­
tocratie seducers and have trouble comprehending the language and 
strange rituals of "Messieus-là les courtisans." Charlotte wavers be­
tween too literal and too suspicious a reading of Dom Juan's flowery 
declarations, and Agnès must be taught the language of passion before 
she can relate to men—and as if to illustrate the continuity of religious 
discourse and secular gallantry, Molière makes Arnolphe's religious 
examination of Agnès's conscience the occasion of her avowal of love 
for Horace. 
In similar fashion, La Princesse de Clèves shows how passion and 
avowal are related to court experience. The disease is first caught at 
court: "Ainsi il y avait une sorte d'agitation sans désordre dans cette 
cour, qui la rendait très agréable, mais aussi très dangereuse pour une 
jeune personne" (Lafayette 45). The only way the princess envisages 
controlling her adulterous desire is either to follow her mother's death­
bed advice, "retirez-vous de la cour," or to confess her crime to her 
own husband. The shock value of the ending comes from the fact that, 
unlike most courtly lovers, she does not hide her passion and manage 
it by confiding in an "amie intime" but breaks out of the cycle of 
courtly love by confessing directly to her husband. 
SIGNS OF CONTRADICTION 
Historically, the seventeenth century has not yet come to the moment 
when the private self will be set forth as the only authentic self and a 
new form of social organization, based on a community of such selves, 
will be demanded—that is the work of Rousseau—but tensions be­
tween the two selves are already apparent. The severest moral critics 
of court society, the Jansenists, reserved the relation with God entirely 
for the private, hidden self; the Christian "should lead a life like the 
others in appearance, but as different from theirs in spirit as the Son 
of God is from his creatures" (St. Cyran, qtd. in Viner 137). The political 
world is left intact, abandoned to its own wickedness, while the private 
self leads an unapparent life of grace. 
The possibility of strife between the public court sphere and the 
private confessing self is apparent in the story behind Crespi's illustra­
tion of the sacrament of penance (fig. 12). The painting represents St. 
John Nepomuc, a recently canonized saint who had been confessor to 
Figure 12. Giuseppe Maria Crespi, St. John Nepomuc Confessing, Turin, Pinaco­
teca, 1743. Reprinted with permission of Art Resource, New York. 
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the queen of Bohemia. He could be called the martyr of sigillum be­
cause he was put to death in 1383 for failing to reveal to the king the 
content of the queen's confession.9 He remained an obscure figure until 
the seventeenth century, when his canonization was advanced by the 
Jesuits, themselves confessors to half the courts of Europe. 
The painting is of course anachronistic, since the confessional did 
not exist in 1383, but it serves well to illustrate the tensions of confes­
sion in court society. We see the separation by the grill. At the focal 
point of the painting, the disproportionately large ear of the saint is 
visible. The symbolism is enhanced by the fact that the ear actually 
hearing the confession is hidden from representation. The painting 
performs a sort of visual sigillum, both revealing and effacing the secret 
discourse of confession, suggesting a hiatus between the visual do­
main and the spiritual, verbal order. 
PROSCENIUM AND CONFESSIONAL 
All use the proscenium arch to serve as a fourth wall 
behind which the actors are required to behave naturally 
and unselfconsciously as if no audience were present. 
J. S. STREET 
. . . que chacun de ceux qui y parleraient fût présumé y 
parler avec le même secret que s'il était dans sa chambre. 
CORNEILLE, Discours des trois unités 
Roughly contemporaneous with the introduction of the confessional 
in France, another spatial innovation was being imported from Italy: 
the perspectivist theatrical setting. The multiple "mansions" of the me­
dieval theater were replaced by a single scene in order to enforce the 
rule of "unité de lieu," and trompe l'oeil settings were used to create 
the illusion that the action of the play was transpiring in a unified, 
realistic space. The conventional backdrop consisted of the columns, 
grottoes, and rooms of a temple or palace. The use of a stage curtain 
to be raised at the beginning of the spectacle and lowered at the end 
also appeared during the second and third decades of the seven­
teenth century. 
The result of these changes was to raise a barrier between spectator 
and spectacle. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, "there 
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was no formalized separation between performers and public" (Mitt­
man 1). The presence of off-duty actors or spectators invading the stage 
did not compromise medieval and Renaissance theatricality. Medieval 
religious drama made no attempt to be a realistic portrayal of earthly 
life; its simultaneous representation of temporal and eternal reality 
sought to raise spectator and spectacle to a transcendent reality Re­
naissance drama promoted the idea that theater and world were one: 
"all the world's a stage" as Shakespeare's melancholy Jacques pro­
claims. The mark of classical drama is its insistence on the autonomy 
of the dramatic space; the reality of the real world and the theatricality 
of the dramatic world are both founded on a strict separation of 
the two. 
Corneille says the spectator views the action as though hidden be­
hind a wall. He or she occupies the same voyeuristic position as that 
of Vigny's Père Joseph, able to observe the characters as they move 
from the "chambre" to the "palais," as they act both on and off the 
stage of court society. The new theatrical dispositif is able to represent 
simultaneously the space of "civilité" and that of "intimité." These are 
the two spaces that Roger Chartier identifies in the Histoire de la vie 
privée as being the twin aspects of daily life at court: 
L'espace gouverné par la civilité est celui de l'existence collective, 
de la sociabilité distinctive de la cour et des salons, ou bien du 
rituel social en son entier dont les normes obligées doivent con­
traindre tous les individus, quelle que soit leur condition. A l'in­
verse, l'intimité exige des lieux retranchés, des espaces séparés 
ou trouver solitude, secret, silence. Le jardin, la chambre—mais 
plus encore l'alcove et la ruelle—l'étude et le cabinet offrent de 
telles retraites qui, tout ensemble, cachent ce qui ne doit ou ne 
peut plus être montré (les soins du corps, les fonctions naturelles, 
les gestes de l'amour) et abritent des pratiques associées plus 
qu'auparavant à l'isolement: ainsi la prière ou la lecture. (165) 
In the same volume, J.-M. Goulemot seems to identify the classical 
stage exclusively with the space and the norms of "civilité." He sees 
the "bienséances" and the tendency toward abstract, universal repre­
sentation as expressions of the same repressive code that governs pub­
lic court behavior: "C'est d'abord le processus d'occultation du privé 
et de l'intime qui définit l'âge classique. Qu'il s'agisse de la poésie 
lyrique ou du théâtre, le mouvement est le même" (380). 
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I would see this as only half of the picture. In the passage I cited 
from the Discours, Corneille specifically uses the words "secret" and 
"chambre," a clear indication that by means of the convention of the 
fourth wall he hoped to analyze his characters in their "intimité." I 
would grant that the civil ethic of court society is never entirely aban­
doned; the plays were public spectacles and as such governed by the 
rules of decorum. Despite the fiction of privacy being invaded, the 
characters maintain almost the same level of dignity as they show in 
public. But too much attention is paid to the repressive aspect of the 
bienséances. Their real effect is to legitimize the discourse of desire. 
They are only a detour, a protocol to be observed in the ever-increasing 
loquacity of the passions in the West. As part of the civilizing process, 
their function is not to silence desire but to orchestrate its expression 
and management. 
Failure to understand the bienséances in this light leads Goulemot to 
characterize the classical stage as a "rituel distant et glacé" (383). One 
is immediately reminded of Phèdre's words: "Je sentis tout mon corps 
et transir et brûler." Court behavior is marked by distance, verbal re­
straint, and even coldness, but these are signs of a new, mediated 
erotic, not the triumph of repression. There is a tension between re­
fined speech and underlying passion which it is impossible to charac­
terize uni vocally as either moral or erotic. 
Formally, the new theatrical device was thus admirably suited to 
psychological investigation. An increasingly dignified audience raises 
the level of taste from vulgar farce or baroque showiness to a more 
serious plane. An aristocratic audience sees its class destiny played out 
before it in the drama of love and duty to the state. There is an increas­
ing sobriety in both decor and theme, and words carry more of the 
meaning than visual display. There is more subjective probing in the 
plays of Corneille, Racine, and Molière than in the typical Renaissance 
drama. Jacques Truchet admirably sums up the interiorizing tendency 
in the new tragedy of the 1640s: 
La nouvelle tragédie s'intéresse aux causes des événements, aux 
mobiles profonds des actes. D'où l'importance de la délibération 
dans ce théâtre, et de l'analyse. Au lieu d'exhiber lyriquement ou 
frénétiquement leur amour, leur espoir, leur haine ou leur colère, 
ces personnages s'interrogent sur eux-mêmes, cherchant à cerner 
la vérité de leur être. C'est par exemple Auguste analysant son 
attitude face à son propre pouvoir, à son devoir, à son projet hé­
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roïque, c'est Pauline faisant un admirable effort de lucidité pour 
voir clair dans son coeur. (135) 
As we will see, confessional scenes are a key element in this new the­
ater, and, if it is not stretching analogies too far, I would see equiva­
lences between the confessional and the proscenium. It is well 
documented, by Bray among others, that Counter-Reformation Italy 
was the inspiration for many of the precepts of French classicism. I am 
not proposing anything like a direct influence of religious architectural 
innovations on literature, but rather a suggestive coincidence, similar 
discourses and similar spatial dispositions for staging interiority in the 
seventeenth century. 
A final structural parallel between the confessional and the prosce­
nium concerns the unseen, Other destinataire. Both confessional and 
proscenium create the hidden spectator. The audience, like the confes­
sor or the analyst, is outside the communicational network. To be more 
precise, the audience occupies the impersonal place suggested by the 
real analyst; the classical audience is totally beyond the dialogue of the 
acting subjects. The analyst and the confessor, by hiding their faces, 
seek to invoke the presence of the Other who overhears their conversa­
tion. The hidden priest represents an invisible God, and the invisible 
analyst dramatizes the presence of the Symbolic order. 
The classical stage becomes less and less a visual spectacle as the 
century advances; it insists more and more on the text of human inter­
actions. It asks the question whether the truths of the heart can be 
known: "Vous ne savez pas lire au fond de mon coeur," Phèdre com­
plains to Hippolyte. As a subject she remains misunderstood by others 
and by herself. Can her enigma be resolved from within the play—by 
Oenone, or Hippolyte, or Thésée—or only from without, by an Other? 
Can her desire be addressed to anyone except the obscene spectator? 
3 
A COEUR OUVERT: HEROIC 
AVOWAL IN CORNEILLE 
Pauline a l'âme noble et parle à coeur ouvert.

POLYEUCTE

Entre, entre à son exemple au cabinet du coeur ..

L'IMITATION DE JESUS CHRIST

Corneille was educated by Jesuits and remained in close contact with 
his masters of the Collège de Rouen throughout his life. His nephew, 
Fontenelle, in his "Vie de Corneille/' says of him: "II a eu souvent be­
soin d'être rassuré par des casuistes sur ses pièces de théâtre" (25). 
Corneille himself seems to substantiate this image of an artist seeking 
the approval of religious authorities by his claim in the preface to Attila 
that he submits all of his work "à la censure des puissances tant ecclési­
astiques que séculières, sous lesquelles Dieu me fait vivre" (712).1 
Recently, Marc Fumaroli has studied in detail the lifelong moral and 
literary collaboration between Corneille and one of his teachers, Père 
Delidel, author of the anti-Jansenist Théologie des saints. Published in 
1668, the book is prefaced by an "Ode au P. Delidel" in which Corneille 
credits the "savant et pieux écrivain" with his own artistic genesis and 
states his desire to follow his mentor's spiritual lesson. By prefacing 
this theological tract, Corneille was clearly siding with the Jesuits in 
their dispute with the Jansenists over the question of grace. In a more 
self-serving vein, he was also lining up against the persecutors of the 
theater. At the time of the "Ode," the poet had already replied to 
Nicole's antitheatrical Traité de la comédie by taking the position, in the 
preface to Attila, that his own theater was capable of purging any 
wicked passion it might arouse. So on the questions of grace and the 
theater, Corneille took a "Jesuit" position. These public stances are 
signs of a deeper debt of Corneille to his teachers, conscious declara­
tions pointing toward unconscious, structural affinities between 
teacher and pupil. 
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Corneille's first experience of the theater was the Latin school plays 
staged by his teachers in Rouen. In these productions, the myths of 
classical antiquity became vehicles for Jesuit morality. Syncretism and 
interpretive ingenuity allowed the Christian humanists of Corneille's 
age to read spiritual allegories into ostensibly pagan stories. Thus, as 
Père Rotrou explains, "Les furies d'Oreste, la roue d'lxion, etc.... ne 
furent jamais autre chose que le remords d'une mauvaise conscience" 
(qtd. in Rivaille 473). This same interpretation turns up in an early play 
of Corneille's. A similar eclectic attitude toward pagan culture can be 
found in the writings of Racine, who, interestingly enough, finds refer­
ences to confession and attrition in Plutarch and Plato (2:1141 ).2 
André Stegmann has called the Jesuit neo-Latin theater "Cornélien 
avant la lettre" in its emphasis on moral conflict and its similar choice 
of historical subject matter. He explains how Jesuit spirituality was 
adapted to the school plays: "L'ascèse toute spirituelle de St. Ignace est 
transposée en ascèse héroïque. L'individu accepte de se sacrifier à un 
ordre spirituel ou politique, préférable à son bonheur ou intérêt per­
sonnel" (Héroïsme 56). An ambivalent, secularized version of Ignatian 
asceticism and sacrifice can also be found in Corneille's theater: 
Rodrigue sacrifices love to family honor; Horace transcends friendship, 
family, and even personal honor for Rome; Auguste learns to accept 
the ingratitude of friends and the solitude of power and forgives his 
enemies for the good of the state. Polyeucte carries the ascetic pattern 
to its logical conclusion by sacrificing all human values to his faith. 
Psychologically, Corneille's conception of heroism owes much to the 
asceticism of the new spirituality; his theater focuses less on the violent 
"geste" and more on the inner battles of heroic consciousness. The 
violent scenes of heroic action are kept off stage as much for formal 
reasons as for decorum. His subject is heroism in the first person, the 
discursive probing of the self, the moment before words give way to 
mute, ambiguous actions. 
In the light of Lacan's interpretation of baroque spirituality, Steg­
mann's "ascèse héroïque" also suggests that asceticism in general and 
confession in particular can be understood as a certain historical form 
of the erotic. There is a sort of heroic jouissance that the protagonist 
derives from triumph over the self and verbal acknowledgment of the 
loss of the object. Confession situates the subject in the simultaneous 
enunciation and suspension of desire. Faced with the loss of the object, 
the hero's heart swells with the same sort of ascetic pleasure that Lacan 
sees on the face of Bernini's St. Theresa. 
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For Lacan, the mystics reveal the truth of human desire: the provi­
sional obstacle to desire is permanent; the apparently external impedi­
ment represents a permanent interior distance between the subject and 
the object of his desire; jouissance comes from a rapport with the Other. 
For me, the confessional is the historical figure of this specifically West­
ern and Christian experience of desire. It stages desire as a strange 
open-ended conversation with an unseen third party, and it inscribes 
the subject in a network of pastoral power. 
This interpretation of the meaning of asceticism as, not the simple 
destruction of the passions, but their verbal revelation followed by 
masochistic pleasure puts me in the camp of those who emphasize 
libido and energy, not dispassionate reason, in Corneille. Octave Nadal 
is on the right track when he says: "C'est la sensibilité qui, chez Cor­
neille, met l'homme debout, rassemble les activités spirituelles, les 
bande et les oriente" (22). The Cornelian ethic has more to do with the 
post-Tridentine appeal to the passions than with Stoic ataraxia. 
A first look at a famous scene from Le Cid illustrates this idea of 
passion and asceticism. The love of Rodrigue and Chimène rises to a 
poetic pitch during the chamber scene when they are apparently lost to 
each other. Never is Rodrigue so crushed by despair at the inseparable 
distance between himself and Chimène; he invites death at her hand: 
"Le coup m'en sera doux"; yet never is he so insolent and full of defiant 
energy (936). He shows Chimène the sword with which he has killed 
her father; there is no possibility for the present that the two lovers 
could be reconciled. Yet out of this scene of mutual asceticism— 
avowal on the part of Chimène and an implicit penance by Rodrigue, 
who seeks punishment for his crime—the lovers draw a passionate 
energy that will sustain them. 
Corneille's contemporaries were shocked and excited by this scene; 
in the Examen of the play, the author notes: "II s'élevait un certain fré­
missement dans l'assemblée, qui marquait une curiosité merveilleuse 
et un redoublement d'attention." It is one of the most erotic moments 
in his theater because of the juxtaposition of the forbidden presence of 
Rodrigue in Chimène's apartment and the rhetorical restraint exercised 
by the two characters. Chimène and Rodrigue perform an ascetic duet 
that consecrates their physical separation but accomplishes something 
analogous to the heart-to-heart mystical union. Acknowledgment of 
the Other, the mise en discours of desire, is what is erotic, not just physi­
cal intimacy. 
The subject of this study is the role of confession in this process, 
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and accordingly, I wish to examine further the links between our au­
thor and the main currents of confessional practices in his day. Of par­
ticular interest to us, in the general current of Jesuit influence upon 
Corneille, is the Jesuit attitude toward confession. Jesuit moral teach­
ing was based on what Louis Rivaille calls a "culture de la volonté" 
(468). Inspired by Molina's confidence in "libre arbitre," Jesuit educa­
tors sought to inculcate a strong will and deliberative habits on the part 
of their students by means of "sermons, allocutions de fin de semaine, 
conférences morales; dans les hautes classes, méditations, examens de 
consciences, 'récollections/ où les jeunes gens devaient trouver la 
clarté de la décision et puiser la force de l'exécution" (468). 
These procedures were based on certain principles of Scholastic 
psychology, which taught that the human soul is composed of (1) an 
intellect capable of ascertaining the truth, (2) a sovereign will, enlight­
ened by the intellect and capable of governing the third part of the 
soul, and (3) the passions, which have a use in the execution of its de­
signs. The role of confession and "recollection" was to take stock of 
the passions and eventually to put them to good use. Only when the 
passions were antécédentes, when they circumvented libre-arbitre and 
precipitated the subject toward pleasure instead of the truth, were they 
evil. By correct moral training, the energy of an antecedens passio could 
be transferred into a passio consequens, which followed upon the delib­
eration of the intellect and was supposed to arouse the soul to carry 
out the orders of the will. The one area of their moral theology where 
the Jesuits departed from the Scholastic model was in their insistence 
on the primacy of the love of God in their spiritual vision: "La clé du 
système n'est pas la raison mais l'amour" (Stegmann, Héroïsme 219). 
The Ignatian spiritual experience is directed less at the intelligence 
than at the heart and the imagination. For example, Loyola says that 
his novices should "practice the seeking of God's presence in all things, 
. . . in all that they see, taste, hear, understand, and in all their actions. 
This kind of meditation, which finds God our Lord in all things is 
easier than raising oneself to the consideration of divine truths which 
are more abstract" (Counsels 43). In this they were in concert with the 
Augustinian tendency of all moral philosophy during the first fifty 
years of the seventeenth century (Bénichou 231). 
Wherever the Jesuits extended their influence, confession was a hall­
mark of their strategy. It was a key to the formation of their own 
priests. The Spiritual Exercises involve a twice daily "examen," and a 
general confession during the first week. Loyola's description of a 
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spiritual warfare between the retreatant and the devil is derived from 
the monastic tradition, and he sees confession as the same sort of de­
feat for the demon which the Desert Fathers had imagined: 
When the enemy of human nature brings his wiles and persua­
sion to the just soul, he wants and desires that they be received 
and kept in secret; but when one reveals them to his good confes­
sor or to another spiritual person that knows his deceits and evil 
ends, it is very grievous to him, because he gathers, from his 
manifest deceits being discovered, that he will not be able to suc­
ceed with his wickedness begun. 
(212, 13th Rule for the discernment of spirits) 
The Jesuits required weekly confession of their novices. It was im­
portant in their schools, and it was vital to their political intrigues. In 
France, the Jesuits formed an unbroken succession of royal confessors 
from the reign of Henri III throughout the seventeenth century. They 
were a power behind the throne, deliberately bending the rules of mo­
rality to accommodate their royal clients. Mme de Maintenon com­
plained of the pernicious influence of "confesseurs à l'eau douce" on 
Louis XIV (Grégoire 72). In his Histoire des confesseurs des empereurs, des 
rois, et d'autres princes, Abbé Grégoire cites this passage from a Jesuit 
manual which outlines how the laxists deliberately set out to, in H. C. 
Lea's words, "conquer by yielding" (3:583): "Dans la direction de la 
conscience des grands nos confesseurs suivront le sentiment des au­
teurs qui font la conscience plus libre, contre le sentiment des autres 
religieux afin que les quittant, ils veuillent entièrement dépendre de 
notre direction et de nos conseils" (39). The Jesuits actively sought 
control over the consciences of the "grands" by the use of their casu­
istry. By offering easy absolution and accommodating arrangements 
between Christianity and the courtly aristocratic ethos, they sought 
to extend their influence over the elite. There is no need to renounce 
completely one's worldly ways, they said, just confess them to a casu­
ist. The repressive side of the law disappears, but power is still enacted 
by the obligation to confess. No need for remorse or guilt, just the 
necessity to avow. The Jesuits had doubtless understood that pastoral 
power need not be repressive to be effective; on the contrary, by ap­
pearing to suspend a restrictive law, they seemed to be extending lib­
erty and freedom to those who entered their fold willingly. According 
to Foucault, this is the classic ruse of pastoral power, and it explains 
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why Western man has submitted so willingly to various practices of 
the self: because he sees in them an exercise of liberty, not implication 
in a power structure. 
This is another area where we will look for analogies between Cor­
neille's religious milieu and the functioning of confession in his plays. 
Does he use casuistical rhetoric to reconcile the criminal acts of his 
heroes with the principles of divine right monarchy, and does the hero 
sometimes conquer most effectively by appearing to yield? 
I am not the first to see a parallel between Corneille and the casuists; 
several times in his reading of the Lettres provinciales, A. J. Krailsheimer 
mentions Corneille: "The morale relâchée imputed to the Jesuits is in 
many ways the theological counterpart of the ethical codes already 
seen in Descartes, Corneille, and Retz, and it is an open question how 
far the connection was causal" (102). And further: "Corneille's heroes 
'dirigent l'intention' when they look back on their actions, and seek to 
make self-interest respectable by identifying it with the common good, 
as expressed in social demands" (108). 
We will pursue these questions especially in Horace and Le Cid, 
where the notorious casuistical subjects of dueling and homicide re­
ceive the kind of lenient treatment that sp incensed Pascal. Horace, 
after all, kills his brother-in-law and then his sister, yet is pardoned by 
the king of Rome and preserves his status as national hero. Rodrigue 
kills the count in a duel with no remorse other than over the loss of his 
mistress. Both of these acts were expressly forbidden by most orthodox 
moral theologians, but there were casuists willing to allow dueling 
and homicide in certain cases to preserve aristocratic honor. Corneille's 
similar favorable treatment of these issues will invite comparison with 
the science of his Jesuit masters. 
The other model for asceticism and confession in Corneille's life is 
the Imitation of Christ. It was a favorite devotional work of the author's 
all his life, and he translated it into French verse between 1651 and 
1656. One is struck in reading his translation by the similar language 
and atmosphere between this classic of devotio moderna and Corneille's 
theater. This is due in part to the theatrical style of Corneille's transla­
tion, but it also results from the fact that the author's theater is inspired 
by some of the same moral principles and mental structures to be 
found in the Imitation. Certain spiritual and psychological topoi found 
in the stage productions are extrapolations of the science of the cloister. 
André Stegmann speaks of "profondes analogies" between the 
translation and the plays and of a similar "démarche intérieure du 
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héros"; he concludes: "C'est dans l'Imitation que l'on trouve la meil­
leure définition de l'héroïsme Cornélien" (Héroïsme 324). I have chosen 
a line from the Imitation as the epigraph for this chapter on Corneille 
because it uses the same sort of architectural metaphor for the spiritual 
life which underlies the invention of the confessional. The passage 
comes from book 3, section 38, dealing with methods for exercising 
free will and maintaining "le dedans vraiment libre et tranquille." The 
narrative voice, which is that of Christ, advises the reader, when faced 
with a moral dilemma, to retreat into the tabernacle like Moses. The 
tent in the desert is replaced by a recently invented domestic space, 
the "cabinet":3 
Entre, entre à son exemple au cabinet du coeur 
Et pour tirer de moi le conseille nécessaire 
Du zèle en tes besoins redouble la ferveur. 
A recent compartmentalization of domestic life suggests a new spiri­
tual reification, "le coeur" as a private chamber where God gives secret 
advice and rouses the emotions. For the Cornelian hero, this retreat 
into the private room of the heart is just as decisive as it is for the 
spiritual man, and it is rendered possible by a similar demarcation of 
space. For the translator of the Imitation, the stage figures the "cabinet 
du coeur." By the magic of the proscenium stage, the spectator is al­
lowed to peer into the private confines of the hero's heart. Alone on 
stage, or in the company of a trusted confident, he reveals his inner 
being, unaware that his privacy is being violated. 
The walls of the conventional palace setting enclose the hero and 
project the form of his inner space. The simultaneous presence of the 
spectators, separated by the invisible fourth wall, heightens the divi­
sion between private meditations and public life. The "cabinet du 
coeur" as a moral space is replicated by the stage, and we become 
privileged witnesses to the inner and outer drama of the hero as he 
tries to mediate between the private certainties of conscience and the 
demands and truths of history. 
The complement to this private watchfulness over the soul is the 
confessing of the noble heart to others: "Pauline a l'âme noble et parle 
à coeur ouvert" (463). Having attained interior illumination about the 
self, the hero must bare his or her inner soul no matter how trying the 
circumstances. The confession of the self is part of the process whereby 
the hero attains full self-knowledge and carries out his mission. The 
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others within the play must also become spectators of the heroic heart 
as private truth becomes transparent communication in the idealized 
community. 
Among critics, Jean Starobinski has shed the most light on this drive 
of the Cornelian protagonist toward self-revelation. In his essay "Sur 
Corneille," he writes at length about the hero's desire to make a specta­
cle of his whole life, preferably at court. Ultimately this involves reveal­
ing the hidden struggles of his interior life and the private victories 
over the self. As with confession in the spiritual life, the actual process 
of avowal helps achieve heroic status. Emerging victorious in the trial 
of self-statement, the hero presents a glorious and seemingly unified 
spectacle of the ego: 
Tout se passe comme si l'âme héroique ne pouvait supporter à la 
longue la division du manifeste et du caché, comme s'il lui était 
intolérable de vivre en état de dédoublement; l'effort par lequel 
elle réprime ce qu'elle ne consent pas à laisser paraître culmine 
dans un acte à la fois destructeur et unificateur. Le héros peut 
alors à nouveau se montrer tout entier, une fois consumé en lui 
tout l'inavouable, c'est-à-dire tout ce qui était autre que son plus 
haut moi. Ainsi l'intériorité héroïque vise sa propre destruction 
et triomphe lorsqu'elle s'ouvre sur une extériorité totale. La con­
science ne peut s'arrêter au déchirement secret; elle s'immole et 
livre son sacrifice en spectacle à l'univers. Dans ce spectacle où 
l'antithèse du dedans et du dehors est abolie, l'être et le paraître 
se réconcilient définitivement. (63) 
For Starobinski, the hero achieves a semiotic resolution, the outside 
finally revealing and conforming to the inside. Confession would be 
the dramatization of the passage of the hidden signified from inside 
to out. Whether or not this process is seen as a successful closing of the 
gap between inner meaning and outside expression is open to further 
discussion. In the plays of Corneille, Racine, and Molière, there are 
heroic, tragic, and comic versions of this avowal. The recurrent Corne­
lian figure for this activity, "parler à coeur ouvert," suggests something 
other than Starobinski's abolition of an antithesis. In Corneille, the 
opening of the heart is rather a more violent process reminiscent of 
the monks' confessional "agon." It is expressed in images of combat, 
political struggle, medical purgation, and, finally, martyrdom. The 
coherence of the heroic self is bought at the price of a physical and 
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rhetorical opening up that suspends its meaning on the favorable read­
ing of an omniscient spectator. Grandeur and illusion of the heroic self 
which, in its supreme act of self-revelation, defers meaning to those 
empowered to decide. Heroism turns out to be, not the imposition of 
private, conscious meaning, but rather an opening up to hermeneutic 
authority. Ultimately, the hero must become part of the Legend; he 
surrenders his private signification to the reading and writing of sa­
cred or national History. 
The paradox I am suggesting is that the hero's triumphant revelation 
of the heart conceals subjection to a preordained repertory of images 
that he will recognize as self, which ties the hero to a perpetual discur­
sive self-creation where his only true integrated self, outside and in­
side, is a spoken self, where heroism is fully realized only when the 
act is completed by the verbalization of the heart. Like the founding 
proposition of Descartes's philosophical "je," similarly conceived in the 
privacy of the "poêle," Corneille's heroic "moi" exists only "toutes les 
fois que je la prononce" . . . and that they concur. 
MÉDÉE: "JE NE ME REPENS PAS

DE VOUS AVOIR TRAHI"

In his Discours de la tragédie, written in 1660, Corneille prided himself 
on having invented a new kind of moralistic, didactic tragedy, un­
known to the ancients, based on "la punition des méchantes actions 
et la récompense des bonnes" (832). For Corneille and many of his 
contemporaries, Aristotelian catharsis meant "la purgation des pas­
sions," and it was thought that this was best accomplished by the spec­
tacle of the passions leading to crime and punishment. Most modern 
scholars have since concluded that catharsis is a medical term meaning 
a homeopathic cure in which the ingestion of small amounts of a toxic 
agent or pathogen teaches the body to repulse a foreign substance. 
Applied to the theater, this modern view of the word means that dur­
ing the course of a play the spectator indulges in his pathological in­
stincts and is thereafter relieved of forbidden desires. But in Corneille's 
day, any suggestion that the spectator shared in the criminal passions 
of the dramatis personae was grounds for condemning the whole the­
atrical enterprise. It was inconceivable that controlled participation in 
forbidden impulses could serve the civilizing process. Those who 
made a moral defense of the theater adopted a line of reasoning like 
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Corneille's. Racine, for example, says in the preface to Phèdre that in 
his play "les moindres fautes sont sévèrement punies." 
However, Corneille's first tragedy, Médée (1635), does not conform 
to this formula, since its eponymic heroine commits the repugnant 
crimes of fratricide and infanticide yet escapes unpunished. Already 
in the dedicatory comments of 1639, one senses Corneille's unease 
with the amoral content of the play as he tries to bring it within the 
scope of his moralizing conception of the theater. He contends that the 
spectator does not have to see Medea punished; a faithful representa­
tion of her crimes suffices to inspire "quelque horreur"; the audience 
understands instinctively that these horrendous acts "ne sont pas à 
imiter" (173). 
However limited this didactic theory of tragic catharsis, Corneille's 
comments do point to the singularity of Médée within his oeuvre. It is 
my contention that this is not the result of unpunished wickedness but 
rather the failure of a fundamental moral mechanism in Corneille— 
confession. Neoclassical tragedy no less than ancient tragedy was not 
based on straightforward moral didacticism. It is not a melodrama in 
which the good triumph unproblematically over the bad. Ancient trag­
edy involved catharsis, properly understood as homeopathic cure, and 
neoclassical drama makes use of a similar morally ambivalent cere­
mony—confession—which legitimizes the representation of criminal 
desire and allows for a more sophisticated adjudication of crime than 
"la punition des méchantes actions." 
Médée stands apart from the rest of Corneille's plays because the 
criminal impulses of its main character are not mitigated by avowal, 
and the play conforms more to the ancient tragic model than to Cor­
neille's Jesuitical sense of morality. There are other unpunished crimi­
nals in Corneille's theater, as we shall see, but they become morally 
acceptable by submitting to the civilizing process of confession. Medea 
stands in contrast to a number of confessing heroes and especially 
heroines: L'Infante, Chimène, Horace, Cinna, Pauline. She makes a de­
fiant avowal or opening of the heart, but it is an anticonfession, a re­
fusal to put her desire at the disposal of the city 
Médée is Corneille's only pure tragedy because it represents a total 
failure of society to deal with crime and guilt. The political structure 
of Corinth is destroyed because it cannot resolve the issue of the origi­
nal sins of its would-be king, Jason. An attempt is made to purify Jason 
by dissociating him from his murderous wife and accomplice, Medea, 
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who alone as pharmakos is made to bear the guilt. But she appears at 
the end of the play, like an avenging demon, to administer poetic jus­
tice. Jason pays with the loss of his own children for betraying Medea 
and trying to avoid the guilt he shares for the murder and mutilation 
of her brother. 
The attempted exile of Medea is based on the archaic concept of 
defilement and ritualistic purification. Paul Ricoeur says that defile­
ment is the most primitive representation of evil, since "impurity is 
measured not by imputation to a responsible agent but by the objective 
violation of an interdict" (Symbolism 27). Exile is the characteristic ex­
pression of this system, since it removes the objectively "impure" ele­
ment from the city. It also signifies expulsion from the legal space of 
the polis; outside the city, the banished criminal is no longer protected 
by the law and may be killed with impunity. The idea of exile contains 
within it the seed of a higher conception of justice, since it refers to 
human laws.4 But in Médée, responsibility is not fairly meted out. An 
attempt is made to separate Jason legally and ritualistically from the 
crimes committed on his behalf by dissolving his marriage with 
Medea and exiling her. The decree of banishment does in some sense 
succeed, since Medea will indeed leave the city, but not before exacting 
a terrible revenge and destroying the Corinthian dynasty. 
Confession is the Judeo-Christian mechanism for dissipating evil. 
The cycle of crime and vengeance is interrupted by the verbal purifica­
tion of the guilty. The community can reopen its gates to the soul ex­
iled by sin. Unlike Oedipus's and Medea's exile, that of Jehovah's 
people can come to an end. A merciful God hears the confession of a 
contrite heart and relents. The verbalization of the heart gives man a 
second chance against the defilements of his past. The absence of this 
ritual contributes in a fundamental way to the anomalous character of 
Médée in Corneille's work. The play is a tragic prologue to a heroic 
theater founded on the mediating power of confession. Medea's unre­
pentant status at the end of the play, "Je ne me repens pas de vous 
avoir trahi," signifies the triumph of evil over the city and the failure 
of any confessional apparatus that might contain her. 
In a sense, the spiritual voyage of the Cornelian hero begins, as 
Dante's did, in hell. Medea, the first incarnation of the tragic hero, 
would not be out of place in the Florentine master's Inferno. When she 
first appears on stage and we catch our first diacritical glimpse of her 
soul, we are in familiar spiritual company. In her famous opening 
speech, "Souverains protecteurs des lois de l'hymenée," she invokes 
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the powers of the Underworld to take revenge on Jason. The details 
of the portrait reveal a mixture of ancient and more recent Christian 
elements. Medea calls upon the torturing demonesses of hell, her 
"fières soeurs," to leave momentarily their "cachots" where they 
"gênez les âmes" to come to her aid. Instead of the sacred "cabinet du 
coeur," Medea's psyche is a demonic "cachot." 
Where Euripides' heroine invokes "Great Zeus, Lady Themis . . . 
Queen Hecate" (49), and Seneca's sorceress details the recipe for Creu­
sa's poisoned robe, Corneille's Medea invokes a more Dantesque co­
hort: "Filles de 1'Acheron, pestes, larves, furies" (210). "Gênez" and 
"cachot" are fourteenth- and sixteenth-century lexemes, respectively, 
and the vision of demons at work on the souls of the damned is decid­
edly medieval, not Greek or Roman. "Larves" has a Latin origin and 
a venerable past in medieval demonology; "peste" entered the French 
language in the fifteenth century. Medea is as much the contemporary 
of the Loudun possession trials as she is the enchantress of Greek 
legend. 
The one quality she possesses that marks her as a precursor of the 
hero is her "grande âme" and her ability to commit herself entirely to 
one cause. Medea is the heroic ego in its primitive, demonic form, 
powerfully narcissistic and full of the terrible fantasies of earliest child­
hood. The tragedy marks the painful discovery of self through the ex­
perience of the lost object. Before the betrayal, Medea had cathected 
all of her libido, powerfully represented as magical powers, to Jason. 
The tragic couple form a strange reversal of what Freud calls the "nor­
mal" type of relation between an "anaclitic" male overestimating the 
female object and impoverishing his own ego, and the "narcissistic" 
female seeking a lover who will mirror her own adoration of self. Here 
it is Jason who seduces female admirers by the power of his own nar­
cissism.5 
Medea has totally surrendered her own ego-libido to Jason, but his 
betrayal triggers a powerful and painful return to herself. Like a 
stretched rubber band, object-libido snaps back into her own ego giv­
ing rise to the frenetic "Moi, dis-je et c'est assez" (321). Freud describes 
this furious return of libido to the ego as characteristic of schizophrenia 
and other excessively narcissistic states:6 
The question arises: What is the fate of the libido when with­
drawn from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania 
characteristic of these conditions affords a clue here. It has doubt­
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less come into being at the expense of the object-libido. The libido 
withdrawn from the outer world has been directed on to the ego, 
giving rise to a state which we may call narcissism. But the mega­
lomania itself is no new phenomenon; on the contrary, it is, as we 
know, an exaggeration and plainer manifestation of a condition 
which had already existed previously. This leads us to the conclu­
sion that the narcissism which arises when libidinal cathexes are 
called in away from external objects must be conceived of as a 
secondary form, superimposed upon a primary one that is ob­
scured by manifold influences. (14:74-75) 
Medea has been betrayed by the patriarchal "lois de l'hymenée." Hith­
erto content to leave her ego invested in the image of Jason and to play 
the role of perpetuator of that image as mother, her impending exile 
has forced her to reconstruct her ego, which she does by unleashing 
the demonic forces of primitive narcissism. Instead of normal ego de­
velopment, which involves abandoning primitive narcissism in favor 
of "displacement of libido to an ego-ideal imposed from without," the 
play represents a tragic destruction of the ego-ideal and an affirmation 
of the "megalomania" and "omnipotence of thought" of primitive nar­
cissism and schizophrenia. 
Freud says that normally the conscience watches over the ego and 
forces it to strive toward the ego-ideal: "For that which prompted the 
person to form an ego-ideal over which his conscience keeps guard, 
was the influence of parental criticism conveyed to him by the medium 
of the voice" (14:76). But from the beginning, the pact struck with 
Medea was not based on the repressive voice of conscience and the 
imposition of an ego-ideal. Jason is "sans conscience" (13); to secure 
the Golden Fleece he had to "cajoler Médée" (36), and elsewhere he 
says of his conquest, "Je conjurai Médée" (52). On the psychological 
and sociological level, civilization is founded on a solicitation of the 
passions, a "conjuring up" as Jason says. The conscience hears not only 
the critical parental voice but also the call to desire: "Viens ça, vers le 
Père." The problem is that Medea will not submit her desire to the 
regime of lack and the Father; her desire is immediate and productive. 
Medea spells this out clearly enough to Créon, explaining how the 
force of her desire was necessary to carry out the Argonauts' heroic 
task: 
Si lors à mon devoir mon désir limité

Eût conservé ma gloire et ma fidélité,
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Si j'eusse eu de l'horreur de tant d'énormes fautes, 
Que devenaient Jason, et tous vos Argonautes? 
Sans moi, ce vaillant chef, que vous m'avez ravi, 
Fût péri le premier, et tous l'auraient suivi. 
Je ne me repens point d'avoir par mon adresse 
Sauvé le sang des Dieux et la fleur de la Grèce. 
(431-38) 
The heroine refuses to abandon the productive force of her desire; she 
envisages one last "chef-d'oeuvre" (253), which turns out to be the 
poisoned robe, the "don fatal" given to Creuse. This artistic work of 
primary process and primary production bursts into flames at the end 
of the play, consuming Jason's children, wife, and father-in-law—a final 
physical message of Medea's unrepentant desire, which would not de­
liver itself up verbally to the paternal order. 
Créon had attempted to abrogate the pact with Medea's desire 
through exile: "Va purge mes Etats d'un monstre tel que toi" (380). 
And Jason displays tragic hubris by thinking he can conveniently dis­
sociate himself from Medea's desire. The play attempts to draw a line 
between the criminal sorceress and the state. Immediately following 
Medea's defiant "Moi dis-je," her attendant counters with the image of 
society: "un roi fort de tant de sujets" (327). Medea rejects this associa­
tion of subjects; she is the unrepentant, the unanalyzable schizophrenic 
who rejects the order of subjectivity and the king. The rulers of Corinth 
hope to save the state from its dangerous alliance with amoral desire. 
Créon hopes that marriage and exile will establish "et dedans et de­
hors une profonde paix" (520). But the plan backfires, and the play 
ends on the note of a futile witch-hunt as Jason dies, vainly hoping 
that the gods "peuvent de la sorcière achever le supplice" (1626). 
The tragic sense of the play is compounded by the feeling that the 
catastrophic outcome might have been avoided if the crimes of the past 
had been acknowledged and guilt dealt with justly. Medea seems to 
have an intuition of how desire and guilt will be handled in the future. 
We sense that she might have been recuperated by a more subtle sub­
jective apparatus. She protests the injustice of her bearing all the guilt 
and, arguing as a jurist, indicts Jason on the charge of conspiracy: "Tu 
présumes en vain de t'en mettre à couvert: / Celui-là fait le crime à 
qui le crime sert" (859-60). 
Elsewhere in the play there is another incidental reference to confes­
sion, but here also it serves only to point out the questionable good 
faith of the characters involved. In a scene that is similar to Pauline 
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confessing to Sévère, Creuse explains to an angry Aegée why she has 
chosen Jason over him: "Souvent je ne sais quoi qu'on ne peut 
exprimer / Nous surprend, nous emporte, et nous force d'aimer" (635­
36). But unlike Pauline, Creuse has chosen passionate love over esteem, 
and the confession, instead of mollifying Aegée, only angers him: 
"Que me sert cet aveu d'une erreur volontaire?" (649). To which Creuse 
replies: "Je ne veux plus, Seigneur, me confesser coupable" (651). She 
then claims that political reason and a desire to remain close to her 
father were her real motives, but neither the spectator nor Aegée is 
convinced by these arguments, since she has already declared quite 
openly her passionate interest in Jason. On a smaller scale, this scene 
reflects the same dysfunction of confessional discourse which is a key 
factor in the tragic pattern of the play. Neither the original sins of the 
state nor the passions of a princess can be successfully mediated by 
confession in this play. Desire remains stubbornly attached to its imme­
diate objects; Medea will not cease in the production of her violent 
desire, and Creuse will let nothing come between herself and Jason. 
Both refuse the discourse of confession, and both are fittingly united 
by the destructive masterpiece of Medea's desire, the "présent décep­
tif" (997). Corneille takes pains to inculpate Creuse in this regard. Early 
in the play she is presented as coveting Medea's robe as much as Jason 
himself as object: "J'en eus presques envie aussitôt que de vous" (588). 
In dying she speaks of "l'ardeur qui me dévore et que j'ai méritée" 
(1385). It is the same recalcitrant, unanalyzed female desire that unites 
the two rivals for Jason's love and consumes itself on the tragic victims 
at the end of the play. Irrespective of the inconstant and narcissistic 
object, Jason, desire itself burns forth for the first and last time in Cor­
neille's theater in its immediate materiality; henceforth it will be medi­
ated by confessional discourse as the burning flesh gives way to 
talking hearts. 
LECID: "RODRIGUE, AS-TU DU COEUR?" 
The legend of El Cid (Arabic sayyid, "lord") grew up around the figure 
of Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, an eleventh-century Castilian warrior who 
captured the Muslim city of Valencia. The first literary celebration of 
his exploits was the Poéma de Mio Cid, written around 1207 (Fletcher). 
Later, he became the model of chivalry and the patron of the Re­
conquest, despite the fact that he had fought with the Moors as much 
as against them (Kamen 2). Starting in the fourteenth century, a new 
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element appeared in the chronicles of the Cid: his marriage to Ximena, 
daughter of a man he had killed in battle, don Gomez de Gormez. In 
the early versions of the story, Ximena asks the king to order Rodrigo 
to marry her as recompense for the loss of her father. In the romances 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ximena seeks justice from the 
king but accepts immediately and without protest his order to marry 
a man whose sword is practically still wet with her father's blood. As 
the role of women in feudal society began to evolve, the plot of the 
story was changed to attenuate the moral scandal of murder followed 
by marriage. In Guillen de Castro's Las Mocedades del Cid (1618), 
Rodrigo and Ximena are in love before the duel, so both protagonists 
are faced with a conflict between love and honor. As Reynier com­
ments, Ximena is no longer "une fille résignée ou calculatrice" but 
"une personne morale" (78). 
There are numerous colorful episodes from de Castro's version 
which Corneille suppresses: Rodrigo receiving his spurs from the in­
fanta, the meeting of the council to choose a governor, the "test scene" 
in which Rodrigo's father bites his son's thumb to stir up his anger, the 
duel itself, which in the Spanish play is fought right in front of the 
distraught Ximena. De Castro also stages the battle scene between Ro­
drigo and the Moors, and his play contains a miracle episode, typical 
of medieval legends, in which Rodrigo gives his coat to a leper who 
turns out to be St. Lazarus. Corneille eliminates all of this superfluous 
material to focus on the interior disposition of Chimène and Rodrigue. 
He has recast the medieval epic as a heroic trial of passion and self-
statement. Instead of the physical provocation of the Spanish play's 
father, the Cornelian father challenges his son with the fundamental 
heroic question: "Rodrigue, as-tu du coeur?" Literally he means "cour­
age," but as he himself will learn, the force that inspires Rodrigue is 
more than warrior courage. Heroism is fueled by desire, which is pro­
duced in the heart and sublimated through speech. Don Diègue's ques­
tion is at the origin of classical civilization: Can a rhetoric of the 
speaking heart be developed which exhibits and controls desire in a 
socially acceptable way? Will desire forgo its terrible immediacy as 
seen in Médée and learn the language of lack and displacement? 
The first confessant we encounter in the play is the infanta. Being of 
royal blood, she can only marry a king, but the object of her desire is 
the mere nobleman, Rodrigue. The way she overcomes this conflict 
between duty and desire sets an example that will be followed 
throughout the play: she opens her heart to her lady-in-waiting, 
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Léonor. She seeks relief from the mounting pressure of a repressed 
conflict: "Ma tristesse redouble à la tenir secrète / Ecoute, écoute enfin 
comme j'ai combattu" (78-79). She then details the power of her pas­
sion ("mon coeur est embrasé") and her generous overcoming of an 
unsuitable love by giving Rodrigue to Chimène. The same fiery meta­
phors for love are used here as were employed by Medea: "Et j'allumai 
leurs feux" (104), but these fires have been tamed by this cathartic 
opening of the heart and submission to the paternal order: "Et je me 
dis toujours qu'étant fille de roi" (99). The infanta's love remains a 
metaphorical flame that has been safely constrained, and her self-
statement situates her within the royal, genealogical chain. Her "je me 
dis" is the antithesis of Medea's schizophrenic "Moi-dis-je, et c'est as­
sez." The opening exploration of the infanta's heart also shows us that 
the fire that burns between Chimène and Rodrigue takes its source in 
this generous gift. It is a legitimized, frustrated fire of renunciation, 
the unconsummated desire of an other. 
The next conflicts between desire and civilization to be mediated 
by confession are the twin dilemmas of Rodrigue and Chimène. 
Rodrigue has killed a man in an illicit duel, and Chimène continues to 
feel passionate love for her father's murderer. But both of these issues 
will be resolved by the cor ad cor conversation between the lovers in act 
3, scene 4, and finally by the "inquisition" of Chimène by the king at 
the end of the play. 
Both illicit desires receive a favorable hearing. Rodrigue refuses to 
disavow the duel, and Chimène will not eradicate the scandalous love 
from her heart. By a laxist treatment of the issues involved, verbaliza­
tion of the "crimes" provides an avenue for discovering meritorious 
motives behind apparent sins; evil is mediated and desire recuperated 
for the good of society. 
As the scene begins, Chimène has just revealed to Elvire that she 
still loves Rodrigue: "Je l'avoue" (846) and that for honor's sake she 
must seek his death. No sooner are these words out than Rodrigue 
suddenly appears. He has overheard the last words and only missed 
the avowal of love by seconds. Chimène gasps: "Rodrigue devant 
moi!" (852). For a moment, Rodrigue occupies the place of voyeuristic 
spectator, and the play seems to suggest my analogy between confes­
sional and stage. The sudden appearance of Rodrigue sends a shiver 
through the audience and reawakens the fantasy of the unconscious 
being watched over by the conscience. The scene is set for an in-depth 
probing of the protagonists' hearts. 
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The first issue to be dealt with is Rodrigue's murder of the count. 
Both ecclesiastical and civil authorities condemned the duel. At the 
insistence of Richelieu, Louis XIII had signed an edict against dueling 
in 1626 with the death penalty for offenders (Reynier 249). Twice in 
the play itself, the king takes exception to his subjects fighting without 
his authority and only forgives Rodrigue after his victory over the 
Moors (2.6, 4.5). 
Among the casuists, the question of the duel received diverse treat­
ment. The stricter among them condemned the practice: "Les peines 
de ceux qui se battent en duel sont: l'excommunication réservée 
au pape, l'infamie perpétuelle, la privation de la sépulture ecclésias­
tique . . .  " (Pontas). However, certain Jesuits found a way of justifying 
duels. Père Airault, one of Pascal's targets in the Lettres provinciales, had 
this to say about the subject: 
Si vous me voulez ravir l'honneur en me donnant un soufflet ou 
un coup de bâton, je puis l'empêcher par la force des armes; donc 
la même défense est permise, quand vous voulez me faire la 
même injure avec la langue, ne pouvant l'éviter autrement qu'en 
vous tuant.... Il faudrait pourtant avertir le calomniateur afin de 
l'engager à cesser ses calomnies, et s'il ne le voulait pas, il ne 
serait pas à propos de le tuer publiquement, à cause du scandale, 
mais en secret, (qtd. in Amann 45) 
Rodrigue follows this sort of reasoning—even the very words—in jus­
tifying the duel to Chimène: "Tu sais comme un soufflet touche un 
homme de coeur" (875). But to get beyond the impasse of the vendetta 
system and the "rigoureux point d'honneur," Rodrigue delves deeper 
into his heart to explain his crime. By a process akin to the Jesuitical 
"direction of intention," he re-creates his mental disposition at the time 
of the killing: "Je t'ai fait une offense, et j'ai dû m'y porter / Pour 
effacer ma honte, et pour te mériter" (895-96). This is not the same 
version of the event arrived at during the "stances," where Rodrigue's 
final motivation in fighting the duel was to preserve his "gloire" and 
save his family honor. Although in verse 324 he had realized that Chi­
mène could not love someone unwilling to defend paternal honor 
("J'attire ses mépris en ne me vengeant pas"), he certainly did not go 
into battle "pour te mériter," as he now suggests to Chimène. In the 
"stances," Rodrigue had made his decision by a logic of elimination: 
Chimène must be sacrificed, but "sauvons du moins l'honneur." The 
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recourse to a fictional reconstruction of the event allows him to confess 
his love as an equal motive in the killing. 
Is this pure bad faith on his part? Perhaps direction of intention 
anticipates the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination. Acts are 
committed for a host of contradictory reasons, conscious and uncon­
scious, and Rodrigue's casuistical confession allows the deeper, more 
paradoxical motivations for his act to come to the surface. At some 
level, desire for Chimène did dictate his act. The surface appearance 
of submission to paternal law hides an equally powerful Oedipal de­
sign. It is by killing a father that Rodrigue shows himself worthy of 
Chimène. Perhaps this is what is most authentic in Rodrigue's confes­
sion and what speaks most convincingly to Chimène, provoking on 
her part a similar declaration of love. Among the primitive forces that 
Rodrigue's father invoked when he asked his son if he had a heart was 
this sentiment of violence against the father. Rodrigue's love is de­
clared in the ambivalent language of transgression and submission to 
the paternal law. 
In this confessional scene, a son and a daughter have reached an 
entente; while reiterating the paternal code of honor, each has revealed 
his heart to the other. Rodrigue manages to convey that his murder is 
a sign of his love, and likewise, Chimène pledges obedience to the 
point of honor but also gives Rodrigue verbal confirmation of her love: 
"Va, je ne te hais point" (963). A first step has been taken in alleviating 
the tragic conflict provoked by the vendetta system. 
The gruesome oracle of the father's talking wounds is superseded 
by the confessional discourse of the children. Before the encounter 
with Rodrigue, Chimène had evoked the paternal body language that 
had her in its fatal thrall: 
Son sang sur la poussière écrivait mon devoir; 
Ou plutôt sa valeur en cet état réduite 
Me parlait par sa plaie, et hâtait ma poursuite; 
Et, pour se faire entendre au plus juste des rois, 
Par cette triste bouche elle empruntait ma voix. 
(676-80) 
This is the same sort of guilty writing and corporeal language that is 
used in the Judeo-Christian tradition as an image of man's birthright 
of sin in the flesh. Here, it is a sign of the cycle of violence and revenge. 
In the play, as in the tradition, guilty writing can be alleviated by ver­
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balization. In the end it is not this "triste bouche" which the king hears 
but rather the mouth that avows love for Rodrigue. 
"Avouer par la bouche" 
It is Chimène's avowals that sustain the action of the play and ulti­
mately resolve the tragic conflict. Her admission to Rodrigue gives 
him the inspiration he needs to defeat the Moors and earn his own 
forgiveness from the king. There is a similar forced confession of love 
before the duel with don Sanche. Faced with the emotional blackmail 
of Rodrigue, who threatens to let himself be killed, Chimène admits: 
"Adieu: ce mot lâché me fait rougir de honte" (1557). And, finally, at 
the end of the play, Chimène's unwilling confession to the king allows 
him to pass judgment and put an end to the tragic vendetta. The inqui­
sition of Chimène is a structural constant in the play; it defines in an 
essential way the peculiar heroic erotic that Corneille has created, and 
it allows the king to intervene as arbiter of the truth and desire of 
his subjects. 
Octave Nadal has commented on this aspect of the rapport between 
the two lovers: "II [Rodrigue] joue le rôle de tortionnaire vis à vis de 
sa victime, qu'il tourmente jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu de sa bouche 
l'aveu qu'elle est vaincue par l'amour. Ce procédé inquisitorial, con­
duit avec délice, n'est certes pas le fait de la tendresse, mais celui de 
l'amour propre et de l'égoïsme amoureux" (171-72). The methods used 
by Rodrigue and later by don Fernand are inquisitorial, but the effects 
that Nadal describes ("amour propre," "égoïsme") do not satisfactorily 
explain all of the nuances of inquisition. 
By emphasizing Rodrigue's cruelty and egotism, Nadal is sug­
gesting that the inquisition scene results in the same sort of egotistical 
victory as a duel—Chimène is "vaincue par l'amour." This is only par­
tially true. One can conceive of Rodrigue's victory here as an erotic 
conquest akin to his military exploits, but the avowal of love that con­
cludes it is not the same as a military defeat. 
Let us first examine the similarities. Rodrigue does wage a sort 
of psychological and rhetorical warfare against Chimène. He appears 
suddenly in her apartment in a move similar to his nocturnal ambush 
against the Moors. To heighten the shock, he is carrying the murder 
weapon. He reveals that he was obliged to kill her father, that he would 
do it again, that his gesture was necessary to remain worthy of her. Is 
he suggesting that her high standards in some way contributed to her 
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father's death? Maybe. He then provokes Chimène by asking her to 
vent her hatred and kill him with the sword. He seems intent on push­
ing her to the limit just to make her show that she doesn't hate him 
and in fact conserves feeling for him in the bottom of her heart. She 
is tricked into admitting that she will seek his death, but not out of 
hatred. This is the tacit admission of love that Rodrigue has been seek­
ing. He has overcome Chimène's resistance and forced her to verbalize 
her passion. 
There is an undeniable element of aggression and pleasurable cru­
elty on the part of Rodrigue. The primitive version of sexuality as mas­
culine conquest is referred to, but Nadal is wrong to say that it is all 
done for Rodrigue's "amour propre." Chimène's avowal is not the con­
cession of a defeated duelist, and Rodrigue's reaction is not the vain 
exultation of a victor. To confess is not simply to concede. 
The image of Rodrigue as cruel inquisitor is more suggestive, but 
Nadal does not explore all of the angles. He is certainly right to men­
tion the potential for sadistic pleasure in such a scene. Here one is 
reminded of the auto-da-fé in Candide. Cunégonde is horrified to see 
Candide tortured publicly, but cannot deny the sensual appeal of the 
spectacle: "Je vous vis dépouillé tout nu; ce fut là le comble de l'hor­
reur, de la consternation, de la douleur, du désespoir. Je vous dirai avec 
vérité que votre peau est encore plus blanche et d'un incarnat plus 
parfait que celui de mon capitaine des Bulgares" (153). This sort of 
pleasure is not entirely foreign to the inquisitional scenes in the Cid. 
Rodrigue as well as the spectator derives a certain pleasure in torturing 
the truth out of Chimène. It is also evident that Chimène is an accom­
plice in this game. She blushes, she protests, but where does shame 
end and pleasure begin? Corneille's critics were not completely off the 
mark in calling her a "fille dénaturée." 
But cruelty and pleasure are not the only dimensions of a forced 
confession. Christianity has imbued avowal with a sacred aura. It is a 
special epiphany of the Truth and a promise of healing. Augustine 
says: "Thou art there in their heart, in the heart of those that confess to 
Thee" (65). When the lover's discourse invokes the ceremony of avowal, 
another register beyond cruelty and pleasure is attained. Love becomes 
the occasion of insight and healing. Chimène's avowal is a "miracle 
d'amour," not just a humiliating defeat or a sadistic spectacle for 
Rodrigue. 
For the play to reach its conclusion Rodrigue must work out his 
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own restitution for the evil of the duel, and the king must sound the 
heart of Chimène. Like Rodrigue, don Fernand will subject Chimène 
to a veritable inquisition, and here the tactics he uses invite comparison 
with those used by the historical Inquisition. The king decides to test 
Chimène's real sentiments concerning Rodrigue, "Je vais l'éprouver" 
(1336). He lies to her by reporting that Rodrigue has perished at the 
hands of the Moors. She faints, and don Diègue tells the king that 
he has the proof of her love: "Sa douleur a trahi les secrets de son 
âme" (1345). 
Such tactical lies were used by the Inquisition to pry the truth from 
heretics. As Francisco Pena writes in the Manuel des inquisiteurs (1578): 
La ruse dont le seul but est de tromper est toujours défendue et 
n'a rien à faire dans la pratique du droit; mais le mensonge que 
l'on fait judiciairement et au bénéfice du droit, du bien commun 
et de la raison, celui-là est parfaitement louable. A plus forte rai­
son, celui que l'on fait pour détecter les hérésies, déraciner les 
vices et convertir les pécheurs. Que l'on songe au jugement de 
Salomon! (133) 
Chimène initially denies the evidence of her fainting, but another mis­
taken belief in Rodrigue's death produces the final avowal. Seeing the 
sword brought back from the duel with don Sanche, and assuming 
that her lover is dead, she declares: "Eclate, mon amour, tu n'as plus 
rien à craindre.... Sire, il n'est plus besoin de vous dissimuler / Ce 
que tous mes efforts ne vous ont pu celer" (1709,1723-24). Don Diègue 
observes that Chimène has been forced to "avouer par sa bouche" 
(1742). The avowal is irrevocable; when she learns that Rodrigue is 
indeed alive, she can not retract her declaration. 
The king passes judgment; his justice dispenses Chimène from the 
"point d'honneur" and the shame of loving Rodrigue: "Ma fille, il ne 
faut point rougir d'un si beau feu" (1763). Confession has discovered 
the truth, absolved guilt, and united the true hearts. He commands 
Chimène to accept Rodrigue as her husband at an indefinite future 
date. For the present, "possédant déjà le coeur de sa maîtresse" (1838), 
Rodrigue already enjoys the obscure object of his desire, the mythical 
heart that the king has tricked into confessing itself, the broken heart 
mourning its lost love: "Eclate, mon amour, tu n'as plus rien à crain­
dre" (1709). Rodrigue will never receive a higher tribute nor possess a 
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richer treasure than the fragile declaration that he couldn't be present 
to hear and that the king received in his place. For a moment, death 
was love's ally, and Chimène's heart broke its honorable silence. 
HORACE AND CINNA: 
ABSOLUTION AND ABSOLUTISM 
The recent work of Louis Marin has focused on the eucharistie formula 
as a cornerstone to both the theory of representation in the Port-Royal 
grammarians and the political praxis of the court historiographers and 
artists. In the Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port-Royal, the joint 
work of Arnauld and Claude Lancelot, the sacramental enunciation 
"Hoc est corpus meum" is cited several times as an example of how 
signs fulfill their double role of designation and signification. For 
Marin, the eucharistie example is the only enunciation that can accom­
plish both missions of the sign. Only the miraculous divine words can 
found a theory of language capable of going beyond semiosis and 
breaking through to the designation of a real presence. For Marin, the 
consecration formula is the "exemple privilégié du point de vue de la 
théorie logico-grammaticale" in the Logique and the Grammaire générale 
which at the same time presents, accomplishes, and resumes the the­
ory of representation {Critique 32). 
Similarly, in the political domain, the entire strategy of royal propa­
ganda was based on an analogy to the real presence in the sacrament. 
Marin demonstrates that the various portraits of the king were based 
on the eucharistie model. He calls the commemorative medals of Louis 
XIV "hosties royales" {Portrait 147-68). 
I wish to show how the "Ego te absolvo" of confession was equally 
important to absolutism. In the Instructions théologiques et morales sur les 
sacrements, Nicole speculates about why God instituted the sacra­
ments: 
D.	 Pourquoi Dieu a-t-il voulu établir des Sacremens extérieurs pour 
nous communiquer ses grâces? 
R.	 Parce qu'il a voulu qu'en même temps que les Chrétiens lui 
seroient unis par un culte spirituel, ils fussent aussi unis 
ensemble, en un corps visible de religion; & qu'il étoit pour cela 
nécessaire qu'il y eût de la dependence entre eux, & qu'ils se 
communiquassent les uns aux autres par des signes extérieurs, 
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non-seulement les vérités de la foi, mais même la rémission des 
péchés & les grâces nécessaires à la vie chrétienne. (2) 
For Nicole, the sacraments—and he specifically mentions confession 
here—were instituted to form a "corps visible de religion." The theory 
of divine right monarchy was based on an analogous conception of 
society as a body, that of the king, held together by various rituals and 
image building. 
Here it is the other capacity of the sign within the theory of repre­
sentation that is valorized: "Figure porte absence et présence, plaisir et 
déplaisir," Pascal says in Pensée 265. The efficaciousness of confession 
depends on the sign's ability to truly "porter absence." Here represen­
tation is invoked to hide the presence of sin. The confessional sign is 
called upon to stand as the sigillum of sin, the sign that seals and con­
ceals. As Nicole says in his Instructions, "Tout ce qu'on découvre au 
Prêtre par un aveu sincère, sera caché à jamais à tous les hommes,... et 
tout ce qu'on lui cache sera découvert à la face de toute la terre" (259). 
For the Jansenist theologians, only grace could guarantee that the 
figure really did indicate absence. This is why they sought to delay 
absolution: "Que le pécheur qui cherche sérieusement le bien de son 
âme, ne doit pas souhaiter d'être absous de ses péchés sans délai" 
(Instructions 306). This is also why they continually worried if the for­
mula had really worked: "N'y a t-il point de marques . . . qui nous 
puissent donner une juste confiance de la solidité de notre conver­
sion?" (329). These apprehensions made them insist on the disposition 
of the penitent; Nicole is close to the Protestant position when he af­
firms, "L'absolution produit la grace dans les âmes à proportion de 
leurs dispositions" (311). He is at odds with the Council of Trent, which 
put the emphasis on the power of the formula itself and the authority 
of the priest to absolve sins. Absolution was important for both rigor­
ists and laxists; the former stressed the need for grace to make it opera­
tive, whereas the latter were confident, if not presumptuous, about the 
performative power of the words. 
As with the Eucharist, there were political analogies to the sacra­
ment of penance in the real and imaginary practices of the divine right 
monarchy. There were times when it was just as important to undo 
and efface actions as it was to project a presence. 
Our subject is the literary representation of confession and absolu­
tion, so we again return to Corneille, but, as I discussed in chapter 2, 
confessional discourse was also an important feature of court society 
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as it actually functioned. According to the laws of the ancien régime, 
by an act of "abolition," the king could declare the criminal action of 
one of his subjects as having not taken place. Legally, this is what hap­
pens at the end of Horace and Cinna (Couton 27). We also see historical 
instances of the king trying to use confession to rule consciences. Nor­
bert Elias describes the following case: 
In demanding subordination and confession of guilt, Henri IV 
was implacable. He had to be. For example, he first requested 
the Duc de Biron, who was planning an uprising, to confess his 
intentions in a confidential meeting between the two, promising 
him certain forgiveness if he confessed and repented. But when 
de Biron refused to confess, despite the latter's repeated remind­
ers of services rendered to the king, he had him unceremoniously 
brought to justice and finally executed. (Court 183) 
Horace and Cinna are dramatizations of the power of absolution. In the 
first play, the king intervenes at the end of the play to judge a case of 
homicide. He hears the various accusations and defenses of Horace as 
well as the accused's own verbal account of the murder; he then weighs 
the various arguments in casuistical fashion and delivers a verdict. In 
similar fashion to the Cid, a moral dilemma has been resolved by the 
king's confessing of his subject. 
Cinna portrays the foundation of a permanent peace between an 
absolute king and his rebellious subjects brought about by a pardon 
of the conspirators and their subsequent repentance and submission 
to his rule. Confession and absolution are essential attributes of the 
"roi-prêtre." They are rituals that allow the state to dissociate itself 
from the evil of its constituent members.7 By the pronunciation of the 
royal sigillum, the mystical body of the state erases the sins of its 
heroes. 
Confessional discourse also extends the link between monarch and 
subject to the depths of the subject's conscience. Corneille imagines a 
successful synthesis between royal power and pastoral power. It is a 
fragile balance perhaps achieved completely only in Cinna, where Au­
guste intervenes in time to prevent any crime. The emperor exercises 
true government by gaining access to his subjects' consciences and 
hearing their confessions. Rebellion is nipped in the bud, not by re­
pressive force, but by a turning inward and an obligation to reveal 
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one's thoughts: "Apprends à te connaître, et descends en toi-même. . . . 
Parle, parle, il est temps" (1517, 1541). 
The Case of Horace 
Corneille had no great affection for the fifth act of Horace; he thought 
that the episode of Camille's murder was a breach of the Aristotelian 
unity of action and that the last act, "tout en plaidoyers," was an anti­
climactic if not dishonorable ending for both the play and its hero (Exa-
men). However, he must have felt that the murder of the sister and the 
subsequent trial of Horace were integral parts of the Roman legend 
and that his audience expected these events to be treated in his play. 
His Spanish and Italian predecessors had both included the trial, al­
though Lope de Vega, as concerned with dramatic interest as Corneille, 
dispatched the trial in a few stanzas. The growing prestige of the mon­
arch in Corneille's plays and the subjective profundity of his theater 
required a longer and more detailed scene, which, however unsatisfac­
tory from a dramatic standpoint, was necessary to resolve the moral 
dilemma. 
Returning home victorious, carrying the armor of his vanquished 
brothers-in-law, Horace encounters his sister, the betrothed of Curiace: 
"Ma soeur, voici le bras qui venge nos deux frères" (1251). Somehow, 
he expects his grieving sister to share in his glory. She is as devastated 
by Curiace's death as Horace is drunk with victory. 
Horace's tragic mistake is to start a rhetorical battle with Camille 
that ends in murder and dishonor. He doesn't respect the feminine 
prerogative of mourning, one of the few real liberties accorded women 
in a warrior society. Unlike Rodrigue, who offers Chimène the sword 
of reconciliation and sorrow, Horace ends up using his weapon in a 
disgraceful act of violence against a woman. 
An instructive parallel can be drawn between Horace and Rodrigue 
returning victorious from battle to confront a grieving woman. One 
outcome is admirable and the other tragic. This is because Horace is 
capable only of a rhetorical duel with men that terminates in violence. 
Ironically, his dispute with Camille follows the same pattern as his 
face-off with Curiace: tempers rise until Roman patriotism is insulted 
and violence ensues. Unfortunately, Horace has merely repeated the 
scenario of his combat with Curiace, and one could legitimately 
ask whether, at the moment he stabs his sister, he is not somehow 
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reenacting the duel, because it is Curiace's name that is on his lips 
as he unleashes the fatal blow: "Va dedans les enfers rejoindre ton 
Curiace" (1320). 
Rodrigue, on the contrary, symbolically offers the sword to Chimène 
and allows her to unburden her heart. The situation is different in that 
Chimène is not mourning an "ennemi public" and does not insult 
Rodrigue's patriotism. But both men have killed an object totally in­
vested by the female egos they confront. For this reason, Horace's in­
transigent attitude can be meaningfully contrasted with Rodrigue's. 
The Castilian listens to the anguish of female desire, whereas Horace's 
only advice to Camille is "songe à mes trophées: / Qu'ils soient doré­
navant ton unique entretien" (1277). In Le Cid, Rodrigue weathers the 
storm of Chimène's anger and eventually hears the secret of her undi­
minished love. A similar reconciliation between Horace and Camille 
never occurs because the vanquisher of the Curiaces demands that 
Camille suppress her sentiments: "Tes flammes désormais doivent être 
étouffées" (1275). When Camille does open her heart according to the 
Cornelian formula, "Je t'ouvre mon âme" (1279), it only provokes the 
further ire of Horace. The refusal to hear Camille's avowal of passion 
for Curiace is the sign of a tragic lack of communication. 
What this scene really depicts is a total misapprehension of female 
desire on the part of Horace. He will not understand the depth of his 
sister's love for Curiace. The images of the play show us that Camille's 
love is as terrifying as a nightmare, as mysterious as an oracle, and, 
finally; as deep as the grave. Horace confronts this "en plus" of female 
desire as if it were another masculine rival, another "autre soi-même." 
As in the duel, he seeks to conquer an identity at the other's expense, 
to assure that only his "soi-même" emerges from the encounter. But 
what he really accomplishes is an ironic and belated victory for the 
tragic couple. By killing his sister, he tarnishes his honor and gives her 
what she really desires at this point: the status of martyr of love. By 
trying to extinguish his sister's love for Curiace and kill his rival once 
and for all, he really defeats himself and furnishes his rivals with the 
occasion to be gloriously united in death and in legend. Only the trial 
of the fifth act and the restorative power of King Tulle's diacritical judg­
ment can save the hero from disgrace and preserve the play from a 
truly tragic ending. 
After the murder, we are given at least nine different objective eval­
uations of Horace's act before the king arrives to assume proper au­
thority on this "reserved case." The first qualification of the act is the 
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perpetrator's own words as he commits it; he speaks of "justice" and 
"raison." Next, Procule disapproves of Horace's excessive "rigueur" 
(1325). The elder Horace agrees that Camille merited death, but feels 
that his son has shamed himself by his action (1416). Horace himself 
then admits that his "lâcheté" has sullied his noble blood (1425-26). 
The king then arrives and, after calling Horace's action an "étrange 
malheur," allows Valère to begin, as it were, the prosecution's case. 
"Crime," "coupable," "barbare vainqueur," "souillât la gloire," are 
some of the terms used by Valère. Then Horace is commanded to 
speak on his own behalf. He starts his plea by referring to the monar­
chical principle that the subject is always de jure guilty before the king: 
Sire, on se défend mal contre l'avis d'un Roi, 
Et le plus innocent devient soudain coupable 
Quand aux yeux de son prince il paraît condamnable. 
(1538-40) 
Louis Herland interprets these remarks as expressing "insolence" and 
"mépris de l'opinion du Roi" (201). André Stegmann, however, has 
more correctly identified these lines as being "un acte de soumission 
inconditionnelle" {Héroïsme 396). The whole meaning of the trial is that 
the king, as incarnation of the law {lex rex), is alone capable of making 
the correct judgment. 
The monarch enjoys special charisma and powers of judgment 
which escape the ordinary mortal. L'Innocence justifiée, one of many 
royalist tracts of the 1630s, speaks in these terms of the special graces 
that illuminated Louis XIII: "Par une présence d'esprit miraculeuse 
vous trouvez incontinent, sans tourner, le point principal, le centre du 
cercle et le remède aux affaires les plus épineuses, où vos Ministres, 
souvent quelque raffinés et consommés qu'ils soient en toutes choses, 
n'y vont qu'aux atteintes" (qtd. in Thuau 248). This is the sort of ele­
vated insight that Corneille's roi Tulle possesses and that allows him 
to judge the case of Horace. 
In the Roman legend, as recounted by Livy the king disqualifies 
himself and allows the people to make the final decision. Corneille's 
play, however, explicitly rejects the notion that the people could have 
any insight into the hero's heart: "Horace, ne crois pas que le peuple 
stupide / Soit le maître absolu d'un renom bien solide," says Horace's 
father (1711-12). In Corneille's play, the judgment and pardon of Hor­
ace are part of the process of royal deification; Tulle indicates that by 
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rendering justice to men, "un roi se fait un demi-dieu" (1478). In the 
Roman legend, it is the elder Horace's rhetoric that sways the crowd 
and convinces them of the inhumanity of putting a national hero to 
death: Where could he be executed? Inside or outside the walls of the 
city? Everywhere bears witness to his glory. The hero himself and the 
king stand silent as the father makes his impassioned plea. 
In Corneille, the father makes his speech, but it is to a small closed 
hearing. It is an opinion the king considers, but finally the decision 
will rest upon Horace's own words and the king's response to them. 
Corneille's acquittal depends, not on a public spectacle, but on the 
king's sacramental power to absolve Horace and, in keeping with the 
semiotics of confession, to hide the sin of the hero: "Qu'elles [les lois] 
se taisent donc; que Rome dissimule / Ce que dès sa naissance elle 
vit en Romule" (1755-56, emphasis added). As in the Roman legend, 
Horace's glory outshines his crime, but the rhetorical fashion in which 
this is established is quite the opposite. The crucial exchange in Cor­
neille takes place in the verbalization of the fault by Horace and the 
reply to these words. 
First the king commands Horace to speak: "Défendez-vous Horace." 
Here the purpose of confession is not to dispel a mystery or solve a 
crime but rather to examine the overdeterminations of an act and, by 
an interpretive tour de force, to direct the intention of Horace most 
advantageously. 
What is also important here is for Horace to confirm the king's jus­
tice by his avowal. In both the civil and religious justice from this pe­
riod, a condemned man would confess his crime publicly, "faire 
amende honorable," as part of his punishment, after the judgment of 
his guilt. This served to bear public witness to the righteousness of the 
king's justice and, in some measure, to redeem the condemned man 
who acknowledged his guilt. Finally, in a psychological sense, Horace 
must take an active part in the "talking cure" if it is to be effective and 
he is to be cured of his desire for suicide. The king will base his reply 
on the the very terms that Horace uses, thereby offering an interpreta­
tion and a solution to the hero's tragic impasse. 
As I have already indicated, Horace starts his avowal by submitting 
entirely to the king's judgment and acknowledging his guilt. He invites 
the king to go beyond appearances and discover the hidden truth of 
his motivations: 
Sire, c'est rarement qu'il s'offre une matière 
A montrer d'un grand coeur la vertu tout entière 
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Suivant l'occasion elle agit plus ou moins, 
Et paraît forte ou faible aux yeux de ses témoins. 
Le peuple, qui voit tout seulement par l'écorce 
S'attache à son effet pour juger de sa force. 
(1555-60) 
Horace declares that at the root of all of his actions are a "vertu" and 
a "grand coeur" which are invisible to the people but which the king 
alone can discern. There is a secret entente between hero and monarch 
which makes the king the only fit judge of this case. By this intimation, 
Horace surrenders his fate and his meaning to the king. He offers him­
self up as a sign to be read, a "figure" with its present "écorce" and 
its absent "coeur" which only the king can see. 
Rhetorically, the gambit succeeds; the king takes the cue. He begins 
his interpretation by saying that all the testimony is taken into account, 
"toutes vos raisons me sont encore présentes," but his final decision is 
influenced most heavily by Horace's words, some of which he com­
ments upon literally in his decision. 
First, Tulle deftly turns aside the father's defense on the grounds of 
a "premier mouvement": 
Un premier mouvement qui produit un tel crime 
Ne saurait lui servir d'excuse légitime; 
Les moins sévères lois en ce point sont d'accord. 
(1735-37) 
It is difficult to know exactly what Corneille means by "les moins sé­
vères lois" here. In Livy, the archaic law of the Roman legend is indeed 
implacable; the parricide was condemned to be bound and beaten to 
death. But Corneille's vieil Horace invokes certain principles of juris­
prudence that would be plausible in the seventeenth century, and Tulle 
addresses these issues. French customary law contained the notion 
that the will had to be fully engaged for commission of a crime: "II n'y 
a point de crime là où manque l'intention criminelle" (Loysel, art. 791). 
As I have already mentioned, the casuists were willing to bend homi­
cide laws: duels could be justified; anger and precipitation were legiti­
mate attenuating circumstances. It is my contention that Tulle's 
judgment follows a pattern of moral latitude in political matters in 
Corneille which is based on a casuistical, accommodating adjustment 
between the sacred and raison d'Etat. 
The king first declares that the "premier mouvement" argument is 
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not the relevant point. Horace is not absolved because the murder was 
an involuntary act, but by reference to three key notions that are con­
tained in Horace's own speech: 
1. The arm: "Je ne vanterai point les exploits de mon bras" (1573). 
By this allusion, Horace had called the king's attention to the debt the 
state owes him, and it is "le bras" that opens Tulle's justification of 
Horace: "Ce crime . . . part du même bras / Qui me fait aujourd'hui 
maître de deux Etats" (1740). The synecdochical reduction of Horace 
to his arm allows the crime to be confused with his heroic exploits; 
how can one punish the same arm that saved the nation? Horace's 
victories have established the state itself; he is blessed with "dons que 
le Ciel fait à peu de personnes" (1752). Since the state owes its very 
existence to Horace, he is "au-dessus des lois" (1754). His gift is akin 
to charity; it is the total commitment that frees one from the law. 
2. After this argument, Tulle pronounces the absolution itself: "que 
Rome dissimule / Ce que dès sa naissance elle vit en Romule" (1755­
56). Georges Couton says that Tulle here avails himself of an actual 
provision in the laws of ancien régime France which allowed the king 
to pronounce the "abolition" of a crime, "une procédure qui permettait 
par raison d'Etat de considérer un acte comme non advenu" (27).8 To 
our way of thinking, Tulle goes beyond just effacing the crime. After 
initially stating that the murder "blesse jusqu'aux Dieux," he systemat­
ically attenuates Horace's culpability, first, as we have just seen, by 
placing the hero prior to and above the law, and next by examining 
Horace's real motive. 
This involves a reversal of the cause and effect relationship that the 
people see in Horace's behavior. The warrior had complained that the 
people consider only the "effet" of an action and make false assump­
tions about the motive for heroic actions, thus they would misunder­
stand the killing of Camille because they can't perceive the real 
"cause." The king's interpretation establishes the correct cause and ef­
fect relationship: 
Vis done, Horace, vis guerrier trop magnanime: 
Ta vertu met ta gloire au-dessus de ton crime; 
Sa chaleur généreuse a produit ton forfait; 
D'une cause si belle il faut souffrir l'effet. 
(1759-62) 
The apparent crime is excused because as an "effect" it is derived from 
a virtuous "cause." Again, a métonymie shift, this time by a substitu­
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tion of cause for effect, allows the king to save Horace. First, the synec­
doche of the arm for the man had made it physically impossible to 
separate the hero from the criminal; now a métonymie reversal substi­
tutes a cause—"chaleur généreuse"—for an effect: sororicide, the 
overt fact that the people would have seen, judging only from the 
outside. 
3. This brings us to the third key notion in the decision: Horace's act 
was not the result of a rash act, a "premier mouvement," but rather a 
"vertu," which in the terminology of the Scholastics meant an acquired 
habit. Camille's death resulted from the virtue or habit of patriotism 
in Horace. He has trained himself to react in certain circumstances, 
and this is what produced the regrettable but understandable event. 
Whether or not one is ready to excuse Horace on this account, and 
a modern audience is more likely to be repulsed by his conditioned 
behavior, Tulle's judgment does seem an accurate appraisal of Horace's 
act. In the murder of his sister, Horace does seem to be following a 
habitual pattern of behavior, and the key to it seems to be verbal. Hor­
ace has trained himself to react to certain words or formulas, when 
they are pronounced either by himself or by others. 
At the center of this verbal constellation is the word Rome. When 
Curiace separates himself from Rome, "Je rends grâces aux Dieux de 
n'être pas Romain" (481), Horace no longer sees him as a friend. The 
very fact that Rome has spoken blocks out all further considerations: 
"Rome a choisi mon bras, je n'examine rien" (598). Finally, the name of 
Rome's adversary produces a complete dissociation and denial of his 
friend: "Albe vous a nommé je ne vous connais plus" (502). Horace has 
trained himself to respond to verbal cues; this is the mechanism of his 
"vertu." When Camille provokes him with "Rome, l'unique objet de 
mon ressentiment," she sets off a conditioned reflex of "vertu." 
Horace's reliance on verbal cues to produce a "virtuous" pattern of 
behavior brings to mind Descartes's comments on language and the 
control of the passions. The control of the will is essentially an associa­
tive process that Descartes compares to the arbitrary yet habitual link 
between the phonetic syllables of words and the impressions they pro­
duce on the soul: 
Encore que chaque mouvement de la glande semble avoir été 
joint par la nature à chacune de nos pensées dès le commence­
ment de notre vie, on les peut toutefois joindre à d'autres par 
habitude, ainsi que l'expérience fait voir aux paroles qui excitent 
des mouvements en la glande, lesquels, selon l'institution de la 
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nature, ne représentent à l'âme que leur son lorsqu'elles sont pro­
férées de la voix, ou la figure de leurs lettres lorsqu'elles sont 
écrites, et qui, néanmoins, par l'habitude qu'on a acquise en pen­
sant à ce qu'elles signifient lorsqu'on a ouï leur son ou bien qu'on 
a vu leurs lettres ont coutume de faire concevoir cette significa­
tion plutôt que la figure de leurs lettres ou bien le son de leurs 
syllabes. Il est utile aussi de savoir qu'encore que les mouve­
ments, tant de la glande que des esprits et du cerveau, qui repré­
sentent à l'âme certains objets, soient naturellement joints 
avec ceux qui excitent en elle certaines passions, ils peuvent 
toutefois par habitude en être séparés et joints à d'autres fort 
différents. (Passions 65, emphasis added) 
Descartes is confident that a person can train his response to a given 
sensation or passion in the same way the mind is trained to associate 
letters and sounds with the things they represent. By repeated training, 
for example, a soldier can be taught to associate the sensations of battle 
with courage instead of fear. Language is Descartes's example of what 
is most arbitrary and programmable in human behavior. Horace's be­
havior seems to bear this out if I am right in thinking that words"pro­
vide the real explanation for his virtuous action. 
The final note in Tulle's judgment is an appeal to Horace's vital 
forces: "Vis guerrier trop magnanime" (1759). Let us not forget that 
Horace was near suicide after his crime, and that without the expedi­
ent of the king's absolution, there was no hope for him. He was locked 
in the private world of his own justifications and intentions; only the 
king's inquisition can legitimize his intentions and bring him back into 
the fold. Horace was ready to immolate himself to his egotistical honor, 
but by the king's intervention the tragic impasse of heroic subjectivity 
is overcome in favor of the social body. As was the case at the end of 
Le Cid, an initially criminal passion can be absolved and put to good 
use through the process of confession. 
In the section entitled "Loi figurative" of the Pensées, Pascal attacks 
the Jesuits and other laxists in these terms: "J.-C. selon les chrétiens 
charnels est venu nous dispenser d'aimer Dieu, et nous donner des 
sacrements qui opèrent tout sans nous" (538). Fragment 254 from the 
same section simply reads: "Parler contre les trop grands figuratifs." 
What we have just witnessed in the trial of Horace would certainly 
have elicited similar remarks from Pascal. Tulle and his court are in­
deed "grands figuratifs" in their rhetorical reconstruction and absolu­
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tion of Horace's crime. The original sins of the absolutist state are 
glossed over by a deliberate poetics of confusion. Pascal speaks at 
length on the figure to show the difficulty if not the impossibility of 
discerning the truth without the paradoxical truths of Revelation, 
whereas the laxists deliberately operate within the ambiguities of lan­
guage to achieve their political ends: "Encore qu'on ne puisse assigner 
le juste, on voit bien ce qui ne l'est pas. Les casuistes sont plaisants de 
croire pouvoir interpréter cela comme ils font" (729). By clever inter­
pretation and charismatic powers, analogous to the "sacrements qui 
opèrent tout," the king resolves the case of Horace. 
Cinna: "Le maître des coeurs'' 
Absolution remains at the center of Corneille's political reflection in 
his next play. Both tyranny and tyrannicide are averted by acts of self-
analysis and absolution. The monarch and his conspiring subjects are 
saved by examinations of conscience and pardon. The tyrant Octave 
enters his own heart and renounces the cycle of violence and ven­
geance. Faced with the prospect of killing yet another set of political 
rivals, Auguste pauses. He admonishes himself, "Rentre en toi," and 
admits that he has governed through murder and fear. Inspired by "le 
Ciel," he then interrogates and forgives Cinna, thereby completing his 
metamorphosis from the tyrant Octave into the emperor Auguste, "le 
maître des coeurs." Like the emperor, Cinna must examine his own 
conscience; Auguste orders him: "Apprends à te connaître." And in 
similar fashion to Auguste, he discovers a guilty heart. Ingratitude, 
treachery, and personal glory are his guiding sentiments, not the salva­
tion of the state. Cinna is a desperate lover, not a civic hero. The be­
trayal of Auguste's adoptive daughter, Emilie, is the final challenge to 
the emperor's tolerance, but in a moment of self-conquest and political 
insight, he pardons his enemies instead of killing them. The divinely 
inspired act of absolution signifies both the indemnity of Auguste for 
his past crimes and the redemption of the conspirators, who are trans­
formed into loyal subjects. The tragic impasse of tyranny and tyranni­
cide is resolved by absolution. Instead of another writing of guilt, a 
"proscription," the play concludes in effacement, the magnanimous 
"oubli" of the emperor. 
All of Corneille's oeuvre, and Cinna in particular, has been studied 
many times for its political lesson. The dramatist, who once collabo­
rated with Richelieu, is variously portrayed as the artistic spokesman 
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of absolutism and raison d'Etat, and Cinna is considered the most suc­
cessful idealization of the absolute monarch. Bernard Dort, for ex­
ample, calls Corneille an "écrivain d'Etat, poète de la légitimité, sujet 
convaincu des vertus de l'absolutisme" (18) and qualifies Cinna as a 
"vision presque mystique . . . en équilibre dans l'Histoire" (54). More 
recently, Michel Prigent has chosen to study Corneille's characters as 
"héros ou victimes de la raison d'Etat" (4). 
The various characters in the play express at different moments the 
main tenets of the monarchical doctrine of an all-powerful state, a di­
vinely sanctioned coalition of subjects under the figure of the king. 
Cinna expresses this idea of the integrity of the state guaranteed by 
the royal presence. Advising Auguste, he says, "Sous vous, l'Etat n'est 
plus en pillage aux armées; / Les portes de Janus par vos mains sont 
fermées" (553-54). The king prevents the state from fragmenting into 
rival factions, and he puts an end to the disordered state of war, sym­
bolized by the closing of the gates of Janus. A few lines earlier, Cinna 
gives his view of the unstable tendency of democracy: "Mais quand le 
peuple est maître, on n'agit qu'en tumulte: / La voix de la raison jamais 
ne se consulte" (518-19). The power of the king to consolidate the state 
by binding the anarchical mob together is evident in this exposé of the 
"Etatist" doctrine. What has so far escaped the attention of political 
readings of Cinna is another principle of the nascent state: pastoral 
power. 
Once again, my theoretical reference is the work of Michel Foucault. 
In his essay "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Rea­
son,'" Foucault argues that the modern state, from its origins in the 
seventeenth century, was founded on two kinds of rationality: (1) raison 
d'Etat, which is the science of forming a lasting coalition of subjects 
united by the monarch, and (2) pastoral power, which is a power exer­
cised through knowledge of individuals. Hence the title of the essay, 
"Omnes et Singulatim," since the modern state functions by simultane­
ously forging the group and cultivating the individual subject. 
Since raison d'Etat has already received much critical attention, Fou­
cault dwells on the second, unsuspected aspect of state rationality. He 
calls it pastoral power because it developed around the figure of the 
shepherd-leader discussed in Greek, Hebrew, and Christian texts. The 
shepherd-ruler cares for each individual member of his flock, and he 
must know his sheep on an individual basis. In Greek mythology, the 
shepherd-ruler belonged to an ideal Golden Age when men were 
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guided by gods. 'The deity being their shepherd, mankind needed no 
political constitution" (Plato, Statesman, qtd. in Foucault 234). In the 
ensuing real historical period, politics set itself the task of binding citi­
zens together to form the city-state. 
The pastoral ideal, relegated to a mythical past by Greek political 
thought, was actively developed in Christianity, acquiring the specific 
features of spiritual direction, obedience, and self-renunciation which 
I have analyzed in the preceding chapters. Foucault characterizes the 
modern state as borrowing both civic and pastoral rationalities for its 
purposes: 
We can say that Christian pastorship has introduced a game that 
neither the Greek nor the Hebrew imagined. A strange game 
whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-
identity; a game which seems to have nothing to do with the 
game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of the citizens. 
Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happened to combine 
those two games—the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game— 
in what we call the modern State. ("Omnes" 239, emphasis added) 
Cinna is the representation of both "games" mentioned here by Fou­
cault—the state as both unitive, civic project and problematization of 
the individual subject and his or her desires. My reading emphasizes 
the pastoral aspects of state power in Cinna, since this is an area where 
I find other critics' explanations unsatisfactory. Most readings resort 
to seventeenth-century moral concepts like "générosité" or "magnani­
mité" to explain Auguste's pardon, which appears to be a gratuitous, 
"inspired" gesture. I maintain that the concept of pastoral power 
can provide a more systematic explanation of the events portrayed in 
Cinna and make them more relevant to the historical moment of their 
transformation from Roman legend into reflection on the modern 
state. 
Auguste's first words give us a clue as to the novelty of the political 
themes Corneille wishes to explore. Unaware of the conspiracy brew­
ing against him, the emperor seeks the counsel of Maxime and Cinna. 
He asks his presumed friends which is the better form of government, 
monarchy or republic. This is a scene not to be found in Seneca's ver­
sion of the legend, but borrowed from Dio. But just before asking the 
conspirators' advice, the emperor bares his soul in a truly confessional 
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revelation of the disappointments and anxieties of power. This passage 
is not to be found in Corneille's sources; the dilemma and its poetic 
expression are strikingly modern: 
L'ambition déplaît quand elle est assouvie, 
D'une contraire ardeur son ardeur est suivie, 
Et comme notre esprit, jusqu'au dernier soupir 
Toujours vers quelque objet pousse quelque désir 
II se ramène en soi, n'ayant plus où se prendre. 
(365-69) 
Auguste has discovered the same truth about desire and dissatisfac­
tion in the political sphere that Molière's Dom Juan experiences in 
erotic life. There is no such thing as "possession"; desire itself has be­
come problematical at this moment in history. One can comically cele­
brate this state of affairs, abandon oneself to the serial succession of 
new objects, and accept the dispersion of the self symbolized by the 
final rendezvous with the commandant. After much subjective probing 
and the unfolding events of history, Auguste will discover an alterna­
tive path of self-preservation based on the denial of desire and mastery 
over the instincts. 
He considers for a moment a total renunciation of power and all of 
its wish fulfillments. He asks his counselors to speak freely and to 
advise him whether to continue on as king or abdicate in favor of a 
republic: "Traitez-moi comme ami, non comme souverain" (399). This 
invitation to informality is seen by many critics as a sign of weakness 
and indecision. Doubrovsky speaks of "Auguste en perte d'autonomie 
héroïque... . On ne peut établir en même temps des relations de supé­
riorité et de réciprocité" (195). Prigent comments: "Auguste se trouve 
ici au plus bas degré de la politique. Il déclenche lui-même le processus 
subversif en renonçant au titre de 'souverain' pour celui 'd'ami': est-ce 
au roi d'abaisser la monarchie?" (59). But for us, knowingly or not, 
Auguste has spread a net of confession and confidentiality into which 
the rebels will fall. 
This scene begins the process of disarming Cinna from within. The 
resolute republican who had eloquently defended the cause of Roman 
liberty will be touched by the emperor's openness and will find himself 
burdened with "remords" and "conscience," unable to carry out the 
assassination. Viewed strictly from the perspective of classical political 
power, this scene does seem to constitute a moment of weakness, but 
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as an exercise in pastoral power, this maneuver by Auguste is ex­
tremely efficacious. He invokes the concept of "ami," which he will 
repeat again triumphantly at the end of the play: "Soyons amis." This 
might appear as a derogation of monarchical power, but it turns out 
to be the other, pastoral face of the state through which Auguste 
triumphs. 
A look at some contemporary texts on "amitié" can confirm the 
powerful connotations of this word in seventeenth-century court soci­
ety. In general, La Rochefoucauld is severely critical of what passes for 
"friendship," calling it "un commerce où l'amour-propre se propose 
toujours quelque chose à gagner" (52). But there are rare exceptions 
that confirm the rule: "Un véritable ami est le plus grand de tous les 
biens" (106). Real friendship is based on mutual truth obligations; total 
confidentiality reigns between true friends: "On doit ne leur rien 
cacher de ce qui ne regarde que nous, se montrer à eux toujours vrais 
dans nos bonnes qualités et dans nos défauts même" (117). 
Mme de Lafayette's La Princesse de Clèves also reveals the close asso­
ciations between friendship, confidentiality, and power at court. When 
the queen, Marie de Medicis, recruits the vidame de Chartres as her 
confidant, she must first "confess" him. As the vidame tells the story: 
"Elle souhaitait de s'assurer de mon secret et elle avait envie de me 
confier les siens." The queen tells him, "La manière dont je vous parle 
vous doit obliger à ne me rien cacher. Je veux que vous soyez de mes 
amis ... mais je ne veux pas, en vous donnant cette place, ignorer quels 
sont vos attachements" (104, emphasis added). The queen here uses 
almost the same words as Auguste to offer the vidame a privileged 
place at court; he has access to power, but the queen's friendship also 
imposes obligations of truth and loyalty. 
Finally, we must remember that in court society rank was denoted 
by degree of intimacy with the king. To be present at the royal lever or 
meal, to be the valet or écuyer of the king, was a mark of distinction, 
an inclusion in the power structure. The offer of royal "friendship" 
carried with it none of the connotations of equality or merely private 
conviviality we might assume in modern society, where friendship and 
public life are more clearly demarcated. 
Unconsciously, the same bond of "friendship" is played out in the 
first scene of act 2 when Auguste reveals the secrets of his own heart 
and asks for honest political opinions from his newly initiated 
"friends." As monarch, he will soon be entitled to their gratitude and 
their consciences. For the moment, Auguste is deluded in saying to 
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Cinna and Maxime: "Je vois trop que vos coeurs n'ont point pour moi 
de fard" (628). But the words express the ideal relation between an 
absolute king and his subjects, the "discernement" mentioned by 
Cinna in line 506. 
There is thus a sort of prophetic logic in the advice Cinna offers. 
The ardent republican finds himself defending the royalist position; he 
defends the superiority of the monarchy and advises Auguste to stay 
on the throne. He later explains to an astonished Maxime that the move 
was a cynical ploy to keep the emperor in power just long enough to 
carry out plans for a vengeful coup d'état. But in an ironic way, Cinna's 
adherence to the royal ideology is consistent with his being enclosed 
in the pastoral embrace of friendship by Auguste. 
After the meeting, he seems opposed to the idea of tyrannicide and 
tries to convince Emilie of the gravity of such a crime: 
Le Ciel a trop fait voir en de tels attentats

Qu'il hait les assassins et punit les ingrats,

Et quoi qu'on entreprenne, et quoi qu'on exécute,

Quand il élève un trône, il en venge la chute.

De pareils châtiments n'appartiennent qu'au foudre. 
(1003-10) 
Unlike some Jesuit casuists, Cinna disapproves of tyrannicide as a 
means of political action; the just subject must suffer the abuses of the 
tyrant, leaving it to divine intervention to remove him.9 But on this 
question he flip-flops maddeningly throughout the play. In the begin­
ning, he qualifies Auguste as a "tyran" (145), and a "tigre altéré de 
tout le sang romain" (168). His assassination will be glorious: "Avec la 
liberté, Rome s'en va renaître" (226). But even after his interview with 
the emperor and his attempts to persuade Emilie as to the divine invio­
lability of kings, he still feels bound by the "serment" (993) he has 
pledged to his mistress and the conspirators. He is again ready to jus­
tify tyrannicide: "II faut sur un tyran porter de justes coups" (1051), 
although, significantly, he now sees his action as a "crime" (1064) and 
intends to punish himself immediately by suicide. 
Cinna's ideology is at the mercy of his love life. He would appear 
to be a royalist at heart and sincere in his preference for this form of 
government in his speeches to Auguste and Emilie, but his passions 
have led him to espouse the republican cause. He and his fellow con­
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spirators have not even made detailed plans for the sort of government 
that will follow their revolt. Perhaps Cinna's political confusion is also 
the sign of the dialectical struggle that accompanies the emergence of 
absolutism. In France, the divine right monarchy asserted itself at the 
expense of the great feudal barons, and in Cinna's royalist speeches he 
blames the nobles for perpetuating civil war. On the other hand, his 
republican sentiments are perhaps expressions of bourgeois and par­
liamentary aspirations to power. During the first part of Corneille's 
career, the king pursued an alliance with the bourgeoisie against the 
great noble houses. The paradox of Cinna's republicanism and absolut­
ism could well reflect the dynamics of political developments in Cor­
neille's day. One can see that absolutism paved the way for the 
bourgeois prise de pouvoir by destroying the grands and allying itself 
with the robe class. 
Critics such as Couton and Stegmann maintain that Corneille con­
demned the violent overthrow of kings: "Le tyrannicide reste toujours 
à la fois un régicide et un parricide, le pire des crimes. On ne peut 
détrôner un usurpateur que pour rendre le trône à l'héritier légitime" 
(Couton 98; Stegmann, Corneille éd. 268). The dramatist went so far as 
to falsify history in Nicomède to spare his public the spectacle of "une 
castrophe si barbare" (Corneille, Oeuvres 520). 
The intended lesson of Cinna was doubtless that tyrannicide was an 
unthinkable political option in the seventeenth century, but within the 
space of Roman history it remains a tragic possibility until the tyrant 
Octave is converted into the magnanimous divine right emperor. Au­
guste himself, in a long confessional passage, considers that the con­
spirators are justified, even by the gods: 
Rentre en toi-même, Octave, et cesse de te plaindre. 
Quoi! tu veux qu'on t'épargne, et n'as rien épargné! 
Songe aux fleuves de sang où ton bras s'est baigné, 
De combien ont rougi les champs de Macédoine, 
Leur trahison est juste, et le Ciel l'autorise. 
(1130-45) 
Until heaven endows him with the aura of pastoral power, the cycle of 
tyranny and tyrannicide will continue. Until Auguste assumes both 
objectively and subjectively the sacred place of the monarch, political 
murder will remain the order of the day. 
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Auguste's meditation on his own guilt in the passage above is a key 
moment in the emergence of pastoral power. He reiterates the themes 
of dissatisfaction and moral disgust with the exercise of power in the 
world. He is searching for an end to political crimes and relief for 
his own conscience. The solution will come with the idea of pardon, 
first suggested by his wife, Livie: "Essayez sur Cinna ce que peut la 
clémence" (1210). 
Auguste's first reaction is to retreat to the logic of raison d'Etat: 
Tout son peuple est blessé par un tel attentat, 
Et la seule pensée est un crime d'Etat, 
Une offense qu'on fait à toute sa province, 
Dont il faut qu'il la venge, ou cesse d'être prince. 
(1251-54) 
The emperor could well be following the advice of a famous étatiste 
manual, Richelieu's Political Testament, in which the king is advised to 
be implacable with conspiracies: 
With regard to crimes of state it is necessary to close the door to 
pity, ignoring the pleas of interested individuals and the clamor 
of an ignorant populace, which occasionally condemns what is 
most useful and even indispensable to it. Christians ought to for­
get their personal injuries, but magistrates must not forget those 
which affect the public interest. In fact, to leave them unpunished 
is as likely to invite their repetition as to pardon and remit them. 
According to a pure reason of state position, Auguste should show no 
mercy. But the play eschews an exclusively political rationality; it goes 
beyond political reason to demonstrate the superior principle of the 
king as pastor, as master of the heart. 
Dramatically, Corneille arranges the last act of the play so that the 
decision to pardon the conspirators arrives as a sudden inspiration 
from heaven. Livie had suggested the alternate route of clemency, but 
Auguste had refused this advice and moved toward another proscrip­
tion or "supplice" (1662). Suddenly, as the emperor learns that even 
his adoptive daughter has betrayed him, he receives an insight that 
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resolves simultaneously his own subjective malaise and the political 
crisis: 
Je suis maître de moi comme de l'univers; 
Je le suis, je veux l'être. O siècles, ô mémoire, 
Conservez à jamais ma dernière victoire! 
Je triomphe aujourd'hui du plus juste courroux 
De qui le souvenir puisse aller jusqu'à vous. 
Soyons amis, Cinna, c'est moi qui t'en convie. 
(1696-1701) 
According to the monarchist logic of the play, the king's conscience is 
the source of political wisdom. As was the case with Horace, he person­
ally solves the problem of crime and punishment; his words of forgive­
ness and the reiteration of the term "ami" provide a synthesis and a 
solution for the entire development of guilt and remorse throughout 
the play Cinna and Emilie, who had refused to show remorse, sud­
denly find the words of guilt and pardon on their lips: 
Emilie: Je connais mon forfait... 
Je sens naître en mon âme un repentir puissant, 
(1717-19) 
Cinna: O vertu sans exemple! ô clémence qui rend 
Votre pouvoir plus juste, et mon crime plus grand. 
(1731-32) 
Both the monarch and his subjects are delivered from their guilty con­
sciences, the conspirators by the pardon, and Auguste by the sudden 
realization that he is the king and as such free from the crimes of the 
past. By vanquishing his own personal inclination to revenge, he has 
subjectively attained the monarchical position, becoming "maître de 
moi comme de l'univers." Livie had already exposed this part of the 
royalist doctrine: 
Tous ces crimes d'Etat qu'on fait pour la couronne, 
Le ciel nous en absout alors qu'il nous la donne, 
Et dans le sacré rang où sa faveur l'a mis, 
Le passé devient juste et l'avenir permis. 
(1609-12) 
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But Auguste has to realize this subjectively. By performing an absolu­
tion himself, he establishes the precedent of pardon within the state. 
He operates as both celebrant and recipient of this sacrament of for­
giveness.10 
Auguste's gesture has been variously interpreted by critics and even 
emperors. Napoléon understood the pardon as a cynical maneuver: 
"Une fois, Monvel, en jouant devant moi, m'a dévoilé le mystère de 
cette grande conception. Il prononça le 'Soyons amis, Cinna/ d'un ton 
si habile et si rusé, que je compris que cette action n'était que la feinte 
d'un tyran, et j'ai approuvé comme calcul ce qui me semblait puéril 
comme sentiment" (qtd. in Doubrovsky 213). 
Jacques Maurens explains it as an example of "la vertu des Païens," 
and stresses the historical fidelity of Corneille: "II serait absurde 
d'imaginer que Corneille ait voulu montrer Auguste bénéficiant réele­
ment de la grâce" (274). For us, Corneille has overlaid the Roman leg­
end so heavily with Christian elements as for it to be totally 
reconstructed. The drama of the conspirators' guilty consciences, the 
Christian theme of the morbidity of human desire, and the heroic trial 
of self-statement are entirely of Corneille's making. They transform the 
story of a political truce into one of a sacred pardon. They propose a 
new kind of heroism and power in which self-depreciation and confi­
dentiality are not political blunders or evidence of weakness but rather 
new dimensions of power relations. The king must undergo his own 
subjective analysis of guilt, but he emerges as a broker of consciences, 
"le maître des coeurs." 
Serge Doubrovsky interprets the gesture as an instance of aristo­
cratie arrogance: "Auguste ne pardonne pas par charité ou par mag­
nanimité, au sens moderne, mais par 'générosité' au sens du XVIIième 
siècle, c'est-à-dire par orgueil aristocratique, pour prouver, à ses yeux 
comme à ceux des autres, sa propre supériorité" (214). This interpreta­
tion stems from the author's existentialist concept of a "projet de maî­
trise" based on the aristocratic hero's struggle to conquer an 
"existence" against the adversity of other men and the forces of history. 
A key moment in this Hegelian power game is the recognition of the 
master by the slaves, and this is apparently the real significance of 
Auguste's pardon. 
Religion is brought into the discussion of Cinna, but it is interpreted 
as a projection of the master mentality: "Le projet monarchique, en 
dernière analyse est la forme extrême que prend le projet humain d'ê­
tre Dieu" (218). The movement toward theology in the play would be 
 147 A COEUR OUVERT
simply an attempt to deify the master who tries to "escape history" 
(217). Doubrovsky uses the key existentialist categories of "essence" 
and "existence" to explain how the emperor attempts to canonize his 
existence and reduce the other masters to a dependent state of essence: 
"On s'aperçoit qu'il y avait une certaine justification à la révolte anar­
chique et anachronique d'Emilie, à son refus de laisser son Moi se ré­
sorber dans l'Histoire, de troquer une Maîtrise, originellement jaillie 
du mouvement même de l'existence, contre une essence aristocratique, 
octroyée d'en haut, par le Ciel et par le Roi" (220). Religion in Cinna is 
simply a transparent expression of the emperor's will to power. 
I would agree that religion creates power relations and that Cinna, 
in its exploration of political and religious power, could be considered 
a "prolégomène à tout Etatisme futur" (220). But Doubrovsky's analy­
sis fails to appreciate the specificity of the two rationalities that com­
bine to form the modern state, the pastoral and the civic. His account 
of religion as a pure exercise in aristocratic mastery is a misrepresenta­
tion of the Christian mentality. If Auguste really had pardoned by "or­
gueil aristocratique," would Emilie and Cinna have thrown themselves 
at his feet? If power is enacted by the Hegelian recognition scene of 
the master by the slave, what is the meaning of the many appeals to 
introspection throughout the play? Auguste's power is based on reli­
gion, but it involves a reversal of the Hegelian model: the slave's dis­
course is no longer simply acknowledgment of the master but analysis 
of himself as well, and the master himself takes on the identity of the 
shepherd. 
What is missing from Doubrovsky's account is an appreciation of 
the "slave" essence of Christianity. To the idea of a "projet de maîtrise" 
and religion as transparent expression of the noble will to power, one 
must oppose the historical lesson of Nietzsche: "The masters have been 
disposed of; the morality of the common man has won" (36). This was 
a process that took many centuries, but by Corneille's day, I contend, 
the aristocratic ethos had already absorbed certain "ascetic" values. In 
fact, Corneille's work traces in exemplary fashion the evolution from 
the feudal ethic of "meurs ou tue" to the arrival of conscience and guilt 
as part of the master mentality: "Je sens au fond du coeur mille re­
mords cuisants" (803), "Je connais mon forfait . . .  " (1717), etc. The 
Nietzschean idea of a radical difference between "noble" and 
"priestly" values, and of the Western soul as a "battleground" between 
the values of "Rome and Judea," is a necessary antidote to the one-
sided presentation of the "projet de maîtrise" (Genealogy 52). 
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Christianity is opposed to the knightly-warrior ethic; the will to 
power subsists, but it has allied itself with the "ascetic ideal." In the 
Nietzschean scheme, the phase of "artists of violence and organizers 
who build states" gives way to another creative project, the ascetic 
making of the self, the "secret self-ravishment, this artists' cruelty, this 
delight in imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffer­
ing material" (87). In a passage that doubtless inspired Foucault's 
whole idea of pastoral power, Nietzsche describes the ascetic ruler as 
a shepherd: "He [the shepherd] must be sick himself, he must be pro­
foundly related to the sick—how else would they understand each 
other?—but he must also be strong master of himself even more than 
of others, with his will to power intact, so as to be both trusted and 
feared by the sick, so as to be their support, resistance, prop, compul­
sion, taskmaster, tyrant, and god" (126). However one interprets 
Nietzsche's characterization of the ascetic as "sick"—and there are dia­
lectical reversals and epistemological valorizations of the sick else­
where in his philosophy—this passage does seem relevant to the 
emergence in Cinna of the paradoxical "maître des coeurs," who ex­
plores his own guilt and subjectivity before becoming the master. Like 
a Freudian analyst who first undergoes the didactic analysis, Auguste 
develops his own unconscious as a tool for understanding and govern­
ing others. He goes against the grain of orthodox politics; he appears 
to abandon power and descend to equality: "Traitez-moi comme ami, 
non comme souverain" (399). He forgives where all of the theorists of 
raison d'Etat advise severity, yet he triumphs completely. The masters 
have been disposed of. The stole is mightier than the sword. 
POLYEUCTE: "A COEUR OUVERT" 
We end our study of heroic avowal in Corneille with Polyeucte because 
structurally and thematically this play carries to its conclusion the as­
cending pattern of confession and heroism in the "grand Corneille" of 
the years 1635-40. Confessional discourse follows the fortunes of the 
hero throughout the rest of Corneille's career. Confession remains a 
major component in the elaboration and resolution of moral conflict, 
although the solutions become more and more tenuous as the political 
order degenerates. The last play, Suréna, marks the eclipse of the hero 
and his open heart. Suréna inhabits a tyrannical world where there 
is no longer a "roi des coeurs." Instead, the hero must defend the 
truths of his heart against a predatory state. As Suréna tells Pacorus, 
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"L'empire des coeurs n'est plus de votre empire" (1310). This develop­
ment is beyond the scope of my work, however, as I have chosen Racine 
to illustrate the tragic possibilities of confessional discourse. 
Structurally, the plot of Polyeucte develops as a series of personal 
revelations. A single event, the return of Sévère, sets in motion a series 
of subjective examinations and determinations to resolve the crisis by 
self-revelation. There are no fewer than six avowal scenes that carry 
the play forward. 
Thematically, confession appears in a Christian context, which 
allows Corneille to examine the whole scope of its meaning. Primarily, 
the word signifies verbalization of sin, but it can also mean confession 
of faith. There is a natural progression from one meaning to the next, 
as avowal of sin prepares the soul to receive and confess the divine 
truth. The theme of immolation is attached to confession because pub­
lic proclamation of the faith leads to martyrdom, the ultimate forum 
for the Christian declaration of the self. The martyr is a witness 
(Gk. martur) to the sacrifice of the body in favor of the transcendental 
truth of the heart; he confesses simultaneously man's sinfulness and 
its overcoming by signification. His body becomes a steadfast sign of 
the truth of his faith, a proof that God sustains him in the ordeal. As 
we recall, the first ritual of confession was a public chastisement of the 
body directly modeled upon martyrdom. In the Christian tradition, 
self-statement always gravitates toward masochistic and persecutory 
scenarios. To state the truth about the self is to suffer and die. 
In Polyeucte, the heroic trial of self-statement follows out this logic 
of confession to the end. The pattern of avowal and renunciation 
stretches from the beginning to the end of the play. From the first issue 
of Pauline's mysterious dream to its final revelation as Polyeucte's mar­
tyrdom, there is a constant recurrence of confession: Pauline confesses 
her adulterous passion first to Sévère himself and then to her husband 
as a means of defending her honor but also of perpetuating a form 
of admirative, sublimated love. Polyeucte, in turn, confesses his faith, 
thereby sacrificing both his wife and his life, as if heroic self-statement 
finally coincided with self-destruction: "Qu'on me mène à la mort, je 
n'ai plus rien à dire" (1313). 
The process leads the hero beyond the political and sexual arrange­
ments that Corneille celebrates in his previous plays, namely, the state 
and the family. Polyeucte smashes the idols of the Roman Pantheon to 
proclaim a single ethical God and surrenders his wife to his former 
rival, Sévère. A revolutionary event safely distanced in Roman history 
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but not without significance for Corneille's period, a warning that the 
sacred is always a dangerous ally of ideology because it formulates 
the dreams and demands of mankind and projects them outside of 
history into eternity. In Polyeucte we see conjugal eros fatally attracted 
to death and imperial Rome forced to admit higher allegiances on the 
part of its subjects: "Je dois ma vie au peuple, au prince, à sa 
couronne, / Mais je la dois bien plus au Dieu qui me la donne" (1211— 
13). Polyeucte must give up the physical pleasures of his recent mar­
riage as well as his attachments to the political order. 
To an extent, religion is the "opium of the people," and the divine 
right monarchy certainly tried to exploit the quasi-sacramental aura 
that surrounded the king, but discourses are polyvalent. The formation 
of conscience and the impulse to confess are processes that could 
threaten absolutism. Polyeucte's Christian dream contains a theology 
of liberation, an egalitarian vision of a future in which "les rois et les 
bergers sont d'un même rang" (1529). In Polyeucte, the allegiance be­
tween the throne and the altar is only saved by the dubious conversion 
of Félix, who, as monarch, is reduced to the role of admiring spectator 
of heroic consciousness. 
The Obligation to Reveal 
Polyeucte's first dialogue with his wife reveals that he is hiding some­
thing from her: "Quel est donc ce secret?" (112). The secret turns out 
to be his newly found faith, and martyrdom will ultimately ensue be­
cause of the fundamental obligation of the Christian to reveal his or 
her heart: "Un chrétien ne craint rien, ne dissimule rien: / Aux yeux 
de tout le monde il est toujours chrétien" (1549-50). The believer uses 
verbalization to combat sin, to strengthen his resolve, and, finally, to 
buy the crown of martyrdom. The process of speaking the truth about 
oneself furnishes the "grace" necessary for heroic action. This idea is 
illustrated many times throughout the play. 
When Pauline is troubled by a dream, Stratonice invites her to deal 
with it through avowal: "A raconter ses maux souvent on les soulage" 
(161). The confessional principle is immediately recognized and af­
firmed by Pauline, who replies with a formula of her own: "Une femme 
d'honneur peut avouer sans honte / Ces surprises des sens que la 
raison surmonte" (165). Before giving the details of the dream, she 
explains to Statonice how she once loved Sévère but bowed to her fa­
ther's preference for Polyeucte; then she recounts her nightmare vision 
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in which her husband is murdered by the combined efforts of the 
Christians and her father.11 Various characters offer their opinion of the 
dream: Pauline is worried, Polyeucte unaffected but deferential to his 
wife's feelings. Néarque, acting like a monastic director, offers his dia­
critical advice: 'Ainsi du genre humain l'ennemi vous abuse . .. / Et 
ce songe rempli de noires visions / N'est que le coup d'essai de ses 
illusions" (53, 59-60). The dream comes from the devil because it is 
delaying Polyeucte's conversion. But the demon's efforts are defeated 
in part through revelation of the dream. Polyeucte knows the motive 
behind his wife's fears, and these resistances can be dismantled by 
Néarque. 
The spectator, however, senses that the dream is premonitory and 
the whole play in a sense a kind of Traumdeutung. As the events of the 
dream are fulfilled one by one, starting with the return of Sévère, the 
viewer begins to doubt Néarque's authority. Was the dream just a 
"noire illusion"? Are the Christians "impie et sacrilège," as Stratonice 
suggested (257)? To the extent that the dream retards Polyeucte's con­
version, it is "diabolical." From a psychoanalytical perspective, its de­
tails could also express unconscious, repressed wishes: continued 
erotic attachment to Sévère, revolt against the paternal law counterbal­
anced by images of castration, as the father rushes in to stab Poly­
eucte.12 But by the play's end, these tragic scenes from the family 
romance are transformed into a beatific vision. 
"Avouer sans honte" 
In scene 2 of act 2, Pauline is sent by Félix to mollify Sévère. Lacking 
the courage to confront the emperor's new favorite, whose marriage to 
Pauline he had thwarted, he hopes that she can save him from Sévère's 
wrath. It is an ignoble maneuver that puts Pauline in a difficult posi­
tion. Sent by her own father to exploit an old passion for political pur­
poses, she must preserve her honor. 
The tactic she chooses is avowal, beginning the interview with a 
straightforward declaration that she is married and loves Polyeucte. 
She then announces her intention to open her heart fully to Sévère: 
"Pauline a l'âme noble et parle à coeur ouvert" (463). 
She exploits the power of confessional discourse by taking the high 
ground morally. By covering herself with the "nobleness" attached to 
confession, she shields herself from the consequences of admitting her 
love. The performative, redemptive power of confession can outweigh 
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the facts of the case. The self-assurance of one who initiates confession 
bespeaks a mastery that cannot be disarmed. 
She first admits that she would have chosen Sévère over Polyeucte: 
"Si le ciel en mon choix eût mis mon hyménée, / A vos seules vertus 
je me serais donnée" (465-66). Sévère presses for concessions: "Est-ce 
là comme on aime, et m'avez-vous aimé?" (496). But unlike Chimène, 
Pauline avoids the role of inquisitional victim. She retains the initiative; 
she confesses that she still loves Sévère violently: "Le dedans n'est que 
trouble et que sédition. / Un je ne sais quel charme encor vers vous 
m'emporte" (504-5). However, she is firmly resolved to follow her duty 
and remain faithful to Polyeucte. Sévère is told that he must honor and 
preserve Pauline's virtue because this is why he loves her in the first 
place. This is the strange paradox of passion and denial in Corneille; 
virtue itself becomes eroticized, and the passions conspire with their 
own refusal. 
The key moment in this process occurs in the middle of Pauline's 
avowal when the troubling, unspecified passion, "Un je ne sais quel 
charme," is brought under control by a métonymie shift from "vers 
vous m'emporte" to an aspect or quality of Sévère: "Votre mérite est 
grand, si ma raison est forte, / Je le vois encor tel qu'il alluma mes 
feux" (506-7, emphasis added). Pauline confines her passion to 
"merit," which both she and Sévère can increase by honoring the pater­
nal laws of marriage. A chaste ecstasy of denial and mutual admiration 
may continue: "Adieu, trop malheureux et trop parfait amant" (572).13 
Pauline remains consistent in her use of confession to extricate her­
self from a difficult situation. Like the princesse de Clèves, she combats 
her adulterous inclination by admitting it to her husband: 
Et pour vous parler avec une âme ouverte, 
Depuis qu'un vrai mérite a pu nous enflammer, 
Sa présence toujours a droit de nous charmer. 
(614-16) 
Polyeucte seems ravished by this exercise in openheartedness: "O 
vertu trop parfaite, et devoir trop sincère" (621). We do not know ex­
actly all the sentiments that Pauline's confession arouses in Polyeucte's 
heart. Certainly, he must feel the pangs of jealousy. There is a hint of 
ironic cruelty in his verbatim citation of this passage when bequeath­
ing Pauline to Sévère: "Puisqu'un si grand mérite a pu vous 
enflammer, / Sa présence toujours a droit de vous charmer" (1589-90). 
The wound of jealousy pushes Polyeucte farther along the ascetic 
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path of confession and sacrifice; immediately following Pauline's con­
fession, he announces his plan to destroy the idols and bring about 
his own martyrdom: "Allons mon cher Néarque, allons aux yeux des 
hommes / Braver l'idolâtrie, et montrer qui nous sommes" (645-46). 
Polyeucte is inspired by his wife's confession to make his own admis­
sion, which will in turn win back the heart of Pauline, "seduce" her to 
the highest form of the erotic of virtue. 
Le combat de la chasteté 
"O combat que surtout j'appréhende . . .  " (1082). In his prison cell, 
Polyeucte learns that Pauline will visit him and try to dissuade his zeal 
for martyrdom. To prepare for the "combat" of her visit, Polyeucte first 
engages in a spiritual and rhetorical battle with the temptations of the 
flesh. The noble Pauline, the perfect wife, becomes "un obstacle à mon 
bien" (1144). Like the famous anchorites, Polyeucte must wage the soli­
tary struggle against the "honteux attachement de la chair et du 
monde" before he can merit the crown of martyrdom (1107). 
He first seeks the intercession of Néarque in heaven to help him in 
his struggle; then he sends a guard to bring Severe to his cell, as he 
plans to give his wife away to his former rival. The other guards retire, 
and Polyeucte is left alone on center stage to conduct his battle for 
chastity. This is not an eroticism of immediate physical presences, like 
that of Dante's Paolo and Francesca, but a baroque, "obscene" repre­
sentation of passion where temptation and jouissance, whether spiritual 
or carnal, are not the meeting of two bodies but solitary internal en­
counters between a subject and his pleasures. This is the modern sub­
ject of sexuality alone in the confessional: 
Source délicieuse en misères féconde, 
Que voulez-vous de moi, flatteuses voluptés? 
Honteux attachements de la chair et du monde, 
Que ne me quittez-vous quand je vous ai quittés? 
Allez, honneurs, plaisirs, qui me livrez la guerre: 
Toute votre félicité 
Sujette à l'instabilité 
En moins de rien tombe par terre, 
Et comme elle a l'éclat du verre 
Elle en a la fragilité. 
(1105-14) 
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What he confronts are not the unclean spirits, the literal temptresses of 
the Desert Fathers, but the abstract qualities of Counter-Reformation 
spirituality, "flatteuses voluptés," "honteux attachements de la chair," 
"honneurs, plaisirs." They are personified and engaged in an imagi­
nary dialogue, "Que ne me quittez-vous quand je vous ai quittés?" 
Since they persist in tormenting Polyeucte, they are invited to show 
what they really have to offer. But he is not seduced by the spectacle: 
"Vous étalez en vain vos charmes impuissants" (1116). This is because 
God reveals to him the real spectacle of human history: "II étale à 
son tour des revers équitables / Par qui les grands sont confondus" 
(119-20). The passions are bested in a theatrical contest with God, as 
Polyeucte's soul becomes the discerning spectator of his own desires. 
In the end, he turns aside human love, the masochistic "source déli­
cieuse en misères féconde," and opts for a spiritual jouissance beyond 
death: 
Saintes douceurs du ciel, adorables idées, 
Vous remplissez un coeur qui vous peut recevoir; 
De vos sacrés attraits les âmes possédées 
Ne conçoivent plus rien qui les puisse émouvoir. 
Vous promettez beaucoup et donnez davantage. 
Vos biens ne sont point inconstants 
Et F heureux trépas que j'attends 
Ne vous sert que d'un doux passage 
Pour nous introduire au partage 
Qui nous rend à jamais contents. 
(1145-54) 
Here, desire satisfies itself in an imaginary "en plus" in which "ado­
rabies idées" overfill the heart. Polyeucte's wife is superfluous because 
in his mystical vision he has transcended human sexuality; his mysti­
cal pleasure is feminine as well as masculine, figured by the heart, 
which can be active or passive—here passively filled in ecstasy, later 
to eject its blood in martyrdom and convert Pauline. A "doux partage" 
puts an end to the division of human sexuality. Images of eternity and 
overflowing contrast with the earlier metaphor of human desire as a 
fragile mirror that "en moins de rien tombe par terre" (1112). The flesh 
is comparable to "l'éclat du verre": fleeting illusions and broken glass. 
This threatening imagery of the passions as dangerous and sharp was 
also present in the "glaives" that God suspends over the heads of the 
wicked (1121). 
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Polyeucte's personal vision concludes with a shift to the communal 
"nous." This signifies that he has projected himself forward into a com­
munity of saints and abandoned his worldly attachments. Thus he can 
deal impassively with Pauline. He has come to the point of not seeing, 
not knowing Pauline: "Et mes yeux éclairés des célestes lumières / Ne 
trouvent plus aux siens leurs grâces coutumières" (1159-60). He has 
been delivered from her visual charm and is only interested in her as 
a potential member of his new sect. Like Horace, he can cut his per­
sonal ties of affection in one verse: "Je ne vous connais plus, si vous 
n'êtes chrétienne" (1612). 
Nothing More to Say 
Polyeucte's confession is complete; he has nothing more to say: "Qu'on 
me mène à la mort, je n'ai plus rien à dire" (1312). One last time he 
tries to explain the mysteries of his faith. He declares the ethical superi­
ority of his own God over those of the empire: 
La prostitution, l'adultère, l'inceste, 
Le vol, l'assassinat, et tout ce qu'on déteste, 
C'est l'exemple qu'à suivre offrent vos immortels. 
(1667-69) 
It is significant that Polyeucte ranks the Tridentine sins par excellence, 
those of the flesh, before crimes of violence. The real locus of Poly­
eucte's conversion is his passionate heart, which has ascended from 
the primitive gratifications of prostitution, adultery, and, of course, in­
cest to a spiritual, postgenital stage, figured by the androgynous heart. 
The words of Polyeucte continue to meet with incomprehension, and 
he betrays a certain impatience at trying to explain his religion: "Mais 
j'ai tort d'en parler à qui ne peut m'entendre" (1663). Even his final 
exchange with Pauline ends on a severe note of admonition, not total 
accord: 
Pauline: Je te suivrai partout et mourrai si tu meurs. 
Polyeucte: Ne suivez point mes pas ou quittez vos erreurs. 
(1681-82) 
The full performative power of Polyeucte's confession will only be real­
ized by the spectacle of his death. The final signifier that carries out 
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Polyeucte's confession and converts Pauline is his dismembered body. 
The folly, the horrid spectacle of martyrdom, is seen and understood: 
"Je vois, je sais, je crois, je suis désabusée" (1727). Heroic confession 
concludes with the destruction of human beauty and form. An anti­
thetical, antitheatrical moment concludes the representation of the self. 
The martyr scene occurs offstage. Polyeucte is beyond classical repre­
sentation; he has pronounced his last phrase and stepped into infinity, 
the vanishing point that orders perspectivist representation but re­
mains beyond. 
4 
UN AVEU SI FUNESTE: 
TRAGIC AVOWAL IN RACINE 
Je meurs, pour ne point faire un aveu si funeste.

PHÈDRE

Jean Racine belonged to the other principal religious family in seven­
teenth-century France, the Jansenists. He was, literally, the child of 
Port-Royal, the destitute orphan raised by two nuns, Marie Desmou­
lins, his maternal grandmother, and her daughter, Racine's "mother," 
the future abbesse of Port-Royal, "la soeur Sainte-Thècle, qui à travers 
sa grille, lui avait servi comme de mère" (Sainte-Beuve, qtd. in Mauron 
213). A boarding student at the Petites Ecoles, he received perhaps the 
finest education available in his day to any student regardless of social 
class. The Jansenists were educational innovators, and some of the 
most brilliant minds of the century taught in their schools. Racine had 
the good fortune to study under Pierre Nicole, Antoine Le Maître, and 
the Hellenist Claude Lancelot. His mental and affective life was 
formed in the severe, exacting mold of his Augustinian masters, 
for whom "l'esprit des enfants est presque tout rempli de ténèbres" 
(Nicole, qtd. in Taveneaux, Catholicisme 1:178). 
The pupils at Port-Royal lived a quasi-monastic life: up at five-thirty 
in the morning for communal prayers and the first page of Latin before 
breakfast, then a translation exercise, carefully written and read to the 
"maître"; meals were taken in silence while a text from the Bible was 
read aloud. The children were taught in small groups of five or six and 
never let out of sight of the master, even while asleep.1 The Jansenists 
sought to rectify, as they saw it, the naturally wicked inclinations of 
the child by isolating him from nature and confining him to an artificial 
world of permanent surveillance and calculated activity. According to 
Louis Marin, education at Port-Royal was based on the ideology of 
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representation. The students became "subjects"; all of their behavior 
and mental development was "represented," rendered visible and in­
telligible to the master, who alone, like the Deus absconditus of Jansenist 
theology, remained outside the model yet assured its operation: 
Dans sa forme même, l'espace pédagogique reproduit, en le re­
doublant dans un modèle, à la fois l'espace religieux, où le Dieu 
caché toujours présent et toujours absent, présent parce qu'ab­
sent, parle silencieusement à chaque être pour l'amener au salut, 
et l'espace politique où le Roi a fait du langage une puissance par 
le réseau complexe et réglé des échanges entre ses sujets et lui. 
Le système pédagogique, comme appareil idéologique permet 
ainsi de traduire, avec sa force propre, la transparence depuis tou­
jours perdue de la représentation par la constitution d'un en­
semble cohérent de comportements, d'attitudes et de pratiques, 
par des discours visibles. Dès lors, la confusion radicale intro­
duite par le péché se trouve dissipée, dans le lieu scolaire, par le 
jeu de la présence et de la visibilité: omniprésence du regard du 
maître qui rend visibles et expose dans leur signifiance les indivi­
dus vivants pour les assujettir à la culture, en faire des sujets 
culturels—réduits à la "nature" et à la "raison"—bref, des sujets 
de l'idéologie de la représentation dont le maître est lui-même 
un représentant. (Critique 214) 
Even the excellent Latin and Greek education that the young Racine 
received had its theoretical justification. The natural, maternal lan­
guage was considered "le langage de la concupiscence"; dead lan­
guages were deliberately taught to denaturalize the child: "Ce langage 
des morts est toujours un peu mort et n'a rien qui pique vivement 
notre amour-propre" (Nicole, qtd. in Marin, Critique 210). 
In this "clôture scolaire," as described by Marin, confession played 
a special role, and the young Racine would have encountered it at 
every turn of his early education. If education and representation at 
Port-Royal necessarily produce images of confinement, it is my sug­
gestion that the confessional would most accurately express all of the 
nuances of the model. 
The sacrament was of the very essence of Jansenism and its educa­
tional theory. In his La Vie quotidienne des Jansénistes, René Taveneaux 
says that "la pénitence, plus que tout autre, fut, de la part des port­
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royalistes, l'objet d'une attention, d'un soin de tous les instants," and 
of their schools: "Plus que d'écoles proprement dites, il s'agit d'une 
direction de conscience, inapte à être étendue ou transposée aux col­
lèges" (83, 133). 
Confession is vital to the whole Jansenist moral project and educa­
tion in particular because it enforces the subjective side of the ideology 
of representation. Marin emphasizes the "regard du maître," which 
sustains the system by making the behavior of the students visible, 
reducing them, as it were, to the status of transparent portraits. But 
equally important to the subjectivizing process is the discourse 
whereby the student actively renders himself visible to the master's 
gaze and offers up for inspection the internal world of thought. Nicole 
says that one must "travailler toute sa vie à faire son portrait, c'est-à­
dire qu'il faut y donner tous les jours quelque coup de pinceau, sans 
effacer ce qui en est déjà tracé.. . . Nous formerons peu à peu un por­
trait si ressemblant que nous pourrons voir à chaque moment tout ce 
que nous sommes" (Oeuvres 48). Subjectivization and representation 
work hand in hand most effectively when the subject is compelled to 
make a portrait of his inner life, not just when he is spied on externally 
by the master. The system operates perhaps at its maximum efficiency 
when the gaze of the master is internalized and the subject is able 
to move closer and closer to self-knowledge by construction of the 
portrait. 
Another indication of the importance of confession within Jan­
senism is the amount of energy its apologists devoted to issues dealing 
with this sacrament. Port-Royal's most sustained and successful po­
lemic concerned the rigorist approach to confession. Arnauld, in his 
De la fréquente communion, heralded the inventor of the confessional, 
Charles Borromeo, and advocated the strictest form of penance. In con­
trast to the Jesuits, he wanted absolution to be very difficult to obtain. 
For serious sins, it should be deferred for weeks while the confessant 
meditated and performed arduous penances. Arnauld even tried to 
revive the practice of public penance for public sins. Jansenist priests 
were encouraged to keep written records of their parishioners, "livres 
d'état des âmes," (see figure 7) which kept account of who confessed 
and who didn't. They could require the "billet de confession" before 
administering the sacraments and take steps to ostracize those mem­
bers of the community who did not confess regularly and lead a life 
they approved of (Taveneaux, Vie 136). 
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The Jansenist insistance on rigorous confession was the main cause 
of their struggle against the Jesuits and the occasion of one of the most 
famous theological debates in the history of literature. The erudition 
and wit of Pascal's Lettres provinciales managed to popularize the con­
troversy and put humor on the side of the rigorists. 
We know that Racine personally lived the exciting atmosphere sur­
rounding the Provinciales. According to Raymond Picard, "Racine les a 
lues et relues" (28). His school was so dominated by the issue that his 
Latin teacher, Nicole, even used the letters in his classes for translation 
exercises. We have no record of Racine's reaction to these events, but 
it is interesting to note that the first surviving piece of his correspon­
dence from this period refers to the tenth Provinciale and is an attack 
on the Jesuits in the satirical style of Pascal's letters. 
The real Jansenist theology of confession, however, was anything 
but a laughing matter, and as we penetrate the atmosphere of fear and 
trembling surrounding confession at Port-Royal, we see elements of a 
drama that occurs with regularity in Racine's theater: the tragic scene 
of avowal. Confession was at the core of Jansenist spirituality because, 
as Nicole says, the whole moral life depends on knowledge of the self: 
"Comme l'ignorance de soi-même est la source de tous les vices, on 
peut dire que la connaissance de soi-même est le fondement de toutes 
les vertus" (Oeuvres 29). 
This quotation is taken from his essay "De la connaissance de soi­
même," in which he distinguishes the Christian Nosce te ipsum from its 
Greek and Roman counterparts. For Nicole, the pagan motto is just 
a strategic practice in a world governed by self-interest and "amour 
propre." In the "world," know thyself is really intended for others: they 
should know themselves and they would see how pitiful they really 
appear to us; or self-knowledge can take the form of vain contempla­
tion of the image of the self reflected in the objects one possesses and 
the fear and respect one commands. Only Christian self-knowledge is 
authentic for Nicole because it forces the believer to contemplate "le 
fond de son âme," an object for the Jansenists of truly horrible dimen­
sions. The sight of just one sin in its true perspective would be fatal: 
"II est vrai de dire de tous nos péchés connus dans toute leur étendue, 
ce que l'Ecriture dit de Dieu: 'Non videbit me homo, et vivet'" (58). 
Here we begin to enter into the tragic, if not fantastic, vision of one of 
Racine's masters. Only the elect are aware of the general depravity of 
the world; the greater part of humanity lives in total self-ignorance, 
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unaware that its passions make it the prey of demons: the world is "un 
lieu de supplices." 
Tous ces gens aveuglés et abandonnés à leurs passions sont au­
tant de preuves de la rigueur de la justice de Dieu; c'est elle qui 
les livre aux démons qui les dominent, qui se jouent d'eux, qui 
les trompent, qui les jettent dans mille désordres, qui les affligent 
dans ce monde par une infinité de misères, et qui les précipitent 
enfin dans l'abîme pour les tourmenter éternellement. 
Ainsi le monde entier est un lieu de supplices, où l'on ne décou­
vre, par les yeux de la foi, que des effets effroyables de la justice 
de Dieu; et, si nous voulons nous le représenter par quelque im­
age qui en approche, figurons-nous un lieu vaste, plein de tous 
les instruments de la cruauté des hommes, et rempli, d'une part, 
de bourreaux, et de l'autre, d'un nombre infini de criminels aban­
donnés à leur rage. 
La bouche de l'enfer est toujours ouverte . . . les grands et les 
petits, les forts et les faibles, les riches et les pauvres y entrent 
pêle-mêle à tOUS moments. {Oeuvres 147, emphasis added) 
The only remedy to the situation is for the Christian to attain true 
knowledge of the self through recourse to a rigorist "directeur": "Ce 
n'est pas assez d'avoir un directeur, ni même d'en avoir un éclairé. Il 
faut de plus s'abandonner à lui sans déguisement et sans artifice, et 
avoir dessein de se conformer au jugement qu'il fait de nous, et non 
pas le porter à suivre le nôtre" {Oeuvres 57). 
These are the distinguishing features of the Christian knowledge of 
the self: a vision of humanity unconscious of the depths of its perver­
sity yet absolutely obligated to discover and confess its hidden sins 
because, in the hereafter, a terrible day of self-knowledge awaits all 
men: "cette vue nous est inévitable." 
C'est en vain que nous fuyons de nous connaître; cette vue nous 
est inévitable, puisque Dieu ouvrira les yeux à tous les hommes 
pour se voir tels qu'ils sont, mais avec cette horrible différence, 
que ceux qui n'auront pas voulu se connaître dans ce monde-ci, 
se verront malgré eux, dans toute l'éternité, d'une vue qui les 
comblera de rage et de désespoir; au lieu que ceux qui n'auront 
pas évité de se voir en cette vie, et qui auront travaillé par ce 
moyen à détruire en eux ce qui déplaît à Dieu, ne verront plus 
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rien en eux pour jamais qui ne leur cause de la joie. (Oeuvres 28) 
La punition commune des réprouvés dans l'autre vie sera de se 
voir eux-mêmes, le caractère général des réprouvés en celle-ci est 
de ne se voir point; de sorte qu'il est également vrai que l'on 
n'entre dans le ciel qu'en se connaissant, et dans l'enfer qu'en ne 
se connaissant pas. (Oeuvres 34) 
Here again, we encounter Dante's vision of human society in its en­
tirety subjected to the universal obligation to confess. Self-knowledge 
is the road to salvation or the fatal discovery of perdition; confession 
is either divine cure or demonic torture in the "lieu de supplices." Even 
more than Dante, Nicole seems to insist on the solitary psychological 
torture of hell as eternal contemplation of the wicked self. He imagines 
a more private, inward heaven or hell as opposed to Dante's extrapola­
tions of the communal life of the medieval city. In Nicole's afterlife bliss 
or torture awaits an individual subject whose joy or suffering consists 
in self-reflection. 
But what makes the Jansenist quest for the self not only terrifying 
but truly tragic is that it is an uncertain process: 
On ne connaît jamais avec certitude ce qu'on appelle le fond du 
coeur, ou cette première pente de l'âme qui fait qu'elle est ou 
à Dieu ou à la créature.... Nul ne connaît avec certitude si 
ses péchés sont remis.... Souvent on croit avoir la grâce, lorsque 
l'esprit n'est occupé que de pensées et de mouvements tout na­
turels, et souvent aussi on prend pour des mouvements de la 
nature de véritables opérations de la grâce. (Oeuvres 67) 
Une inclination naturelle de l'amour-propre nous porte à prendre 
nos pensées pour des vertus, et à croire que nous avons dans 
le coeur tout ce qui nage sur la surface de notre esprit, (qtd. in 
Bénichou 142) 
Corneille's image, in the Imitation, of "le cabinet du coeur" suggests a 
reassuring enclosure where the self can successfully manage its de­
sires, whereas for Nicole the heart is an abyss; consciousness floats at 
the surface of unknown depths, and the real motivations for acts re­
main obscure. For Nicole and the other Jansenists, the heart is close to 
God because it is the locus of helplessness and loss; Corneille and the 
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voluntaristic tradition represented the heart as an inner sanctum of 
purified intentions and heroic choices. 
We recognize Nicole's language as being in concert with the whole 
tradition of spiritual direction. The hidden origin of thoughts and the 
recourse to a spiritual director to interpret the logismoi of the soul go 
back to the Desert Fathers. But the Jansenist metaphor for the soul as 
unsoundable depth makes spiritual analysis extremely perilous if not 
impossible. Corneille's architectural metaphor for the soul, the "cabi­
net," evokes geometric design and rational containment, a reassuring 
symmetry between the outward appearance of the confessional and 
the inner space it sought to govern, whereas Nicole's aquatic imagery 
suggests an undefinable fluid space in continuous movement. 
A Jansenist never left the confessional feeling reassured; even the 
power of the sacrament left him worrying about the state of his soul. 
Pascal describes the proper affect of a Port-Royalist after confession: 
"Une personne me disait un jour qu'il avait une grande joie et confi­
ance en sortant de confession. L'autre me disait qu'il restait en crainte. 
Je pensais sur cela que de ces deux on en ferait un bon et que chacun 
manquait en ce qu'il n'avait pas le sentiment de l'autre. Cela arrive de 
même souvent en d'autres choses" (Pensée 712). Suspended between 
fear and joy, obeying an "inevitable" obligation yet ignorant of his or 
her real intentions, the confessant was not supposed to be relieved but 
rather reduced to a state of total culpability and confusion, trusting 
only in the inscrutable truth and mercy of God. 
We have here all the elements of a tragic outcome to confession and 
knowledge of the self. Fear of a final eschatological scene of avowal 
pushes the Jansenist to confess in this life, yet in the world, in the 
"lieu de supplices," he cannot trust himself or even the ministers of 
confession. The world and the Church are full of "demons" whom God 
has set loose to prey upon men and women's passions. Thus avowal 
itself is not a heroic act of volition but rather a fateful wager, a moral 
obligation to discover a truth formally unattainable within the spiritual 
and psychological model of "le fond du coeur" and "le Dieu caché." 
As we will see, Racine's theater explores many of the tragic possibilities 
of confessional discourse. 
"UNE FILLE D'UZÈS" 
An anecdote in a letter from Racine to his friend Vitart, dated 30 May 
1662, seems to foreshadow the confessional scenes in many of his later 
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plays and hint at many of his aesthetic principles. Only recently liber­
ated from the Port-Royal schools and hoping, faute de mieux, to succeed 
his uncle in a priory, the future dramatist was eyewitness to an event 
that fascinated him and that he narrates as follows: 
Je vous dirai une autre petite histoire, qui n'est pas si importante; 
mais elle est assez étrange. Une jeune fille d'Uzès, qui logeait 
assez près de chez nous, s'empoisonna hier elle-même et prit une 
grosse poignée d'arsenic, pour se venger de son père, qui l'avait 
querellée fort rudement. Elle eut le temps de se confesser, et ne 
mourut que deux heures après. On croyait qu'elle était grosse, et 
que la honte l'avait portée à cette furieuse résolution. Mais on 
l'ouvrit toute entière, et jamais fille ne fut plus fille. Telle est l'hu­
meur des gens de ce pays-ci, et ils portent les passions au dernier 
excès. (2:438) 
This "petite histoire" is Racine's first dramatic creation; real life seems 
to have furnished him with a scenario that will occur frequently in his 
theater: the cruel uncomprehending father, excessive passion leading 
to a tragic confession that is poison and death, the futile attempt to 
understand the soul through dissection of the body. One can already 
foresee the series of persecutory parents (Agrippine, Mithridate, and 
Thésée) in the father, and the confessant victims (Monime, Eriphile, 
Hippolyte, and Phèdre) in the "jeune nlle." The fundamental mystery 
of the girl's behavior and the belated attempt to solve the riddle by 
interpreting bodily signs recall many instances of misapprehension in 
Racine, especially Thésée's misjudgment of his son's guilt, based on 
the "signes certains" he thinks he sees, followed by his chagrin over 
the body of his dead son, who, like the heroine of the story, remains a 
virgin, ironically never more a virgin ("jamais fille ne fut plus fille"), 
yet no longer a son or a daughter but a dissected body.2 
Philosophically, the story seems to illustrate the tragic limits of the 
classical episteme. The classical system of representation, as described 
in Foucault's Les Mots et les choses, was based on the translation of all 
knowledge into visible signs, which in turn could be revealed by a 
transparent language. According to this scheme, living organisms were 
classified by their external, visible differences. The internal body was 
considered obscure and less satisfactory as a means of establishing 
differences and identities between species. It was only in the nine­
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teenth century that internal anatomy would emerge as the crucial 
means of distinguishing organisms.3 The tale might also be seen as a 
typical patriarchal insistence on the visible.4 
The Uzès story dramatizes the tragic incompatibility between exter­
nal bodily signs and internal truth and suggests a link between Ra­
cine's daily life and his theater. For us it also marks the transition from 
the purely religious discourse of Port-Royal to the beginnings of Ra­
cine's career as an artist. The Jansenistic moral terminology is still 
there: the "passions au dernier excès," "la honte," "le temps de se con­
fesser," but Racine seems to appreciate the story essentially for its dra­
matic and psychological content. His narration of the events is not 
overtly moralizing but rather coldly analytical and ironically tragic. 
The one element the real story cannot relate—the girl's private confes­
sion—will be supplied by the dramatist. He will invent a modern, psy­
chological tragedy based on such a minimal event, the "petite histoire," 
like the "action simple, chargée de peu de matière" discussed in the 
preface to Britannicus. The moment of revelation and understanding 
will proceed from aveu instead of Aristotelian anagnorisis. The tragic 
truth that Racine seeks is confirmed not by external signs and plot 
development but rather by the tragic hero's own obligation to confess. 
Racine's heroes and heroines never manage to carry out Phèdre's des­
perate wager: "Je meurs pour ne point faire un aveu si funeste." Death 
is inevitable but only after the torment of confession. If there is one 
supreme God in the Racinian pantheon, it is Minos, who will inflict 
his suffering in the words of his victims. 
BRITANNICUS: "SURPRENONS, S'IL SE PEUT, 
LES SECRETS DE SON AME" 
Britannicus was Racine's first attempt to compete with Corneille on his 
own terms by writing a political tragedy. Until then, he had been con­
sidered a "tendre," capable of producing only sentimental dramas. By 
taking up a well-known political subject from Roman history, Racine 
was attempting an artistic prise de pouvoir not without analogy to the 
coming of age of Néron depicted in the play itself. As Antoine Adam 
has said, the story is in some sense "le drame de Racine même" (4:327). 
But both internally and externally, the play represented a tragic version 
of emancipation, of the first essai that must also be a coup de maître. The 
first performances were met with the hostility of Corneille and 
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involved Racine in a bitter quarrel with the patriarch of the stage. The 
drama itself tells a similar story of a rebellious coup de théâtre and the 
troubled succession of generations. 
Néron has been raised and educated in a seemingly moral atmo­
sphere. His tutors, Seneca and the virtuous soldier Burrhus, were 
handpicked by Agrippine and have imbued the young emperor with 
a strong sense of duty and conscience. A crucial scene in the play (3.1) 
gives us an insight into the pedagogical principles of Burrhus and his 
standing as spiritual counselor to Néron. The emperor has just an­
nounced that he is hopelessly attracted to Junie, "le mal est sans re­
mède" (777), but Burrhus appeals to his pupil's heart and the memory 
of his virtuous childhood: 
Vous redoutez un mal faible dans sa naissance. 
Mais si dans son devoir votre coeur affermi 
Voulait ne point s'entendre avec son ennemi; 
Si de vos premiers ans vous consultiez la gloire; 
Si vous daigniez, Seigneur, rappeler la mémoire 
Des vertus d'Octavie, . . . 
(780-85) 
Furthermore, Burrhus firmly believes that he has educated and formed 
a conscientious emperor who can rely on an inner, hereditary model 
of virtue. He reassures Agrippine: "Pour bien faire, Néron n'a qu'à se 
ressembler" (218). 
Yet all is not well in this "clôture scolaire" arranged by Néron's 
mother. It is a perverse, hypocritical system designed to keep Néron 
virtuous only in the interests of Agrippine. She has no illusions about 
the virtues of her son: "II se déguise en vain; je lis sur son visage / 
Des fiers Domitius l'humeur triste et sauvage" (35-36). Whether Néron 
turns out to be virtuous or not is of little concern: "Que m'importe, 
après tout, que Néron, plus fidèle, / D'une longue vertu laisse un jour 
le modèle" (43-44). She tells Burrhus pointedly that his moral teaching 
must not come between her and her son: "Ai-je donc élevé si haut votre 
fortune / Pour mettre une barrière entre mon fils et moi?" (144-45). 
Néron is thus confronted with an ambiguous moral dispositif at 
cross-purposes with itself: is it designed to keep him forever in a state 
of infancy? or, as Burrhus claims, can it produce an autonomous em­
peror at the head of a glorious empire? One thing is certain: the out­
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come of the play and Néron's place in history will be decided by who 
wins the battle over Néron's conscience. As Racine says in his preface, 
he has chosen to represent history from within the confines of Néron's 
conscience: "II ne s'agit point dans ma tragédie des affaires du dehors. 
Néron est ici dans son particulier et dans sa famille." The question is 
whether the conscience of the young emperor can come to grips with 
the crisis of his emancipation and make an enlightened civic decision, 
or whether his mind will be clouded by his own passions and the 
perfidious influence of Agrippine and Narcisse, who rival Burrhus for 
control over Néron's conscience. The play, then, like those we consid­
ered by Corneille, focuses on the use of pastoral power in a court soci­
ety and how consciences are turned inward to influence political 
events. Racine depicts the tragic possibilities of the same process; it is 
Agrippine who, at the outset, sets the tone for the exploration of Nér­
on's conscience: "Surprenons, s'il se peut, les secrets de son âme" (127). 
We sense, especially after Racine's skillful exposé of Agrippine's 
character and the ominous image of her secret power ("derrière un 
voile, invisible et présente"), that the battle for the secrets of Néron's 
soul will not necessarily result in the triumph of virtue. We foresee the 
possibility of a malevolent pastoral power. 
This impression is soon reinforced by the first appearance of the 
play's main character. He distinguishes himself by the cruel, inquisito­
rial treatment of his prisoner, Junie. The fateful resemblance between 
mother and son becomes apparent here. Like the mother, Néron takes 
special pleasure in concealing himself to manipulate his subject. His 
sexual interest takes the same form as his mother's political machina­
tions. He first becomes attracted to his captive when, from a hidden 
vantage point, he sees her brought in by the guards: 
Excité d'un désir curieux 
Cette nuit je l'ai vue arriver en ces lieux, 
Triste, levant au ciel ses yeux mouillés de larmes. 
(386-88) 
His desire, like his mother's power, feeds on "curiosity" and knowl­
edge; he must know more. He questions Narcisse about the obscure, 
idyllic couple: "Britannicus, l'aime-t-il?" (427). The fact that Junie re­
mains far from the court and ignorant of Néron's erotic expertise is 
somehow a provocation; she has not even inquired whether "César est 
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aimable, ou bien s'il sait aimer" (426). His desire seems to be directed 
as much at penetrating the mystery of the young couple's love as at 
Junie herself. Or so it would seem, since he takes more pleasure in 
interrogating and spying on her than in actually trying physical con­
summation. 
His first interview results in a candid avowal on the part of Junie 
of her love for Britannicus, coupled with an oblique criticism of the 
dissimulating manners of the court: 
II a su me toucher, 
Seigneur; et je n'ai point prétendu m'en cacher. 
Cette sincérité sans doute est peu discrète; 
Mais toujours de mon coeur ma bouche est l'interprète. 
Absente de la cour, je n'ai pas dû penser, 
Seigneur, qu'en l'art de feindre il fallût m'exercer. 
J'aime Britannicus. 
(637-43) 
The conversation is further aggravated by Junie's attempt to excuse 
Britannicus's love by appealing to obedience: "II m'aime; il obéit à 
l'Empereur son père, / Et j'ose dire encore à vous, à votre mère" (560­
61). This is precisely the wrong thing to say because it makes no dis­
tinction between Néron and his mother ("à vous, à votre mère"). 
But in a profound sense, Junie has made the correct identification. 
Néron is a sadistic voyeur like his mother. Following Junie's avowal he 
devises a cruel scenario in which she will turn Britannicus away while 
Néron watches in secret: "II vaut mieux que lui-même / Entende son 
arrêt de la bouche qu'il aime.... Renfermez votre amour dans le fond 
de votre âme" (668, 680). He takes delight in corrupting Junie's loyalty 
to the truth and making his rival suffer. 
But like his mother, he also manages to see only what he wants to 
see. The sadistic staging of his victims' secrets corresponds to his own 
inner blindness. Both mother and son fail to anticipate the next move 
of their victims, and both lose all sense of themselves while spying 
on others. Despite Néron's explicit stage directions, Junie manages to 
communicate a note of warning to Britannicus. Britannicus knows that 
despite her words of separation there is some doubt as to their full 
meaning, and he returns a second time for clarification. There he learns 
that, as he suspected, Junie was not speaking the truth. 
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At this time, Néron is also confronted with a loss of mastery over 
his victims. Britannicus denounces him as a voyeur: 
Je ne sais pas du moins épier ses discours. 
Je la laisse expliquer sur tout ce qui me touche, 
Et ne me cache point pour lui fermer la bouche. 
(1066-68) 
The emperor's plan to manipulate the speech of his subjects has been 
turned around on him, and the truth is now out in the open. But it is 
fatal knowledge; Junie and Britannicus have each uttered their avowals 
and will not recant. At the expense of their lives, their hearts and 
mouths will remain in accord. Avowal has brought the victims to the 
point of tragic self-knowledge; they have confessed the truth of their 
love in the face of tyranny, and that truth will cost Britannicus his life. 
The inquisitors, on the other hand, are characterized by self-
delusion. This becomes clear in Néron's case as the plot develops. At 
the crucial moment of decision, a battle is waged between Narcisse, 
the evil counselor, and Burrhus. The latter invites Néron to give up an 
imaginary attachment to Junie ("Vous vous le figurez," 778) and return 
to the moral center of his heart (781). Narcisse, however, exploits Né­
ron's real aversion for his true self. As if to illustrate Nicole's idea that 
vision of the self is intolerable, Narcisse manages to reveal to Néron 
just enough of his true self to frighten him into crime and total flight 
from himself. He tells Néron that his mentors are talking about him in 
these terms: 
Pour toute ambition, pour vertu singulière, 
II excelle à conduire un char dans la carrière, 
A disputer des prix indignes de ses mains, 
A se donner lui-même en spectacle aux Romains, 
A venir prodiguer sa voix sur un théâtre. 
(1471-75) 
There is just enough truth in this portrait to push Néron over the edge, 
and he makes the decision to have Britannicus murdered. 
In similar fashion, the more Agrippine thinks she has regained 
power through access to the secrets of Néron's heart, the farther she is 
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from the truth about herself. Toward the end of the play, she exhibits 
true hubris following her supposed reconciliation with Néron, basing 
her supreme self-confidence on the fact that she has been admitted 
into the confidentiality of the emperor: 
Mais bientôt, reprenant un visage sévère, 
Tel que d'un empereur qui consulte sa mère, 
Sa confidence auguste a mis entre mes mains 
Des secrets d'où dépend le destin des humains. 
Non, il le faut ici confesser à sa gloire, 
Son coeur n'enferme point une malice noire. 
(1595-1600) 
At this point in the play, Néron is actually carrying out plans for the 
murder, but Agrippine thinks her power is secure because she has 
shared secrets with the emperor. "Surprenons les secrets de son coeur." 
This was the formula for Agrippine's power, but instead she has fallen 
for a carefully staged reconciliation. The secrets of the heart can be 
theatricalized too, and a person is never so much the dupe as when he 
thinks that he has surprised the other's confidentiality. 
The final tragic irony is that Néron's act of emancipation from his 
mother marks him precisely as her offspring. What particularly horri­
fies Burrhus about the assassination is that Néron watched the entire 
spectacle without blanching: "Ses yeux indifférents ont déjà la con-
stance / D'un tyran dans le crime endurci dès l'enfance" (1711-12). 
Enclosed in a pedagogical and moral system designed by Agrippine, 
Néron mistakenly chose crime as the path to authenticity, but he ended 
up only furthering Agrippine's line of depraved power. 
Corneille, in Cinna, had imagined how the cycle of crime and tyr­
anny could be broken by the use of pastoral power. Auguste gains true 
insight into himself and stops the conspiracy by a gratuitous act of 
pardon and self-overcoming. At a certain moment of Britannicus, Burr­
hus thinks he is about to witness the same sort of miracle. He has 
convinced Néron of Britannicus's innocence and can already see the 
touching scene of fraternal reconciliation and pardon: 'Appelez votre 
frère, oubliez dans ses bras" (1385). An inspired act of magnanimity 
would put an end to Agrippine's conspiracy and her malevolent influ­
ence. Néron would break with his criminal heredity by an act of heroic 
virtue. But this never happens. Néron chooses crime and theatricality; 
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he remains at the surface of himself, the bad actor who assumes the 
impassive mask of tyranny with the murder of his brother. 
The opposition between authentic self-knowledge and theatricality 
is deeply rooted in the Augustinian tradition. In the Confessions, Au­
gustine speaks of being "carried away" by stage plays, away from the 
inner core of the self where, as he says, God "is more inward to me 
than my most inward part" (41). He calls theater a "miserable mad­
ness" that inspires man to love in spectacle "tragical things which yet 
himself would by no means suffer" (36). 
Unlike tragedy, which carries the spectator away, Augustine's own 
text tries to force a moment of self-scrutiny: "Go back into your heart, 
ye transgressors, and cleave fast to Him that made you" (57). As op­
posed to the diversion of pagan literature, Christian biographies and 
autobiographies of saints force a conversio, a turning inward, as in the 
instance when the book of the life of St. Anthony provokes the conver­
sion of the two Carthaginian noblemen and Augustine is sure that God 
has used the book to effect his own conversion: "Thou, O Lord, didst 
turn me round towards myself" (124). 
The Jansenists continued this tradition of anti-theatricalism. Nicole's 
comment in his first "Visionnaire" (31 Dec. 1665) that "un poète de 
théâtre est un empoisonneur public, non des corps, mais des âmes" 
provoked a furious response from Racine which rendered public his 
divorce from Jansenism, a situation that lasted until 1687 (Nicole, Traité 
23; Picard 448). 
Thus Racine's own life was marked by the dialectic between the 
external appeal of the pagan theater and the inner truths of the heart. 
Already in 1663, as he was just beginning his career as a dramatist, he 
had received this letter of admonition from Mère Agnès, which makes 
the same Augustinian distinction between the truths of the heart and 
the dangerous falsehoods of the theater: 
Je vous conjure donc, mon cher neveu, d'avoir pitié de votre âme, 
et de rentrer dans votre coeur, pour y considérer sérieusement dans 
quel abîme vous vous êtes jeté. Je souhaite que ce qu'on m'a dit 
ne soit pas vrai; mais si vous êtes assez malheureux pour n'avoir 
pas rompu un commerce qui vous déshonore devant Dieu et de­
vant les hommes, vous ne devez pas penser à nous venir voir, car 
vous savez bien que je ne pourrais pas vous parler, vous sachant 
dans un état si déplorable et si contraire au christianisme. 
(qtd. in Mauron 245, emphasis added) 
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It is hard not to see an analogy between the atmosphere of this letter 
and the sort of moral claustrophobia that Néron feels. In both cases 
we see a domineering mother who appeals to the truths of the heart 
as a means of controlling a son. It is a tragic version of the Augustinian 
crisis because the conversio is governed by an oppressive maternal in­
stance. To the extent that Racine is Néron he is in a tragic double bind: 
his only path to originality and authenticity consists in the trans­
gressive activity of the theater. 
Perhaps he could take comfort from the fact that, as the play demon­
strates, one is never more faithful to the parental model than when one 
decides to improvise, to be absolutely original. Racine, the prodigal of 
Port-Royal, was destined to leave for posterity the greatest monument 
to its spiritual grandeur. 
£A//\ZE7": "INVISIBLE D'ABORD 
ELLE ENTENDAIT MA VOIX" 
Early in Racine's next play, Bajazet (1672), the vizir Acomat explains 
how he first gained entry into the seraglio. He was interrogated by 
Roxane, the sultana, who remained hidden from view: "Invisible d'a­
bord elle entendait ma voix" (203). This mode of operation is similar 
to that of Néron and Agrippine, and, like them, the heroine of this play 
is a cruel tyrant of pastoral power bent on satisfying her desires 
through surveillance and extorted confessions. The seraglio itself is an 
emblem of the coercive-discursive power the sultane exercises; it is a 
secular equivalent to the cloister or the confessional, and Acomat is 
admitted to this forbidding space of sexual segregation and enforced 
avowal much as if he were entering a convent. His entry or rejection 
will be based on a purely symbolic exchange that reduces him to a 
voice, a message, that Roxane can safely decode without the distrac­
tion and inherent reciprocity of a face-to-face visual encounter. 
Seasoned by a lifetime in politics, the vizir knows that he is in unfa­
miliar territory. Exiled from the sultan's court and the battlefield, his 
accustomed arenas, he feels reduced to "un pouvoir inutile" (90). In 
the confines of the seraglio, it is Roxane who exercises a different sort 
of "pouvoir absolu" (104). Here, the conventional rules of political 
power are suspended, and battles are waged with mute spies, discov­
ered secrets, and written warrants of love and death. While the sultan 
is away consolidating his power by the classical means of military con­
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quest, his female consort uses all the resources of another kind of 
power to overthrow him.5 
She presides over the harem, which perpetuates the royal bloodline 
and shrouds the familial politics of the sultan in secrecy. It is the pri­
vate domain of the sovereign's pleasure and procreation, as well as the 
prison where sibling rivals are secretly murdered or neutralized by "la 
molle oisiveté des enfants des sultans" (116). As gatekeeper to this 
hidden world, it is Roxane's function to have total knowledge of its 
inhabitants' desires. Like Minos, she demands self-revelation of all 
those entering her kingdom. She is the hermetic seal, the sigillum, that 
simultaneously hides the sultan's murderous business while keeping 
an eye on his rivals. Her power stems from both knowledge and dis­
simulation. She is the "dépositaire" of the sultan's letters who masks 
his plans from all others while at the same time spying on his rivals 
and exposing them to his wrath. 
If indeed her power is absolute, it is because she alone assures com­
munication between the inside and the outside of the Byzantine body 
politic. She allows the sultan to remain at a safe distance from the 
turmoil and passion of the seraglio while unmasking his enemies and 
using their passions to destroy them. Roxane is in the seraglio but not 
of it; she upholds the difference between the tragic world of desire and 
familial violence and the public world of effective political action. She 
holds in confidentiality the murderous letter that condemns the sul­
tan's brother to death and at the same time signifies her identity as 
loyal and royal accomplice to his designs. 
The question is whether Roxane will remain content with her posi­
tion and enlightened as to its symbolic underpinnings, or whether, 
inevitably, power will not beget passion that in turn destroys the criti­
cal vision necessary to power/knowledge. The other question is 
whether the sultan has really granted Roxane total objectivity over the 
seraglio: can he remain beholden to a woman who occupies a function 
so vital to his power? 
The catalyst that sets in motion the events that will answer these 
questions is the ambition of the disenfranchised vizir, Acomat. He sees 
that Roxane is vulnerable to a certain kind of passion that will suit his 
ends. In possession of a letter ordering the immediate execution of 
Bajazet at the slightest political move, she has not yet actually seen her 
prisoner. Acomat praises the captive's charms and excites the sultana's 
curiosity. The first meeting has the desired effect; Roxane exhibits the 
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letter and Bajazet sees that feigning love for the sultana is his only 
chance for survival. The clandestinity of their love is the final entice­
ment for Roxane: 
Tout conspirait pour lui. Ses soins, sa complaisance, 
Ce secret découvert et cette intelligence, 
Soupirs d'autant plus doux qu'il les fallait celer, 
L'embarras irritant de ne s'oser parler, 
Même témérité, périls, craintes communes, 
Lièrent pour jamais leurs coeurs et leurs fortunes. 
(157-62) 
Power is what precipitates a certain kind of predatory love in the Ra­
cinian world. As Roland Barthes has said, "Un simple rapport, à l'ori­
gine purement circonstanciel (captivité ou tyrannie) est converti en 
véritable donné biologique, la situation en sexe, le hasard en essence" 
(Sur Racine 19). Here, the biological and inquisitorial power that Rox­
ane holds over Bajazet, as granted by the sultan's letter, generates a 
sadistic love. 
What seems to form the strongest bond between the lovers is the 
"secret découvert." Roxane's curiosity about her captive was a key ele­
ment of her attraction to him, and Acomat correctly anticipated and 
flattered this aspect of the sultana's erotic inclination. Curiosity and 
the attendant secrecy of the relation are sexualized. 
But herein lies tragic error; the very secrecy and impossibility of 
expression that Roxane finds so compelling in fact hides Bajazet's real 
passion for Atalide. Roxane thinks she has devised the ultimate ais-
guise for the secret affair by having Atalide receive the attention and 
affection of Bajazet, which she then transmits to Roxane: 
Atalide a prêté son nom à cet amour . . . 
Du prince, en apparence, elle reçoit les voeux; 
Mais elle les reçoit pour les rendre à Roxane. 
(168, 172-73) 
However, one deception hides another. Atalide, who in principle is 
only the go-between, the inert signifier of Roxane's love for Bajazet, is 
in reality the secret recipient of his love. The sultana has hidden her 
secret love in plain view by inventing the fictitious couple Bajazet­
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Atalide, who in turn have profited from this arrangement by conceal­
ing their love even more openly. 
The role of confession in the play will be to unravel all the secrets 
of the seraglio. Little by little, Roxane's inquisitorial powers lead her 
to the tragic discovery that her own attempts to conceal her illicit love 
from the sultan did nothing but accommodate the young lovers and 
that her analytical powers can only confirm her blindness and betrayal. 
The specific event that inaugurates the tragic day is Roxane's deci­
sion to bring Bajazet out of the seraglio and have him proclaimed the 
new sultan. Acomat awaits her command to rally the disenchanted 
aristocratic faction, the Janissaires, and the people of Byzantium. He 
proposes turning the sultan's death sentence of Bajazet against him by 
exposing it: 
Montrons l'ordre cruel qui vous fut adressé; 
Surtout qu'il se déclare et se montre lui-même 
Et fasse voir ce front digne du diadème. 
(247-49) 
The effect of the letter in Acomat's hands will be to show the people 
the barbarity of Amurat. Roxane, however, has already used the sul­
tan's letter to coerce Bajazet into a feigned amorous relation with her. 
But before taking the fatal step of openly announcing the palace revo­
lution, she wants verbal confirmation of Bajazet's love and a promise 
of marriage. The words that Atalide has been putting in his mouth are 
no longer enough: 
Je ne vous presse point de vouloir aujourd'hui 
Me prêter votre voix pour m'expliquer à lui: 
Je veux que, devant moi, sa bouche et son visage 
Me découvrent son coeur sans me laisser d'ombrage. 
(327-30) 
When the prince arrives he is greeted with Roxane's triumphant 
announcement: "Rien ne me retient plus; et je puis, dès ce jour, / Ac­
complir le dessein qu'a formé mon amour" (423). The irony is that the 
"dessein" that Roxane announces was based on the sultan's letter, 
which she used to blackmail Bajazet. Unwittingly, her plan will bring 
about her own death and that of Bajazet, both of which are preor­
dained in another letter sent by the sultan. Roxane's "dessein" will be 
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tragically echoed by a series of homonyms and puns involving the 
sultan's signature ("sein") and Bajazet's love letter, which falls from 
Atalide's breast ("sein").6 
When pressed to confess his love and reassure Roxane, Bajazet 
evokes a series of obstacles. Roxane reiterates the threat upon the 
prince's life: 
Songez-vous que je tiens les portes du Palais? 
Que je puis vous l'ouvrir ou fermer pour jamais: 
Que j'ai sur votre vie un empire suprême. 
(507-9) 
This produces a grudging avowal of power if not love: "Oui, je tiens 
tout de vous . . . Je ne m'en défens point; ma bouche le confesse" (513­
17). Only Bajazet's mouth, not his heart, will confess at this point. Rox­
ane launches into a tirade and suddenly loses all sense of restraint: 
Bajazet, écoutez, je sens que je vous aime; 
Ne désespérez point une amante en furie. 
Tu vas en triompher. Oui je te le confesse. 
(538, 541, 554) 
For a moment she has abandoned her position as analytic master of 
the palace, and the vocabulary of confession in her discourse signifies 
vulnerability and blindness. When even this violent outburst produces 
only a tepid reply from Bajazet, Roxane calls for the guards and issues 
the menacing order to Acomat, "Sortez," meaning that the coup is off 
and Bajazet will perish. This first avowal scene is a premonition of 
the final interrogations of Bajazet and Atalide, which will tragically 
enlighten Roxane about her errors. Roxane's illusion can only be sus­
tained by perceptual error, inhibited speech, and silence; each time 
Bajazet is summoned to avow his love, the truth starts to appear. 
Acomat manages to reconcile the two lovers and recounts that scene 
to Atalide: 
J'ai longtemps, immobile, observé leur maintien. 
Enfin avec des yeux qui découvraient son âme, 
L'une a tendu la main pour gage de sa flamme; 
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L'autre, avec des regards éloquents, pleins d'amour, 
L'a de ses feux, Madame, assurée à son tour. 
(884-88) 
Here Roxane has surrendered her gaze of power; instead she exposes 
her own soul to Bajazet through her eyes. She has lost all diacritical 
vision of her victim. She sees only his "regard éloquent" and is to­
tally misled. 
When Bajazet recounts this scene to Atalide, he explains that Rox­
ane was so convinced of his love that any anxiety he displayed— 
caused in reality by his love for Atalide and his aversion to lying— 
was taken as the visible proof, the external symptom, of his passion 
for Roxane. He describes his "confusion, que Roxane, Madame, / At­
tribuait encore à l'excès de ma flamme" (993-94). Bajazet is tongue-
tied and distressed, but Roxane is reassured and has returned to her 
former state of interpreting reticence as a tacit avowal, when in fact the 
meaning of these hesitations is the hidden love for Atalide. 
Roxane is like a psychoanalyst with a theory about transference 
love; she is axiomatically committed to the idea that Bajazet's repres­
sion is a sign of love for herself, the analyst. However, she has crossed 
the line of objectivity and fallen prey to the countertransference. In­
stead of maintaining a critical distance from her role as proxy parent 
in the analytic situation, she has mistaken a methodological artifact for 
real emotions directed at herself. 
She is in this predicament because she has set up a discursive proto­
col between herself and Bajazet which resembles that of psychoanaly­
sis. Her captive must obey the fundamental rule, he must not be given 
the chance to conceal anything: 
Je veux que, devant moi, sa bouche et son visage 
Me découvrent son coeur sans me laisser d'ombrage; 
Que lui-même en secret amené dans ces lieux, 
Sans être préparé se présente à mes yeux. 
(329-32) 
What further weighs upon Bajazet's behavior and his words is the 
barely disguised death threat. By refusing Roxane's offer, the prince 
would be spurning the hand that holds a sword over his head. Roxane 
states the threat in the most visceral, biological terms, reminding Baja­
zet: "Que j'ai sur votre vie un empire suprême; / Que vous ne respirez 
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qu'autant que je vous aime" (509-10). This casts Roxane in the role of 
mother, the source of life itself for Bajazet. Not only must he tell all, 
but his interrogator is his mother. 
I suspect that the threat and the truth obligation complement each 
other in installing Roxane as the mother. From earliest childhood, to­
day as in Racine's day, the child in the West is taught that total frank­
ness with the parent is the best policy. How many times in early life is 
a child subjected to truth games in which he or she is told that a crime, 
if freely confessed, will be forgiven: "Faute avouée est à demi par­
donnée." By the time confession or psychoanalysis arrives on the 
scene, this fundamental obligation to tell the truth is already deeply 
inculcated. In my opinion, it is a key factor in producing the transfer­
ence phenomenon. The analyst or confessor is readily assimilated to 
the father, first and foremost because, in Western families, confessing 
to the father is a well-entrenched ritual. 
In Racine's own day, child-rearing manuals were insisting on just 
such practices. As an example, I cite this exhortation from La Civilité 
nouvelle (1671): "In the evening, the parents should examine his con­
science: If the child has lived like a man/ he should be washed and 
caressed. If he has committed a few venial offenses, the parents should 
correct him" (qtd. in Aries 389). Having thus doubly enforced her ma­
ternal identity as life-giver and inquisitor, Roxane is bound to provoke 
a certain psychological authenticity on the part of Bajazet. She will 
ultimately obtain the truth from him, but it will be a violent rejection 
of her maternal, incestuous overtures. 
To a degree, the spectator can empathize with Roxane's error. All 
her terrible power and knowledge seem incapable of producing a final 
unambiguous declaration of love. To be in love is to suffer Roxane's 
dire need for the truth and the gnawing suspicion that the other is 
unfaithful. The play suggests that, at a certain level, the lover's jealousy 
is justified because all love is a transfer, a remake. It always contains 
an element of betrayal because it is a message sent from elsewhere. 
Underneath the desired object is a letter of betrayal. One must be satis­
fied with appearances, since to pursue the question leads to the truth 
but also to the fulfillment of the letter in jouissance and death. 
Bajazet's fate bears this out; he cannot allay the jealousy and suspi­
cion of either Atalide or Roxane. He complains of the "injustes dé­
tours" that he must use to express his love for Atalide and remain alive 
(1135). Symbolically, this means that his object-love for Atalide will 
always bear the traces of the maternal love signified by Roxane. There 
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is a truth and a plausibility in Bajazet's tacit avowals to Roxane. By 
means of the seraglio she holds Bajazet in the grips of a maternal tyr­
anny to which he must at least pay lip service. But, conversely, Roxane 
cannot enjoy total possession of her prey. The paternal threat forces 
him to leave the nest; he is destined to carry his love elsewhere. 
"La lettre et le sein" 
It is only the discovery of the letter that leads Roxane to the truth of 
the situation. Her suspicions are aroused by Bajazet's continued resis­
tance to marriage and Atalide's eagerness to find excuses for his behav­
ior, so she decides to test Atalide using the inquisitorial ruse of a death 
threat. Showing Atalide the sultan's letter, "Vous reconnaissez, Ma­
dame, et la lettre et le sein" (1183), she announces her intention to 
follow the letter's order: "Ne vous montrez à moi que sa tête à la main" 
(1192). Atalide faints, and Roxane draws a tentative conclusion: "Mon 
malheur n'est-il pas écrit sur son visage?" (1222). At first she retreats 
from this unpleasant idea: "Fermons plutôt les yeux" (1236). Her eyes 
are closed in passionate blindness, not analytic insight. But soon, the 
written evidence of betrayal is unavoidable. The fainting spell has made 
Atalide unconscious. A love letter bearing Bajazet's signature ("sein") 
has fallen from her breast ("sein"). Atalide-the-message-bearer has 
turned out to be the very object of Bajazet's love.7 The breast, emblem 
of Roxane's maternal ascendancy over Bajazet, has given way to the 
letter.8 
"Jouir de sa honte" 
Roxane's reaction to the discovery of the letter reveals that her passion 
is as much for secrets and vengeance as for Bajazet himself: "Ah! je 
respire enfin et ma joie est extrême / Que le traître une fois se soit 
trahi lui-même" (1274). Her respiration quickens at the prospect of the 
sadistic pleasure she will enjoy in interrogating Bajazet. Like Dante's 
Minos, she derives sexual gratification from the extorted avowal: "Je 
veux voir son désorde et jouir de sa honte" (1361). As the play draws 
to a close, the exposure of the letter will bring about the ultimate real­
izations of desire. In the final confessional scenes, the tyrant and the 
martyrs will confront each other one last time. 
Bajazet is interrogated first and confirms the truth of his "lettre sin­
cere": "J'aime, je le confesse" (1493). The analysis is complete, the 
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patient has spoken the words of recognition, acknowledged the letter; 
his life itself is less important than the transcendental obligation to 
speak the truth; the ultimate sense of the letter is the inexorable march 
toward martyrdom which follows avowal. 
Atalide confesses to the truth of the letter also: "Je viens mettre mon 
coeur et mon crime à vos pieds" (1576). She even tries to deflect Rox­
ane's sadistic pleasure toward herself: "Jouissez d'un bonheur dont ma 
mort vous répond" (1616). But the only effect is to furnish the last bit 
of evidence necessary to convince Roxane of the depth of the young 
couple's love and make her even more jealous. The avowals of the two 
lovers do nothing but prepare the final phase of their passion and 
death. 
Confessional discourse carries out the meaning of tragic love—the 
death of the lovers. United by the fatal words, the "noeuds," they will 
perish separately, Bajazet strangled in his cell and Atalide by her own 
dagger. 
One last time Roxane offers Bajazet a chance to repent and recant. 
He can redeem himself by assisting impassively at the spectacle of 
Atalide's execution. 
Dans les mains des muets viens la voir expirer, 
Et libre d'un amour à ta gloire funeste, 
Viens m'engager ta foi: le temps fera le reste. 
Ta grâce est à ce prix, si tu veux l'obtenir. 
(1544) 
Like Néron watching his brother die, Bajazet can deny the truth of 
confession and assume the mask of political life in the "lieu de sup­
plices." 
The only thing that remains to be done to complete the tragic pat­
tern is for Roxane to fall victim to the same inquisitorial power that 
she abused. Fittingly, we learn that the sultan had his own spies within 
the seraglio. Some unknown "bouche infidèle" has informed him of 
the sultana's crimes. The order he gives to the assassin Orcan to kill 
Roxane after Bajazet, "l'amante après l'amant," informs the spectator 
that he knew about Roxane's secret love. 
Racine is consistent in his imagery of the fatality of desire in Rox­
ane's death. The final revelation of her desire will also involve a letter. 
After killing Roxane, Orcan displays the sultan's signature: "De son 
auguste seing reconnaissez les traits" (1683). The fatal tendency of 
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Roxane's love was also hidden in a letter. Her breast reveals the mean­
ing of her desire when the sultan's message ("seing") is plunged into 
her breast: "Oui, j'ai vu l'assassin / Retirer son poignard tout fumant 
de son sein" (1676-77). 
IPHIGÉNIE: "UN BEL AUTO-DA-FÉ" 
Après le tremblement de terre qui avait détruit les trois 
quarts de Lisbonne, les sages du -pays n'avaient pas trouvé 
un moyen plus efficace pour prévenir une ruine totale que 
de donner au peuple un bel auto-da-fé; il était décidé par 
l'université de Coïmbre que le spectacle de quelques per­
sonnes brûlées à petit feu, en grande cérémonie, est un se­
cret infaillible pour empêcher la terre de trembler. 
VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 
According to R. C. Knight, it is not until Iphigénie that "l'helléniste se 
déclare" in Racine's work. The earlier plays, even those based on Greek 
legends, were too heavily influenced by contemporary models to be 
authentically Greek and thus, in Knight's view, most distinctively Ra­
cinian.9 With Iphigénie and Phèdre, Racine's unrivaled knowledge of 
Greek literature is finally put on display; the world of Sophocles and 
Euripides is resurrected on the French stage; the Parisian audience is 
treated to the same spectacle that moved ancient Athens. As Racine 
claims in the preface to the play, "Mes spectateurs ont été émus des 
mêmes choses qui ont mis autrefois en larmes le plus savant peuple 
de la Grèce." 
For us, the sense of this Greek revival will be a truly tragic figuration 
for avowal. With Iphigénie and Phèdre, Racine opens a dialogue between 
the myths of antiquity and the Jansenist theology of confession; the 
archaic ritual of human sacrifice and the menacing figure of Minos will 
be used to represent the fate of the tragic victim who must confess in 
the "world." 
As an oblique representation of Racine's own world, these dramatic 
creations suggest that the fatal mechanisms of guilt and sacrifice are 
reappearing within the structures of a supposedly Christian civiliza­
tion. If, as one critic has said, classical tragedy is the "high mass of 
Absolutism," in Racine's hands it becomes an ambiguous combination 
of rituals in which the cruel divinities of archaic Greece return to exact 
specifically Christian obligations and punishments. 
182 UN AVEU SI FUNESTE 
In Iphigénie, the ancient "victimary mechanism" of sacrifice is allied 
with avowal to produce something analogous to an auto-da-fé. Collec­
tive anxiety and violence are focused upon the victim by means of 
confession. The specifically Greek modes of divination—the oracle 
and the augury sacrifice—are supplemented by the confessional reve­
lation of the tragic victim. Murder and sadistic jouissance are sanc­
tioned by a sacred ritual of truth which puts an end to the crisis 
threatening the community. Through the auto-da-fé, the city purges 
itself, not of the blood guilt of ancient tragedy, but (since the modern 
state is a community of subjects) of the impure consciences in its 
midst. This is the mechanism that Voltaire so lucidly and comically 
exposes in Candide: the earthquake, symbolizing collective unrest and 
dissension, is "solved" by the auto-da-fé. In Iphigénie we will see a 
similar selective culpabilization of a victim in response to a natural 
disaster and a social crisis. 
To what extent Racine's play, like Voltaire's philosophical tale, expo­
ses and denounces the scapegoating mechanism is debatable. Two of 
today's most insightful readers of Racine, J.-M. Apostolidès and Gérard 
Defaux, have used René Girard's theory of "la crise sacrificielle" and 
"le mécanisme victimaire" to elucidate the play's psychological and 
sociological dynamics (Defaux 171; Apostolidès, "Belle" 152). Both see 
Iphigénie as conforming to the pattern of a political and sexual crisis, 
caused by mimetic rivalry being resolved by the death of a single vic­
tim. By sacrificing a "fille du sang d'Hélène," the Greek confederation 
achieves a sacred unity under the king Agamemnon and distances it­
self from the uncontrolled female passion inherent in Hélène's lineage. 
For Defaux, Racine deconstructs the myth three centuries in ad­
vance of Girard: "A trois bons siècles d'intervalle, Jean Racine et René 
Girard font dire la même chose aux grands mythes de l'antiquité. 
Comme celle de Girard, la lecture de Racine est essentiellement décon­
struction du mythe" (171). This is achieved by revealing and, implicitly, 
questioning the brutal logic of the ancient sacrifice. 
In my view this interpretation of Iphigénie could be enriched by ref­
erence to some of Girard's latest work on Christianity. After all, for the 
author of Le Bouc émissaire, the Bible was largely responsible for 
exposing and deconstructing the sacrificial mechanism in the West: 
Nous voyons bien que les Evangiles refusent la persécution. Mais 
nous ne soupçonnons pas que, ce faisant, ils en démontent les 
ressorts, et c'est la religion humaine dans son ensemble qu'ils 
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défont, et les cultures qui en dérivent: nous n'avons pas reconnu 
dans toutes les puissances symboliques qui vacillent autour de 
nous, le fruit de la représentation persécutrice. Mais si l'emprise 
de ces formes se desserre, si leur puissance d'illusion s'affaiblit, 
c'est justement parce que nous repérons de mieux en mieux les 
mécanismes de bouc émissaire qui les sous-tendent. Une fois re­
pérés ces mécanismes ne jouent plus; nous croyons de moins en 
moins en la culpabilité des victimes qu'ils exigent, et privées de 
la nourriture qui les sustente, les institutions dérivées de ces mé­
canismes s'effondrent une à une autour de nous. Que nous le 
sachions ou non, ce sont les Evangiles qui sont responsables de 
cet effondrement. (149) 
If Racine was able to anticipate Girard in revealing and undoing the 
ancient sacrificial process, it was through the systematic use of Chris­
tian discourse, most notably confession and the examination of con­
science. 
Whether or not one can be so optimistic as Girard in asserting that 
Christianity has successfully destroyed the scapegoating mechanism 
is something that Iphigénie can also reveal.10 
"Je cède et laisse aux Dieux opprimer l'innocence" 
As the play opens, Agamemnon denounces the injustice of the gods, 
who demand the sacrifice of his innocent daughter. Throughout the 
work, other characters echo this protest against a moral scandal. Cly­
temnestre: "Les Dieux ordonneraient un meurtre abominable?" (921). 
Iphigénie herself: "Ciel! pour tant de rigueur de quoi suis-je cou­
pable?" (922). Clytemnestre again: "Le Ciel, le juste Ciel par le meurtre 
honoré, / Du sang de l'innocence est-il donc altéré?" (1267-68). 
From within and without the play, Racine felt the need to question 
and ultimately to change this aspect of the myth. A modern audience 
would not accept the idea that innocent blood should be spilled to 
appease the gods and launch a military expedition. In the preface he 
addresses this problem: 
Quelle apparence que j'eusse souillé la scène par le meurtre horri­
ble d'une personne aussi vertueuse et aussi aimable qu'il fallait 
représenter Iphigénie? Et quelle apparence encore de dénouer ma 
tragédie par le secours d'une déesse et d'une machine, et par 
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une métamorphose qui pouvait bien trouver quelque créance du 
temps d'Euripide, mais qui serait absurde et trop incroyable 
parmi nous? (1:670) 
The solution will be to find a victim deserving public execution, 
and this will turn out to be the soul-searching Eriphile, who is fatally 
driven to discover her true self and to die: 
J'ignore qui je suis; et, pour comble d'horreur, 
Un oracle effrayant m'attache à mon erreur, 
Et, quand je veux chercher le sang qui m'a fait naître, 
Me dit que sans périr je ne me puis connaître. 
(427-30) 
In a series of private scenes, she will reveal herself to her confidant, 
Doris. Through these avowals she gains no mastery over her criminal 
impulses but falls deeper and deeper into passion and disorder. By the 
end of the play, she has served as her own "oracle effrayant," and Cal­
chas, the interpreter of oracles, has only to step forward and designate 
her as the real Iphigénie named to be sacrificed. 
What Eriphile first confesses to is an irresistible, masochistic attach­
ment to Achille: 
Je me flattais sans cesse 
Qu'un silence éternel cacherait ma faiblesse. 
Mais mon coeur trop pressé m'arrache ce discours, 
Et te parle une fois pour se taire toujours. 
(477-80) 
She describes being carried away by Achille: "Et me voyant presser 
d'un bras ensanglanté / Je frémissais, Doris, . . . "(492-93). According 
to the fatality of the gaze in Racine, she had but to look at her ravisher: 
"Je le vis: son aspect n'avait rien de farouche" (497). 
Her unnatural love turns quickly into jealousy and hatred when she 
discovers that Achille loves Iphigénie. Her real motive for coming to 
Aulis becomes less a matter of resolving her identity than of contami­
nating the happy couple with her misfortune: "Peut-être approchant 
ces amants trop heureux, / Quelqu'un de mes malheurs se répandrait 
sur eux" (519-20). 
Finally, her cruel inverted love invents the ultimate revenge. When 
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Agamemnon tries to save his daughter from the sacrifice, Eriphile in­
forms Calchas and spreads the news among the rebellious solidiers. 
She exacerbates the sacrifical crisis by stirring up discontent against 
the king and bringing the angry camp to the boiling point. The aristo­
cratic Achille is confronted by the "flots tumultueux" and must turn 
them back with the "elite" of his Thessalians (1520). A dangerous state 
of anarchy and loss of hierarchical order threatens the Greek nation. 
In its collective malaise it seeks a victim. 
The Sacrifice of Sacrifice 
Eriphile manages to incriminate herself for the one crime that makes 
her own sacrifice justifiable: she deliberately touches off the sacrificial 
conflagration by blocking Iphigénie's escape. She earns a place on the 
cruel altar by trying to keep her rival there. Her vengeful plan even 
includes a phantasy of military defeat for the Greeks: 
Ah Doris, quelle joie! 
Que d'encens brûlerait dans les temples de Troie, 
Si troublant tous les Grecs, et vengeant ma prison, 
Je pouvais contre Achille armer Agamemnon; 
Si leur haine, de Troie oubliant la querelle, 
Tournait contre eux le fer qu'ils aiguisent contre elle, 
Et si de tout le camp mes avis dangereux 
Faisaient à ma patrie un sacrifice heureux! 
(1133-40) 
Thus Racine has systematically burdened his sacrificial victim with all 
imaginable sins: sexual deviancy, jealousy, revenge, murder, and, most 
important of all, the crime of inciting the sacrificial crisis.11 As such she 
becomes a truly malevolent, even demonic, presence in Aulis. Aegine 
and Clytemnestre denounce her in just such terms: 
Aegine: Madame? Savez-vous quel serpent inhumain 
Iphigénie avait retiré dans son sein? 
Eriphile, en ces lieux par vous-même conduite, 
A seule à tous les Grecs révélé votre fuite. 
Clytemnestre: O monstre, que Mégère en ses flancs a porté! 
Monstre, que dans nos bras les Enfers ont jeté! 
(1675-80) 
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Her death will signify the sacrifice of sacrifice itself. With her destruc­
tion, the evil conflagration will disappear from the city. 
Calchas reads the sentence of the oracle; he is, as it were, handing 
her over to the secular arm. This time it is the one true God, "le Dieu," 
who speaks through his voice, not the indeterminate multitude who 
seemed to condone the sacrifice: "Les Dieux ordonneraient un meurtre 
abominable?" (1747, 921). Eriphile is designated as the guilty victim: 
"Sous un nom emprunté, sa noire destinée / Et ses propres fureurs ici 
l'ont amenée" (1758-59). This is the voice of the monotheistic, ethical 
divinity, who has heard her guilty confessions and consigns her to 
the flames. 
One is entitled, however, to wonder to what extent Racine has really 
deconstructed the sacrificial mechanism. Is the death of Eriphile really 
the last sacrifice? or does it not offer the model of a new type: murder 
justified by confession, community bonding at the expense of a self-
denouncing victim? One innocent victim is saved by the Christian 
weighing of conscience; divine vengeance no longer falls blindly upon 
the blood descendants of its enemies. But if biblical values have 
averted one type of sacrifice, they open the door to another. Eriphile's 
guilt blinds the assembly to the barbarity of the sacrificial ritual. The 
altar remains: "Mais le fer, le bandeau, la flamme est toute prête" (905). 
In their consent to the savage spectacle, the crowd has put on the blind­
fold as much as the victim. 
A truly evangelistic deconstruction of the vengeful sacrificial mech­
anism can only be found in a scene such as this: 
Teacher, this woman hath been taken in adultery, in the very act. 
Now in the law, Moses commanded us to stone such: what then 
sayst thou to her? And this they said, trying him, that they might 
have whereof to accuse him. But Jesus stooped down, and with 
his finger wrote on the ground. But when they continued asking 
him, he lifted up himself and said unto them, He that is without 
sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And again he 
stooped, and with his finger wrote on the ground. And they, 
when they heard it, went out one by one, beginning from the 
eldest, even unto the last; and Jesus was left alone, and the 
woman, where she was, in the midst. (John 8.4-10) 
Here writing reveals the unconscious of the crowd to itself; they are 
shown their own guilt and forget the scapegoat. 
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AUGURY, ANAGNORISIS, AVOWAL 
Iphigénie also contains an equivocal deconstruction of two other tragic 
forms: sacrificial augury and anagnorisis. Racine establishes a link be­
tween avowal and these two elements which transforms and to some 
extent liberates his archaic models but which also suggests the possi­
bility of a regression of Christian discourse toward the tragic. As with 
the scapegoating mechanism, he substitutes confession for the pagan 
forms to produce his own type of tragedy. Scenes of revelation and 
recognition become scenes of avowal. 
Considering sacrificial augury first, a study of the sources reveals 
that Racine added this dimension to his Iphigénie. In all probability, his 
recent reading of Euripides' Electra, which contains a graphic descrip­
tion of animal sacrifice, was the source of inspiration.12 He must have 
felt that this dimension of the sacrifice added an authentic note of the 
Greek sacred and was especially appropriate for his theme of the enig­
matic oracle and the two Iphigénies. In any case, not only is Racine's 
innocent Iphigénie threatened with a sacrifice to atone for collective 
guilt, but her death would also be the occasion of a searching for a 
divine revelation. Clytemnestre describes what awaits her daughter: 
Un prêtre, environné d'une foule cruelle, 
Portera sur ma fille une main criminelle, 
Déchirera son sein, et d'un oeil curieux 
Dans son coeur palpitant consultera les Dieux. 
(1301-4) 
The image of the torn breast and the palpitating heart exposed in 
its anatomical literalness is in sharp contrast to the metaphorical talk­
ing heart found in Corneille. It bespeaks the impossibility of mitigation 
or absolution in a world of brutal passions, faulty interpretation, and 
merciless retribution. The priest, like the Uzès father, would find noth­
ing in the open heart; the Greek augury is powerless to discover its 
secrets. It is only after confession that it makes sense to violate the 
heart. For Eriphile, as for Roxane, the pierced heart can only confirm 
what their guilty confessions alone divulged. 
For Iphigénie, the threat of violation and dismemberment is dissi­
pated by Eriphile's confessions. She avoids having her heart gouged 
out because, through the revelations of Eriphile and the divinely in­
spired interpretation of Calchas, who, like the spectator, seems to have 
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heard the guilty revelations, the truly culpable heart is exposed. For 
Eriphile, the menace of a sacrificial augury is a premonition of her fate. 
She takes the place of the priest; her confessions are the sought-after 
revelations, and, symbolically, she applies the blade to her own breast 
to conclude the sacrifice. 
The divinatory aspect of the sacrifice shows how the sacred justifies 
violence under the guise of a search for truth. In addition to purifying 
the city, the sacrifice promises a sacred revelation. Racine has discov­
ered an archaic link between sacrifice and knowledge. The first lesson 
of mankind must have been a cruel one. The experience of death, sadis­
tic pleasure, and the mysterious signifying chain of the viscera are the 
elements of a primordial scene of knowledge and desire. At the dawn 
of history, according to Nietzsche, sadism was an acceptable form of 
pleasure, and this must have been one of its variants. 
If the Christian religion was responsible in general for curbing such 
behavior, one must admit that in the case of the auto-da-fé it perpetu­
ated the ancient association between sadism, spectacle, and divine rev­
elation. The glorious end justified the means; torture was salutary if it 
produced a confession: 
Here are extracts from the official accounts of two tortures car­
ried out in the sixteenth century. In the first is a woman accused 
in 1568 of not eating pork and of changing her linen on Saturdays: 
"She was tied on the potro with the cords, she was admonished 
to tell the truth and the garrotes were ordered to be tightened. She 
said, 'Senor, do you not see how these people are killing me? I 
did it—for God's sake let me go/" (Kamen 176) 
What is astonishing about such scenes from the Inquisition is that 
one often finds an incongruous jubilation in the midst of such appall­
ing inhumanity. For example, a man is described as having recanted 
while being led to the stake to be burned: "This caused great pleasure 
and joy among all, and the Franciscan, who was kneeling down, arose 
and embraced the criminal." The executioner even asks for the con­
demned man's blessing: "The criminal forgave him gladly, and the two 
embraced.... And desirous that the soul which had given so many 
signs of conversion should not be lost, I went round casually behind 
the stake to where the executioner was, and gave him the order to 
strangle him immediately because it was very important not to delay. 
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This he did with great expedition" (qtd. in Kamen 195). Here one must 
admit that the link between violence and the sacred is as blindly pow­
erful as ever, despite sixteen hundred years of biblical deconstruction. 
At the crux of the situation there are no longer any mysterious oracles 
to designate the victim but, instead, the hapless voice of a confessant, 
upon whose words hang an orgy of violence and religious ecstasy 
The happy ending of the play (Achille and Iphigénie joined in mar­
riage as the winds return to drive the Greek fleet toward the shores of 
Troy) risks diverting attention from the somber logic that has played 
itself out. If the confessions of Eriphile, seconded in extremis by the 
sudden decree of Calchas, have saved Iphigénie from the patently un­
just ancient sacrifice, they have also provided the mass of soldiers with 
a victim: 
L'armée à haute voix se déclare contre elle, 
Et prononce à Calchas sa sentence mortelle. 
Déjà, pour la saisir, Calchas lève le bras. 
(1769-71) 
Rather than a Girardian deconstruction of the tragic myth, Racine's 
Iphigénie suggests a troubling continuity of the tragic myth within 
Christianity A more satisfying account of what has happened might 
be possible by radicalizing Paul Ricoeur's theory of the cycle of the 
myths. In The Symbolism of Evil he develops the idea of a Christianity 
never finished with its historic encounter with Greek civilization and 
the tragic myth: "Tragedy has never finished dying. Killed twice, by 
the philosophical Logos and by the Judeo-Christian Kerygma, it sur­
vived its double death. The theme of the wrath of God, the ultimate 
motive of tragic consciousness, is invincible to the arguments of the 
philosopher as well as of the theologian" (326). Ricoeur argues for the 
supremacy of the 'Adamic myth" and its capacity for absorbing 
the meaning of the other myths. Racine, however, represents a more 
unstable relation between the myths, a moment in history when tragic 
blindness and victimization invest Christian forms. 
Racine has recycled the tragic myths through the Christian ritual of 
confession. Since Racine, we have become condemned Jansenists 
whose consciences are burdened with the great crimes and exceptional 
destinies of the houses of Atreus and Oedipus. Caught in the Oedipal 
Mousetrap, compelled by the Lateran decree or the fundamental rule, 
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we must all confess to the crimes of the family romance.13 Psychoanaly­
sis would not be imaginable without this convergence, during the early 
modern period, of Christian avowal and Greek anagnorisis. 
The final tragic form linked to confession in Iphigénie and Phèdre is 
anagnorisis or "recognition." For Aristotle, it was a necessary compo­
nent of the tragic plot, designed to evoke pity and fear. He defines it 
as follows: "Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from igno­
rance to knowledge, bringing about either a state of friendship or one 
of hostility on the part of those who have been marked out for good 
fortune or bad. The most effective recognition is one that occurs to­
gether with a reversal, for example, as in the Oedipus" {Poetics 11). He 
specifies further that the best recognitions are not the result of external 
signs, bodily marks, and scars, but those that "arise from the incidents 
themselves, striking us, as they do, with astonishment through the 
very probability of their occurrence as, for example, in the action of the 
Oedipus of Sophocles and in the Iphigenia, where it is reasonable for the 
heroine to wish to dispatch a letter" (16). He also discusses at what 
point the tragic hero should become aware of the fatal consequences 
of his act; the best two possibilities are: (l)"One does the deed in igno­
rance and after he has done it recognizes his relationship to the other 
person"; and (2) "The most effective is the final type, for example, in 
the Cresphontes, where Merope is going to kill her son and does not, 
but, on the contrary, recognizes him, and in the Iphigenia Among Tauri­
ans, where a sister is involved in a similar situation with a brother" (14). 
In Aristotle's examples, tragic recognition is a matter of discovering 
unsuspected blood relationships or realizing after the fact that one has 
committed some horrendous crime. Nowhere does he say that the 
tragic plot must focus on the self-illumination of the hero. Some critics 
agree with Aristotle, insisting that our expectations about self-
knowledge are not in the spirit of Greek tragedy.14 Others believe that 
Aristotle missed something of the essence of tragedy in not discussing 
the issue of self-recognition.15 For J.-P. Vernant, Oedipus's recognition 
"ne porte sur personne d'autre que sur Oedipe," and this recognition 
expresses a fundamental theme of tragedy: "Quand il veut, à la façon 
d'Oedipe, mener jusqu'au bout l'enquête sur ce qu'il est, l'homme se 
découvre énigmatique, sans consistance ni domaine qui lui soit propre, 
sans point d'attache fixe, sans essence définie, oscillant entre l'égal à 
dieu et l'égal à rien. Sa vraie grandeur consiste dans cela même qui 
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exprime sa nature d'énigme: l'interrogation" (Vernant and Vidal-
Naquet, 107,131). 
Wherever the truth lies in these debates, it is apparent that recogni­
tion in Greek tragedy, even in the case of Oedipus, is a more external 
process than what we encounter in modern drama. Among the an­
cients, subjectivity is derived by internalizing external structures, by 
discovering one's place in the order of the cosmos. Consciousness 
catches up belatedly with the inexorable and inscrutable march of des­
tiny; the tragic hero discovers his role in the fateful unfolding of myth­
ological action, "drama." 
Critics of Racine are aware of the different dimension of recognition 
in his plays. Knight comments: "Racine n'a presque point pratiqué 
dans son théâtre de 'reconnaissances' au sens littéral d'Aristote; mais 
la formule 'reconnaissance par raisonnement' peut s'appliquer, comme 
le montre M. Vinaver, aux reconnaissances 'morales' aux 'odieuses lu­
mières' répandues autour de Thésée et de tous ces grands criminels, 
qui créent eux-mêmes, par la lucidité que garde leur esprit après ou 
même avant leur acte, leur propre châtiment" (205).16 
I would argue that self-recognition through confession is vital to 
Racine's conception of the tragic, and that this is apparent in the way 
he reworked his sources in Iphigénie and Phèdre. In both of these plays, 
dramatic action is suspended on recognition scenes that are confes­
sional. In each of these works, the innocence of one tragic victim and 
the guilt of another is determined, "recognized," through confession. 
In scenes that have no counterpart in the Greek originals, Iphigénie is 
saved by the miraculous substitution of a sacrificial victim who has 
incriminated herself confessionally, and Phèdre avows her own guilt as 
well as the innocence of Hippolyte. Confession is the basis of Racinian 
recognition, which Vinaver describes eloquently as "cette illumination 
des âmes livrées par leur propre raison à la plus terrible des découv­
ertes: l'horreur de leurs actions" (50-51, emphasis added). 
Let us consider first the case of Iphigénie. Racine changed the ending 
in favor of the type most admired by Aristotle, the conclusion in which 
the tragic deed is averted by recognition of the true identity of the 
victim. It was probably Euripides' Iphigenia Among Taurians that fur­
nished Racine with this scene of a sacrifice narrowly avoided. But in 
Iphigénie this escape is the result not of a letter being dictated but of 
the revelation of Calchas. An instant before the innocent victim is to 
be sacrificed, he reveals that Eriphile, the "autre Iphigénie," must be 
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put to death in her place. He fulfills and explains two oracles at once— 
the one ordering Agamemnon to kill Iphigénie, and the "oracle effra­
yant" that kept the secret of Eriphile's true identity. 
Here we see that Racine has added a dimension entirely lacking in 
the original: Eriphile's Oedipus-like quest for self-discovery. But the 
difference between Oedipus and Eriphile is that the latter's search will 
be answered from within. In a sense, Calchas's report concerning her 
actual birth is superficial. What has led her to the sacrificial pyre is her 
own passions: desire is destiny. 
This is evident from her first appearance in the play. After men­
tioning the oracle that holds the riddle of her identity, she explains 
how the only man who knew her true parents perished in Achille's 
sack of Lesbos. This is where, symbolically, the fatality attached to her 
lineage was replaced by the real fatality that interests Racine, the en­
counter with Achille: 
Ce destructeur fatal des tristes Lesbiens, 
Cet Achille, l'auteur de tes maux et des miens, 
Dont la sanglante main m'enleva prisonnière, 
Qui m'arracha d'un coup ma naissance et ton père, 
De qui, jusques au nom, tout doit m'être odieux, 
Est de tous les mortels le plus cher à mes yeux. 
(471-76) 
This is the fatal force that the oracle will merely confirm at the end of 
the play. The question of Eriphile's identity is secondary to her passion­
ate essence. She herself is honest enough to state this: "Voilà ce qui 
m'amène, et non l'impatience / D'apprendre à qui je dois une triste 
naissance" (521-22). Nonetheless, in disregarding Calchas's power to 
reveal her origins, she puts herself in a position to be overtaken by his 
fateful revelations when she least expects it. For her, the sacrifice is the 
final sign of her violent and destructive passion for Achille. It also 
turns out to be the revelation of her true identity, the guilty blood of 
Hélène confirming her guilty nature. 
Phèdre reveals even more clearly the substitution of avowal for anag­
norisis. In Euripides' Hip-polytus, the goddess Artemis is the instrument 
of recognition, appearing ex machina at the end of the play to reveal to 
Theseus the error he has made in killing his innocent son. In Racine's 
play, Phèdre appears in person and makes her famous confession. It is 
a final moment of enlightenment for both herself and Thésée. It 
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brings to a conclusion the heroine's tortured search for knowledge and 
mastery over herself, and it brings about a reversal from ignorance 
to knowledge on the part of Thésée. The other decisive moment of 
anagnorisis in the play—the moment when Phèdre learns from Thésée 
that she has a rival—is also based on avowal. Thésée reports Hippo­
lyte's confession made on bended knee: "Je confesse à vos pieds ma 
véritable offense" (1121). He finds it absurd and unconvincing, but for 
Phèdre it is a stunning reversal and revelation: "Qui l'eût cru?" she 
demands of Oenone. Ironically, Hippolyte's confession keeps Thésée in 
the dark while providing his wife with the devastating truth that had 
eluded her. 
Neither of these scenes has an equivalent in Euripides, in whose 
play the truth and the destiny of the subject is fatally determined by 
the gods. Avowal in the place of anagnorisis denotes ethical and aes­
thetic differences between the two cultures, which we will explore in 
more detail shortly By resurrecting and altering the Greek master­
pieces, Racine has forged a cultural composite that allies tragic recog­
nition with confession. Cast in an Athenian setting, what is undeniably 
the Christian discourse of confession becomes anagnorisis. The truth of 
confession eludes the hero until the dramatic moment when it bursts 
forth like a tragic anagnorisis: irreversible, implacable, "funeste." 
PHÈDRE: "LA FILLE DE MINOS ET DE PASIPHAÉ" 
Probably the most famous line from Phèdre because it expresses so 
poetically the opposition between civilization and desire in Phèdre's 
ancestry, the verse "La fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé" also signifies 
Racine's originality as much as it does his poetic brilliance. It is the 
logical place to begin a study of his profound reworking of the myth. 
The daughter of Pasiphaë, the love-stricken victim of Venus, had al­
ready been created by Euripides, but the daughter of Minos, who fore­
sees confessing to her father after death—this is entirely of Racine's 
making. In the Greek play Minos is not even mentioned, and in Seneca 
he is the still-living father of Phaedra, not the judge of Hades. Only in 
Racine do we encounter a Minos similar to Dante's, a vindictive judge 
who exacts confessions as a form of punishment. 
Racine has created a Phèdre living in a mixed universe of Greek 
and Christian elements where the necessity to confess can become as 
tragic a destiny as any imagined by the ancient tragedians. Each time 
the daughter of Pasiphaé confesses, willingly or not, she advances a 
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step closer to death and the ultimate eschatological scene of avowal. 
By adding the dimension of Minos-confessor-of-the-Underworld to the 
play, Racine has envisioned a specifically modern and Christian divin­
ity who destroys his Phèdre just as assuredly as Venus did his Greek 
predecessor's. In his version of the play, it is as much Minos "à sa proie 
attaché" as it is Venus. 
Minos and Thésée 
Minos is the generic name of all the kings of Crete, a civilization that 
preceded and dominated the Mycenaean mainland Greeks during the 
Bronze Age. The myths of the abduction of Europa by Zeus and the 
killing of the Minotaur by Theseus are what one scholar calls a "wed­
ding of Greek and Cretan elements" (Nichols 121). They are Myce­
naean accounts of the origins of Minoan civilization and its eventual 
absorption by that of the mainland Greeks, a process that began with 
the invasion of Crete sometime around 1450. It is believed that a suc­
cession of Mycenaean Minoses occupied the palace of Knossos and 
presided over the gradual appropriation of the island's indigenous cul­
ture. Words like Knossos, Minos, and Labyrinthos are of non-Greek ori­
gin, and they denote different religious and political practices. In the 
legends that survive, we can appreciate the cultural rivalry between 
Greece and Crete and the reworking of these authentic Cretan ele­
ments into the patterns of mainland mythology. Homer's Minos, for 
example, is a thoroughly civilized Greek overlord, whose grandson, 
Idomeneus, leads part of the expedition to Troy.17 
Looking into the myth and interpreting it in the light of current 
archaeological and anthropological evidence gives us a sense of the 
foreign elements in Cretan culture which the Theseus legend sought 
to tame. The religious practices, the sexuality, and the political order 
of Crete were a stage of civilization which the Greeks conquered and 
suppressed through the exploits of the Athenian hero Theseus. The 
legend indicates that Crete was the terrifying land of bull worship, 
human sacrifice, and sexual depravity, housed in the fearful architec­
ture of the Labyrinth. The research of contemporary historians of reli­
gion sheds further light on the Minoan religion and its architectural 
expression: 
The bull was the sacrificial animal par excellence in accordance 
with a tradition deeply rooted in the Near Eastern past; at the 
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end of acrobatie bull games it must have been put to death with 
a double axe, probably in the central court of the palace. As for 
human sacrifice, in the absence of any incontestable data, one can 
only observe that the Cretans seem to have practiced it in one 
form or another, if the legend of Theseus and the Minotaur is to 
be believed. (Pelon 36) 
The word labyrinth means literally "house of the double axe"; thus the 
palace of Crete draws its name from the instrument used in its reli­
gious sacrifices. Marianne Nichols gives a description of the Minoan 
sacred palace, illustrated by an engraving, which suggests why the 
mainland Greeks looked upon the Labyrinth with foreboding: 
Palaces all over Crete are characterized by the same or similar 
architectural features. One in the little town of Gournia contains 
a small room off its court paved with blocks of stone. In one par­
ticularly large block a strange hole runs obliquely through the 
entire thickness. It has reminded several scholars of the tables or 
platforms, depicted on gemstones and sarcophagi, on which 
bulls were trussed for sacrifice. Their blood probably was con­
veyed through the hole into a ritual vessel, just as the gemstone 
design shows. (Nichols 141) 
The Labyrinth was a sacred slaughterhouse, and the legend attests that 
it once was the site of human sacrifice.18 
The legends also make it clear that Crete was originally identified 
with sexual practices that disturbed the Greeks. Bestiality, homosexu­
ality, and murder are associated with the royal bed.19 In the myth, 
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Minos calls upon Poseidon to produce a miracle to prove his right to 
the throne of Crete, and the sea god obliges by making a bull emerge 
from the ocean. Minos's woes begin, however, when he refuses to sacri­
fice the bull to Poseidon. His wife has intercourse with the bull and 
gives birth to the Minotaur, who feeds on human flesh. The original 
fault and the ensuing sexual misconduct of Pasiphaë were caused by 
a refusal to sacrifice the bull, and the Minotaur himself survives on 
human sacrifice. Thus the Cretan regime is a cycle of disordered sexu­
ality and monstrosity sanctioned by sacrifice. 
Theseus, the hero of Athenian civilization, puts an end to the cruel 
sacrificial order. Exhibiting the wisdom of Athena, he solves the riddle 
of the Labyrinth, kills the Minotaur, and abducts King Minos's daugh­
ter. Poseidon finishes the task by destroying the Labyrinth with an 
earthquake. 
Euripides' and Racine's tragedies, however, deal with the aftermath 
of Theseus's heroic deeds. According to the legend, his return home 
was marred by the death of his father, who plunged into the sea when 
he saw the black flag on his son's ship instead of the white one signi­
fying the success of the mission. Euripides deals with the persecution 
of Theseus's household by Venus. Minos is a dead issue; his name 
doesn't even figure in the play. Seneca mentions the king, but he is the 
still-living father of Phaedra. The Nurse brings up his name in an at­
tempt to frighten Phaedra away from her lustful crime. Only Racine 
evokes the ancient myth of Minos-judge-of-the-Underworld. The de­
feated monarch returns in Racine's play to haunt the conscience of his 
daughter. He emerges as a rival king and father figure who exacts a 
measure of revenge on his former rival. He represents an underworld 
of passion and discourse which the Athenian hero is tragically unable 
to govern. 
To summarize the situation, there are three civilizations and three 
paternal orders represented in Racine's play: 
1. Archaic Crete, with its murderous libidinous father who earned 
his royal name and his right to the throne by sacrificing to Poseidon. 
He succeeds himself in an incestuous repetition of the same name: one 
Minos after another reigns in Knossos. In the forbidden city, which 
according to legend was built with no outer walls to contain it, the 
most fundamental boundaries of Mycenaean civilization are trans­
gressed. There is even no clear-cut cultural distinction between the 
royal name and that of the animal kingdom. The king's name is fused 
with the Minotaur, the word being an amalgam of Minos and tauros, 
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"bull." At certain prescribed moments, the king reaffirms his power by 
becoming the totemic animal to which bloody sacrifices are made.20 
2. The Athens of Theseus, with its "superbes remparts que Minerve 
a bâtis" (360). Here the name of the father is synonymous with the Law 
and the repression of the instincts. The chaste Hippolytus can succeed 
his father by acquiring the name of hero, by destroying the monster of 
disordered desire. He sets out on the heroic quest, only to discover 
that the monster is really in his father's court. It is Phèdre, who wages 
a losing battle against sexuality, first by means of the repressive offer­
ing to Venus, which fails, and finally by recourse to confession. 
3. Racine's own world, which is founded on the figure of Minos-the­
infernal-judge. In Racine's Christianized version of the myth, Minos's 
name is synonymous with confession. This is the name of the father 
that Phèdre pronounces in act 4, scene 6: "Minos juge aux enfers tous 
les pâles humains" (1280). This is the father figure who presides over 
the destiny of Phèdre and who orders her to confess her crime, not 
conceal it like Euripides' heroine. 
Thésée is incapable of assuming this role of father and priest-king. 
His own name and presence produce the interdiction and inarticula­
tion of desire. When Hippolyte finally does confess, Thésée makes an 
erroneous interpretation. From our perspective, the play is a tragic col­
lision between the paternal laws of Thésée and Minos. Racine reani­
mates the ancient myth to represent a tragic conflict in the sacred 
foundations of his own political order. In distinction to the Cornelian 
syntheses we have studied, Racine sees tragic incompatibilities be­
tween, to paraphrase Pascal, la raison d'Etat and la raison du coeur.11 
Talking Cures 
"Elle meurt dans mes bras d'un mal qu'elle me cache" (146). Phèdre's 
first avowal is prompted by what amounts to suicide prevention on 
the part of her nurse, Oenone. It is the kind of conversation that might 
take place in our own world on a skyscraper window ledge, over the 
telephone, or in an analyst's office. Phèdre is in the final phases of 
starving herself to death, so the avowal is a therapeutic measure, an 
attempt to prolong life by substituting a speech act for an act of self-
destruction. The theory behind such interventions, then as now, is that 
the one can be exchanged for the other because suicide is really a des­
perate attempt to send a message where the normal means of human 
communication have failed. 
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A similar situation, though less critical, was played out in the open­
ing scenes between Hippolyte and his guardian, Théramène. Exactly 
ten lines before Oenone's observation, Théramène had addressed al­
most the same formula to Hippolyte: "Vous périssez d'un mal que 
vous dissimulez" (136). He senses that his charge is embarking on a 
potentially self-destructive journey in an attempt to equal his father's 
heroic exploits and earn the right to sexual autonomy, "le droit de 
faillir comme lui" (100). 
There is nothing exclusively Christian about this kind of talking 
cure. When an ascetic like Tertullian or St. Basil compares confession 
to a medical consultation by which hidden diseases are brought to 
light and cured, he is repeating an aphorism known in the pagan philo­
sophical sects (Vacandard 862). Galen speaks of the medical benefits 
of exposing one's troubles to others. The Pythagorean Golden Verses 
advises self-examination, and Plutarch writes in the De perfectibus in 
virtute that "there are many sick people who accept doctors, and others 
who refuse them. The man who hides the shame of his soul, his desire, 
his unpleasantness, his avarice, his concupiscence, has little chance of 
making progess" (qtd. in Foucault, "About the Beginnings" 1:9; see 
also Dodds, Pagan and Christian 28). In Euripides we find the same 
notion. The Nurse says to Phaedra: "If your trouble is one of the un­
mentionable passions, there are women to help you out. If your afflic­
tion can be communicated to men, speak and your case can be referred 
to physicians" (73).22 
However, the difference between pagan and Christian confessional 
discourse will soon become apparent in Racine's play. The pagan prac­
tice is purely cathartic and stays within the confines of medical dis­
course. The Greek nurse proposes a remedy for Phaedra's illness: 
"There are charms and soothing spells.... I have at home a philtre, a 
soothing charm for love which will put an end to this malady neither 
on disgraceful terms nor injury to your mind" (76). With Phaedra's 
approval, the Nurse gives Hippolytus a love potion. If the potion 
works, an episode or two of forbidden pleasure will cure the queen of 
her lovesickness. Nothing so "hygienic" is possible in Racine's play. 
Confession is the only cure, but one that betrays doctor and patient, 
transformed symbolically into the poison that slowly kills Phèdre as 
she makes her last confession.23 
The famous description of passion's effects on the mind and body 
which Phèdre gives in her confession is an interesting synthesis of 
many sources. The physiology of passion, "Je le vis, je rougis, je pâlis à 
sa vue," is borrowed from Ovid and ultimately derived from Sappho.24 
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Among the effects of passion are blindness and aphasia: "Je ne pouvais 
parler" (275). The Athenian law of shame and repression interdicts 
Phedre's speech and sight. She seeks relief in the sacred, first by cov­
ering Venus's altar with sacrificial offerings: "De victimes moi-même à 
toute heure entourée, / Je cherchais dans leurs flancs ma raison 
égarée" (281-82). The same sort of sacrificial augury referred to in Iphi­
génie proves ineffective against the passions. 
Next, in a passage without parallel in the classical sources, Phèdre 
employs a technique that looks to us like Christian prayer: 
En vain sur les autels ma main brûlait l'encens: 
Quand ma bouche implorait le nom de la Déesse, 
J'adorais Hippolyte; et le voyant sans cesse, 
Même au pied des autels que je faisais fumer, 
J'offrais tout à ce Dieu que je n'osais nommer. 
(284-88) 
The autobiographies of seventeenth-century mystics like Marie de 
l'Incarnation contain similar accounts of pious meditations being 
transformed into visions of temptation. Roland Villeneuve describes 
how Soeur Jeanne des Anges, the key witness in the Loudun posses­
sion trials, was unable to pray because her mind kept drifting to her 
demonic tempter: "[Elle] fut saisie d'amour pour Grandier tout le 
temps de l'oraison, ne pouvant appliquer son esprit à autre chose qu'à 
la représentation qui lui était faite intérieurement de la personne de 
Grandier" (74).25 
We also learn in this passage that Phèdre has regained the use of 
her sight and her voice by recourse to the sacred. According to Lacan, 
this is the function of religious discourse; like psychoanalysis, it allows 
human desire to address its voice to the Other, the true destinataire of 
the demand. Thus this passage already poses the problem of Phèdre's 
desire in seventeenth-century terms: sacrificial offerings, love potions, 
or suicide are her options in Theseus's Troezen, but mental prayer and 
confession to Oenone are the beginnings of a different discourse of the 
passions than that imagined by Euripides or Seneca. 
Shame 
Yet another key distinction between Racine and Euripides concerns 
the ethic of shame, which dominates the Greek play from one end to 
the other. In the opening avowal scene, Racine's Phèdre seems to be 
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following the same code: "Je meurs pour ne point faire un aveu si 
funeste." Stating her passion will only compound her shame; at the 
end of her first confession she concludes: "Je t'ai tout avoué . . . / 
Pourvu que de ma mort respectant les approches, / Tu ne m'affliges 
plus par d'injustes reproches" (312-24). The Greek Phaedra explains 
her decision in the same terms: "There you have my reason for killing 
myself: the desire to spare my husband and children the shame" (76). 
The concern over preserving her name and that of her children will 
inspire all the actions of Euripides' heroine. She commits suicide and 
calumniates Hippolytus in a posthumous letter all to avoid shame. By 
the end of Racine's play, and even before, we will discover the opposing 
Christian concept of the merit of shame. 
The Labyrinth 
"On dit qu'un prompt départ vous éloigne de nous" (584, emphasis 
added). These are the first words that Phèdre addresses to Hippolyte. 
Thésée is absent, presumed dead; in place of the father's negative law 
there are only rumors. Phèdre assures her stepson that the father is 
dead: "On ne voit point deux fois le rivage des morts" (623). Equally 
credible rumors maintain, however, that Thésée is alive: "Un bruit 
sourd veut que le Roi respire" (627). In this state of affairs, repressed 
desire feels authorized to speak, and Phèdre first steps over the line 
by declaring that the absent king breathes only in his surviving son: "II 
n'est point mort, puisqu'il respire en vous" (627). Thus begins Phèdre's 
mythopoetic descent into the Labyrinth in which she re-creates the 
legend to suit Hippolyte's and her own desire. 
The Labyrinth was the sacred palace of the Minoan dynasty, the 
place where violence and desire were held in check by sacrifice. The 
word Labyrinth is now associated with the legend of Thésée. For Hip­
polyte it has become an obstacle to his own desire. As long as he has 
not slain a monster or sacked a city, the Labyrinth will continue to 
symbolize his own belittlement next to his father and the silence he 
must impose on his own desires. Phèdre likewise must follow the same 
law, but in her confession she brings the figure of the Labyrinth back 
to life. It becomes the architectural occasion for Hippolyte to become 
a hero and for her own desire to declare itself: 
Par vous aurait péri le monstre de la Crète, 
Malgré tous les détours de sa vaste retraite. 
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Pour en développer l'embarras incertain, 
Ma soeur du fil fatal eût armé votre main. 
Mais non, dans ce dessein je l'aurais devancée: 
L'amour m'en eût d'abord inspiré la pensée. 
C'est moi, Prince, c'est moi dont l'utile secours 
Vous eût du Labyrinthe enseigné les détours. 
(649-56) 
The deliberate association between the body of Hippolyte and that of 
his father, and the remaking of the myth whereby Hippolyte conquers 
the Labyrinth, are elements that Racine has borrowed from Seneca, but 
with the verse "Mais non, dans ce dessein je l'aurais devancée," Ra­
cine's Phèdre imagines her own version of the myth. This is where the 
plan, "ce dessein," becomes Phèdre's own artistic reconstruction of the 
myth. She enters the Labyrinth without the guiding thread: 
Un fil n'eût point assez rassuré votre amante. 
Compagne du péril qu'il vous fallait chercher, 
Moi-même devant vous j'aurais voulu marcher; 
Et Phèdre au Labyrinthe avec vous descendue 
Se serait avec vous retrouvée, ou perdue. 
(658-62) 
"Ce dessein" also is the moment when Phèdre's declaration passes 
from artistic fantasy to present, active declaration of love. The demon­
strative adjective "ce" indicates both past plan for taking the Labyrinth 
and present fantasy in which Phèdre's desire is actively stating itself. 
"Ce" refers to the present reanimation of the myth with Phèdre as 
author and autobiographical subject of the legend. From obstacle of 
desire, the Labyrinth has been transformed by Phèdre into a confes­
sional space where the ancient architecture of Crete again serves as a 
palace for disordered desire. 
Psychoanalytic critics, with their juridical, repressive view of civili­
zation, tend to interpret the Labyrinth as a symbol of repression and 
Phèdre's avowals as an overcoming of repression. Thus Francesco Or­
lando actually draws a diagram in which the forces of civilization op­
pose each other in a series of binary pairs: the Labyrinth encloses the 
Minotaur just as "secret" restrains "confession" (35). From this point 
of view, confession can only be understood as a breaking through of 
the repressed, the momentary triumph of a natural force over its 
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institutional barriers. I would say that the situation is more complex. 
In the passage above, the symbol of the Labyrinth actually facilitates 
confession. It is an object with a triple symbolic meaning within the 
play: for Minoan civilization it signifies transgression and sacrifice, for 
Thésée it is indeed the symbol of repression, but for Racine's own re­
working of the myth it signifies pastoral power, an injunction to put 
desire into words. In Phèdre's declaration to Hippolyte, confession is 
indeed transgressive, but as the play develops, confession will show 
itself to be part of the apparatus of civilization, it will compel its tragic 
victim to conform to its law. 
Roland Barthes does more justice to the ambivalence of confession 
in the play. In his paradoxical formulas, confession seems to resist be­
ing characterized univocally as transgression of the law: 
Phèdre est sur tous les plans une tragédie de la Parole enfermée, 
de la Vie retenue. Car la parole est un substitut de la vie: parler, 
c'est perdre la vie, et toutes les conduites d'épanchement sont 
senties dans un premier mouvement comme des gestes de dilapi­
dation: par l'aveu, par la parole dénouée, c'est le principe même 
de la vie qui semble s'en aller; parler, c'est se répandre, c'est-à­
dire, se châtrer. (Sur Racine 112) 
The final characterization, the equivalency between speech and castra­
tion is, however, orthodox Lacanianism. Foucault's position, to which 
I subscribe, is that paternal interdiction and negativity do not reign 
over all declarations of desire. Avowal is not always castration but 
rather salvation, liberation, healing, and so on; that is why the subject 
submits to its enticements so willingly. 
Perhaps the best way of characterizing confession in Phèdre is to say 
that it is a polyvalent discourse and that Racine derives many of the 
tragic effects of his play by contrasting the protagonists' expectations 
of what avowal is accomplishing from what it actually does. There is 
a performative ambiguity about confession that escapes each of the 
characters and eventually destroys them. Avowal as uncertain perfor­
mance and inexorable fate: "Cet aveu que je te viens de faire, / Cet 
aveu si honteux, le crois-tu volontaire?" (693-94). 
This dimension is evident in the unforeseen shift that occurs in the 
declaration scene under consideration. Phèdre begins her speech with 
no intention of admitting her love, but drawn into the fantasy of the 
Labyrinth she declares her passion. Hippolyte tries to repress what he 
has heard by invoking the paternal name: "Madame, oubliez-vous / 
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Que Thésée est mon père, et qu'il est votre époux" (663-64). Phèdre 
reacts with a quick improvisation upon her avowal, signaled by a shift 
to the "tu" form: "Ah! cruel, tu m'as trop entendue" (671). Instead of 
offering Hippolyte a transgression, she now appeals to his puritanical 
conscience, wallowing in self-contempt: "Ne pense pas qu'au moment 
que je t'aime, / Innocente à mes yeux, je m'approuve moi-même" 
(676-77). Now she is no longer the "adjuvant" but rather the "oppo­
sant," the dragon the hero must slay:26 
Délivre l'univers d'un monstre qui t'irrite.

Voilà mon coeur. C'est là que ta main doit frapper.

Impatient déjà d'expier son offense,

Au devant de ton bras je le sens qui s'avance.

(701, 704-6) 
The Merit of Shame 
With the mention of expiation (705), Phèdre avails herself of another 
tactic within confessional discourse—the Christian notion of the merit 
of shame. We recall that all of the Greek heroine's actions were directed 
at avoiding shame. Racine's Phèdre would seem to start out in such an 
ethical mode in act 1, but after confessing to Hippolyte, a distorted 
notion of expiation, something mistakenly akin to the monks' idea of 
"the salutary confession," presents itself to her. "J'ai déclaré ma honte 
aux yeux de mon vainqueur, / Et l'espoir, malgré moi, s'est glissé dans 
mon coeur" (767-68). Against all evidence, the daughter of Minos 
thinks that her confession and prostration has somehow touched Hip­
polyte. For a moment she seems to believe that her avowal has re­
deemed her incestuous desire. "Hope" fills her heart. In a deluded 
appeal to the merit of shame, she dreams of seducing Hippolyte. This 
transgressive, erotic use of shame will be reversed in the final scene of 
the play, when Phèdre voluntarily endures the shame of avowal to truly 
expiate her crime. 
Thésée: The Blindness of Kings 
Nous l'avons vu, ni le Roi, ni la Police qui l'a relayé à cette 
place, n'étaient capables de la lire parce que cette place com­
portait l'aveuglement. 
LACAN, ECRITS 
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When Thésée returns and tries to verify the accusations against Hippo­
lyte, his royal insight proves to be tragically unequal to the task. Unlike 
the Cornelian monarch, Racine's tragic king is incapable of becoming 
"le roi des coeurs." This is because his presence enforces the paternal 
law of repression and his methods of investigation are too narrowly 
juridical. 
He is greeted by silence; both Phèdre and Hippolyte refuse to speak 
about the scandal hanging over the household. In the absence of any 
testimony from the two concerned parties, Thésée is only too ready to 
believe the accusatory deposition of Oenone and, above all, what 
seems to him like the most damning material evidence, the sword, 
which he designates metonymically as "le fer": "J'ai reconnu le fer, 
instrument de sa rage" (1011). Thésée lacks diacritical insight because 
he is overly confident that everything in his court is immediately vis­
ible to his royal gaze. He sees things from the perspective of "la place 
du roi."27 Thus Hippolyte's sword has only one meaning, the one pre­
viously assigned to it by Thésée: "Ce fer dont je l'armai pour un plus 
noble usage" (1012). The sword, which is in reality the metaphor of 
royal, paternal power, is decreed a thing by Thésée's monarchical vi­
sion. It is supposed to be used, not signify. For Racine, as for the Lacan 
of the Séminaire sur la lettre volée, the king is, by his very position, inca­
pable of seeing the Symbolic order. 
This blindness persists in Thésée's interrogations of Hippolyte and 
Aricie. The omnipotence of the king's gaze continues to be affirmed 
throughout the investigation, but a note of exasperation and unin­
tended irony can be heard in his declaration. At the sight of Hippolyte 
the king cries: 
Quel oeil ne serait pas trompé comme le mien?

Faut-il que sur le front d'un profane adultère

Brille de la vertu le sacré caractère?

Et ne devrait-on pas à des signes certains

Reconnaître le coeur des perfides humains?

(1036-40) 
These lines express Thésée's certainty that his eye is still master of the 
situation, but they also convey his anxiety about the divorce between 
the outward phenomenological world and the inner truths of the heart. 
They are a demand and, as the case will turn out, a plea that signs 
reduce themselves to unequivocal phenomena. Here Racine is follow­
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ing the Greek text closely, which seems fitting, since here Thésée seems 
quintessentially Athenian in his demand that things submit to reason 
and clarity. 
The final proof of Thésée's inability to exercise pastoral power oc­
curs when his son does in fact confess the actual facts of the case. After 
much hesitation, Hippolyte reveals that the reason for his shame and 
guilt is that he loves Aricie, a forbidden object for political reasons. 
But Thésée rejects the avowal completely: "Mais non, l'artifice est 
grossier. / Tu te feins criminel pour te justifier" (1127-28). Thésée pre­
fers material evidence and third-party accusations; the subjective dis­
course of confession is an "artifice" that cannot alter his sense of 
justice. Hippolyte opposes the two terms: "Elle vous paraît fausse et 
pleine d'artifice. / Phèdre au fond de son coeur me rend plus de jus­
tice" (1137-38). He is alluding to a kind of judgment capable of recon­
ciling artifice and justice, capable of penetrating to the blind, intuitive 
level of the heart. 
Toward the end, Thésée seems to be nearing an intimation of this 
order of justice; he asks himself: "Quelle plaintive voix crie au fond de 
mon coeur? / Une pitié secrète et m'afflige et m'étonne" (1456-57). He 
is near the kind of breakthrough that enabled Auguste to descend into 
himself and pardon the conspirators, but before he can retract the curse 
on his son's head, he hears the news that Hippolyte is nothing more 
than a "corps défiguré, / Triste objet, où des Dieux triomphe la 
colère, / Et que méconnaîtrait l'oeil même de son père" (1568-70). 
Thésée's royal eye has had the last word. The son is finally reduced to 
an object, but one so disfigured, so devoid of the uniquely human 
signs of the heart which can't appear on the face, that the father can 
no longer discern the son. The situation is in many respects a filial 
version of the Uzès story: "Et jamais fille (fils) ne fut plus fille (fils)." 
The Name of the Father 
In order for Thésée to realize a complete anagnorisis in the Racinian 
manner, Phèdre must make a final confession to him in person. In the 
Greek play, Artemis appears ex machina to reveal the truth to Theseus. 
The ethic of shame predominates, and the heroine tries to preserve her 
honor by accusing Hippolytus of the crime in a note and hanging her­
self. There is an intertextual velleity of this gesture in Racine: "Elle 
a trois fois écrit; et changeant de pensée, / Trois fois elle a rompu 
sa lettre commencée" (1477-78). Suicide and dissimulation were 
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acceptable solutions in the Greek world, but Racine's Phèdre is in the 
grip of Minos; she is arrested in the middle of her evil designs by the 
name of a father whose law is confession, not repression: 
Où me cacher? Fuyons dans la nuit infernale. 
Mais que dis-je? mon père y tient l'urne fatale; 
Le Sort, dit-on, l'a mise en ses sévères mains: 
Minos juge aux enfers tous les pâles humains. 
Ah! combien frémira son ombre épouvantée, 
Lorsqu'il verra sa fille à ses yeux présentée, 
Contrainte d'avouer tant de forfaits divers, 
Et des crimes peut-être inconnus aux enfers! 
Que diras-tu, mon père, à ce spectacle horrible? 
Je crois voir de ta main tomber l'urne terrible; 
Je crois te voir, cherchant un supplice nouveau, 
Toi-même de ton sang devenir le bourreau. 
(1277-88) 
R. C. Knight, the most hellenizing of Racine's critics, points out the 
anachronism of this vision: "Jamais, je crois, dans la tragédie grecque, 
aucun héros n'a craint les supplices infernaux.... Les Enfers qu'en­
trevoit Phèdre sont donc, à l'insu peut-être de Racine, en réalité l'enfer 
des chrétiens" (347-48). I would add that the most specifically Chris­
tian feature of this hell is the use of enforced confession to establish 
guilt and carry out punishment. Phèdre's conscience is troubled by a 
typically Jansenist vision of hell in which the hapless soul is caught 
unready for final judgment and forced to contemplate its sins. Her 
words recall almost textually the descriptions of Nicole cited earlier in 
this chapter. 
"Je crois te voir, cherchant un supplice nouveau, / Toi-même de ton 
sang devenir le bourreau." Minos has become the persecutor of his 
own blood. He has supplanted Venus as the avenging deity who di­
rects Phèdre's fate. His prescriptions will determine the end of the play, 
which is radically different from that of Euripides or Seneca. The law 
of Minos dictates that Phèdre's good name must be sacrificed to the 
higher ethic of truth and self-revelation. 
Phèdre in the Confessional 
"Je consens que mes yeux soient toujours abusés" (1599). Like Oedi­
pus, Thésée finally obtains tragic insight only when he is voluntarily 
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blinded. He has just heard Théramène's account of Hippolyte's death, 
and in his heart he suspects that his son was innocent, "un cruel 
soupçon, / L'excusant dans mon coeur, m'alarme avec raison!" (1596­
97). But at this point, Thésée surrenders all of his critical insight to 
Phèdre. He wants no more elucidation of his own blindness and com­
plicity in his son's death. The king hands over judgment to Phèdre's 
accusation: "Je le crois criminel, puisque vous l'accusez" (1600). But 
there will be no accusation; by closing his eyes, Thésée has unknow­
ingly prepared himself to hear Phèdre's confession. The stage is finally 
set for the Imaginary order of vision to be chastised and the truths of 
the heart to be revealed. 
In her brief confession, Phèdre outlines this movement from guilty 
vision to ascetic blindness and insight: "C'est moi qui sur ce fils chaste 
et respectueux / Osai jeter un oeil profane, incestueux" (1623-24). In 
the Augustinian tradition, human vision is "corporeal vision," error 
and concupiscence. For Phèdre and Thésée, unaided human vision cul­
minated in incest, calumny, and the murder of Hippolyte. 
Phèdre assigns ample blame in the crime to the hostile gods and the 
pernicious influence of Oenone, but her final lines place the blame 
squarely on herself. Within Jansenism, no matter how compelled a 
creature was to commit a crime, he or she was still held fully account­
able. Her final words bring to a conclusion the entire confessional logic 
of the play: 
J'ai voulu, devant vous exposant mes remords, 
Par un chemin plus lent descendre chez les morts. 
J'ai pris, j'ai fait couler dans mes brûlantes veines 
Un poison que Médée apporta dans Athènes. 
(1635-38) 
These lines refer back to the medical imagery of the first confessional 
scene and they resolve the issue of shame. Both are radically different 
from the Greek and Latin sources. The Greek Phèdre died to avoid 
shame, whereas Racine's heroine deliberately exposes her shame to 
Thésée. For the Christian there is merit in shame for the individual 
and for all of society. The shame of Phèdre's confession is the beginning 
of her personal expiation, which will continue in the afterlife, and it 
also helps restore order and justice in Athens. Phèdre's confession will 
close the book on Hippolyte's murder: "D'une action si noire / Que ne 
peut avec elle, expirer la mémoire" (1646-47). Once confessed, the 
crime is effaced, covered by the seal of secrecy, the sigillum. 
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The word "expirer" occurs here for the third time in the space of 
nine lines, and it links the memory of the crime to the last exhalations 
of Phèdre's confession. Phèdre herself is the first to employ the word: 
"Déjà jusqu'à mon coeur le venin parvenu / Dans ce coeur expirant 
jette un froid inconnu" (1639-40). The effect of the poison is to chill 
her expiring heart. This brings to a conclusion the medical metaphor 
for confession introduced in the first act, based on Euripides. But the 
medical use of confession is completely revised by Racine. In the 
Greek play it was a way of buying time while a love potion could be 
prepared for Hippolytus. Here the talking cure is the only cure, and 
its action coincides exactly with the poison Phèdre has ingested. Con­
fession is the cure for love; it extends life, but it is a poison that kills 
Phèdre and all of those who believed in its powers. 
Déjà je ne vois plus qu'à travers un nuage 
Et le ciel et l'époux que ma présence outrage; 
Et la mort, à mes yeux dérobant la clarté, 
Rend au jour, qu'ils souillaient, toute sa pureté. 
(1641-44) 
Finally, Phèdre's blindness corresponds with Thésée's. The two are 
truly in a confessional, separated by a curtain of darkness that now 
descends over Phèdre's eyes. The poison of confession has finally taken 
away her guilty vision. She continues to speak, and, as she says, "Par 
un chemin plus lent descendre chez les morts." The slower path to 
Minos's kingdom is the verbal descent of her confession. Her last mo­
ments of consciousness are rendered in perfect alexandrines. The con­
fessional poison has chilled her heart and darkened her vision; thus 
blinded she can name for Thésée what they both never saw: "pureté," 
the paradoxical purity beyond phenomenality which Hippolyte had 
poetically indicated to Thésée: "Le jour n'est pas plus pur que le fond 
de mon coeur" (1112). 
Conclusion

CONFESSIONS AND COMMUNITIES

In this study we have followed the vicissitudes of a discourse that, 
according to Michel Foucault, runs through Western civilization "de 
Tertullien à Freud." I have sought to substantiate this claim for a certain 
historical period. My success or failure depends on the plausibility of 
my rapprochements between the language of psychoanalysis and that of 
Christian confession. If Freud, Lacan, Tertullian, and St. François de 
Sales practice the same discourse or, to use Freud's metaphor for psy­
choanalysis, are on the same historical telephone line, then we should 
be able to make the connection, exchange signals among the different 
confessional discourses. The reader must feel that the same message 
has been transcoded from the past up to the present. 
My other objective, however, has been to respect the historical speci­
ficity of the cultures under investigation. History is the study of identi­
ties between present and past, but also of differences. It is the same 
discourse that runs from Tertullian to Freud, but it is always different. 
At each moment it combines in a unique way with other historical 
givens to form a confessional dispositif. We have studied four such dis­
positifs: (1) early Christian exomologesis, (2) monastic exagoreusis, 
(3) Dante's medieval confession, and (4) the court society confessional. 
In each case, the same obligation to represent the self has produced a 
unique confessional literature and community. 
In the De penitentia, Tertullian orders his followers in the primitive 
Christian community to undergo exomologesis or publicatio sui to expi­
ate three grave sins: murder, adultery, or idolatry. It is a public penance 
in which the sinner "exchanges the sins which he has committed for 
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severe treatment" (qtd. in Watkins 1:115, emphasis added). Transgres­
sions are undone by representation; the body of the sinner is the ex­
pressive signifier that he uses to "publish" his spiritual death and 
thereby earn a chance to be reborn spiritually. After a period of "doing 
penance," the bodily mortification is lifted and the sinner is welcomed 
back into the Church. This confessional dispositif produced a collective, 
public sense of the self and a binding together of the members of the 
community It is the ancestor to all forms of group therapy which use 
inclusion and exclusion to produce a prise de conscience by the indi­
vidual. 
Tertullian's explanation of penance as symbolic substitution for sin 
is almost identical to Freud's definition of the symptom: "A symptom 
is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has 
remained in abeyance" (20:91). For Tertullian, the "instinctual satisfac­
tion" is sin, which can be eradicated, undone by its symbolic exchange 
for "severe treatment." Freud would doubtless categorize exomologesis 
as a specific kind of symptom: undoing (ungeschehenmachen), typical 
of obsessional neurosis.1 But I hope to have learned something about 
psychoanalysis by reversing this reductive comparison and asking: Is 
psychoanalysis like exomologesis? 
Following Foucault's "de Tertullien à Freud," I have sought to show 
that psychoanalysis manipulates and controls bodies just as assuredly 
as did Tertullian's exomologesis, that although neurosis has been ex­
changed for sin and words for acts, psychoanalysis is just as ritualistic 
and coercive as was early Christian confession. To submit to analysis, 
and to think that it is a scientifically objective and liberating discovery 
of the "truth," is to be blind historically to the fact that throughout the 
history of the Christian West, men and women have been forced to live 
their bodies in certain ways. From its origins, Christianity taught its 
adherents to live the body as a theater of sin, and it is this body that 
Freud encountered in his patients—they were involuntary ascetics, 
whose symptoms he would relieve through avowal. 
The creative turn of psychoanalysis was to claim to be a liberation 
from the ascetic system, a freeing of the body from its repressive expia­
tions and symptoms. But in instituting his practice, Freud placed his 
patients under the same Christian obligation to tell the truth with the 
body, and he founded a clinical procedure that invokes the same quasi-
magical power of representation to heal and cure which was the basis 
of confession. Patient and doctor, like priest and penitent, communi­
cate with an unconscious or spiritual agency without ever completely 
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understanding its operation. The ego comes over into the id but does 
not explicate or eradicate it. 
The next group whose social organization was influenced by confes­
sion were the monastic communities of fourth-century Egypt and 
Syria. They were a spiritual elite, and their confessional practices were 
aimed at eradicating sin in its most subtle, mental origins, as opposed 
to the grave sins treated by exomologesis. The exagoreusis of these Desert 
Fathers is much closer to Freud's technique. 
It uses speech as both diagnosis and cure. By the "agon" of confes­
sion the monk gains insight into his unconscious spiritual life and de­
feats the demon. Almost every aspect of the psychoanalytic 
unconscious is foreshadowed in the monastic model of the psyche. 
Conscious life is governed by somatic drives and unconscious forces. 
Thoughts and dreams must be analyzed to reveal their true hidden 
meaning. A subtle poetics of thought interpretation pays close atten­
tion to the formal aspects of the signifier and the contradictory logic 
of the unconscious. The gifted spiritual father decides whether 
thoughts are from the self, God, or the devil, and he heals the con­
fessant with his divinely inspired words. "Speak a word for my salva­
tion" is the oft-repeated demand of the disciple in the apothegms of 
the Desert Fathers. 
The monks believed that the unconscious was moved by demons 
and angels. For Freud, repressed biographical and familial events were 
the catalysts of the unconscious thought process. Apart from this dis­
tinction the two psychic models are remarkably similar. Sociologically, 
what is instructive about the monks' discourse is that it was meant to 
indicate total obedience and humility, a surrender of the mind to the 
authority of a superior. A "perfect union" was formed between the 
spiritual father and the spiritual child by means of confession. The 
monks were thus aware that the knowledge exchanged in confession 
gave rise to a relation of dominance and submission. 
There are several paradoxical aspects of this system which should 
be food for thought in any discussion of confession and society: 
(1) The most efficacious and domineering paternal order ever invented 
was founded, not on repression, but on expression of desire. (2) The 
power to interpret thoughts and to forgive is a potent collectivizing 
force. To bind or to loose is always to bind. One is reminded of Beren­
ger's struggle against the slightest admission of guilt in resisting group 
hysteria in Ionesco's Rhinocéros: "II ne faut pas avoir de remords. Le 
sentiment de la culpabilité est dangereux!" (198). Also, what seems 
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the most individualizing of rituals, since it makes the monk recognize 
himself as a solitary subject of desire, leads to a state of total group 
solidarity. Thus confession ends up being the most social of discourses. 
The individual and society are projections of a single social reality. 
Society cannot be conceived except as a collection of voices, and the 
individual has no existence except as a subject of enunciation. The 
individual must recognize himself in "les mots de la tribu," and the 
tribe exists only as a network of communicating individuals. 
A quite different confessional dispositif was in place by the thirteenth 
century. What the Church lost in intensity and intimate communal 
spirit it gained in extension and scale. The Lateran decree imposed 
auricular confession, in theory at least, on every living soul in Europe. 
From persecuted counterculture, the Church had become an empire, 
the universal agent in sacred History. Confession was now a ritual that 
helped define a global community. For this reason, Dante illustrates 
most clearly the implications of the Lateran decree. In his poem, all of 
humanity is subjected to the obligation to confess, as they enter either 
Hell or Purgatory. His vision is universal. Accompanied by Virgil, the 
poet of the Roman "imperium sine fine," he imagines a new world 
order at the heart of which is confession. 
The Scholastic theory of the sacrament of penance has a key role to 
play in Dante's vision of the afterlife. As the souls enter Hell, they must 
confess to Minos, who bases their eternal punishment on their avowals. 
As Dante visits each circle in the Inferno, it is also clear that the punish­
ments themselves are ironic interpretations of the lost souls' confes­
sions. It is a perverse illustration of the Scholastic doctrine that the 
voice was the determinata materia ad significandam of confession. The 
constant association between speech and punishment in Hell is proba­
bly also related to Dante's own theoretical statements in the De vulgari 
eloquentia that speech is the distinguishing characteristic of man. In 
Hell, salutary confession becomes "bestial segno." 
As the dramatis personae of the Comedy are compelled to confess, 
they are organized and hierarchized into groups of sinners. They are 
subjected to a feudal chain of command. Only those in Heaven have a 
direct rapport with the Divine King; the rest are dealt with by interme­
diary angels or devils. Their lives are characterized by the public socia­
bility of the Middle Ages. Whether in Hell or in Purgatory, their daily 
lives are essentially public and collective. Only the poet's own confes­
sion is a relatively private moment. The moral code that underlies 
Dante's afterlife reserves its worst punishments for those who have 
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violated the personal bonds of feudalism. The "peccator carnali" are 
confined to the first circle of Hell proper, whereas those who have be­
trayed sacred oaths of loyalty are confined to the bottom of the pit. 
The community that emerges from the confessional discourse of 
court society is marked by a more pronounced division between public 
and private life. The truths of their desire can no longer be read on the 
surface of their bodies. They inhabit a different regime of speech and 
signification. Words reveal not by resemblance but rather by represen­
tation; they lead beyond appearance to a dissimilar realm of ideas 
where mind, which has no extension or mass, comprehends a material 
world reconstructed in geometric forms. In the moral domain, the in­
tentions of a hidden self become more important than acts themselves. 
Jesuits exploit the elusiveness of consent and volition in their casuistry; 
Jansenists are obliged to "paint the portrait of the self," defeated in 
advance by their own theory of representation, according to which the 
portrait is the absence of the object. 
The confessional is emblematic of the shift from resemblance to rep­
resentation. Sinner and priest no longer see each other face-to-face; 
instead, they conduct a ghostly conversation aimed at producing the 
baroque spiritual encounter, the cor ad cor conversation described by 
St. François de Sales or the imperative of self-portraiture indicated by 
Nicole. This new confessional discourse first spread among the elite of 
court society. It was also secularized and absorbed by the divine right 
monarchy. In the plays of Corneille and Racine, we see an ambiguous 
sacred/profane confessional dispositif at work. The neoclassic stage, 
which, like the confessional, creates the position of the "obscene" spec­
tator, is witness to the psychological drama of the courtiers. In this 
new interiorizing theater, an aristocratic elite employs confessional 
techniques to gain mastery over its passions. They are like the monks 
except that they are engaged in political instead of spiritual combat. 
Conspiracies and networks of influence are being formed instead of 
the "perfect spiritual sonship" of monastic direction. 
Corneille works out a fragile synthesis between this spiritual analy­
sis and the monarchy. In Cinna, at least, raison d'Etat and pastoral 
power, the two forms of modern political rationality, are reconciled in 
the figure of Auguste, who is the "roi des coeurs." Racine, under the 
influence of the tortuous Jansenist theology of confession, creates a 
tragic world in the grip of Minos. Agrippine, Roxane, Mithridate, and 
Thésée are cruel inquisitors; for Eriphile and Phèdre, the mise en dis­
cours of desire and the discovery of the self are modern versions of the 
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tragic destiny. The inexorable fate of Greek tragedy is exacted by the 
obligation to confess. In Phèdre, Minos represents this combination of 
ancient fatality and Christian confession. Every time Phèdre confesses, 
she advances toward her destruction. It is Minos "à sa proie attaché." 
In the current historical debate about court society I have attempted 
a reinterpretation of Elias's repressive model of the civilizing process. 
For me, the legacy of the courtiers is the development of a public lan­
guage for the analysis of the passions. Like the bourgeois who suc­
ceeded them, their consciousness as an elite was marked by a 
discursive overproduction of sexuality. Herein also lies the erotic ap­
peal of their literature. It is not about "bienséances" and "autocon­
trainte"; rather, it is a new erotic based on the baroque/psychoanalytic 
idea that "il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel." There is only language, which 
"supplée à l'inexistence du rapport sexuel." 
The eighteenth century understood this ambiguity. Sade and Restif 
de la Bretonne recount scenes of sex in the confessional. Our own age 
still finds pleasure in the grip of Minos; the telephone has been eroti­
cized just as the confessional was.2 
For modern society, confession is still the proof of hell or the prom­
ise of heaven. Burning pitch and the Styx speak only to our literary 
memory, but facing up to the self through confession is still program­
matic in our social and psychological schemes. When Sartre's Joseph 
Garcin arrives in hell, he asks where the stakes and grills are. They 
have all disappeared, but Minos still haunts the "salon bourgeois," 
stripped of all furniture except the Freudian dispositif, the "canapé." 
Garcin himself initiates confession: "Tant que chacun de nous n'aura 
pas avoué pourquoi ils l'ont condamné, nous ne saurons rien. Toi la 
blonde, commence . . .  " (47). Avowal is still a valid tool for proving 
the truth of Sartre's existentialist lesson that life is the sum of free acts, 
not good intentions. We are still in the grip of Minos. Society wouldn't 
exist without his knowledge and his power. Garcin the inquisitor or 
Inès the seductress: "Je suis le miroir aux alouettes; ma petite alouette, 
je te tiens!" (43). Hell is not so much "les autres" as it is "l'aveu." 
NOTES

INTRODUCTION 
1.	 All citations of Freud are from the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychologi­
cal Works and are referred to by volume and page number. 
2.	 Lacan also insists on the difference between spiritual direction and psycho­
analysis: "La direction de conscience, au sens du guide moral qu'un fidèle 
du catholicisme peut y trouver, est ici exclue radicalement.... La direction 
de la cure est autre chose" ("Direction" 586). 
3.	 See chap. I for a further discussion of the techniques of spiritual direction 
in Eastern monasticism. 
4.	 The full passage in Latin: "Ipse quidem voce de sepulcro suscitavit, ipse 
clamando animam reddidit, ipse terrenam molem sepulto impositam vicit, 
et processit ille vinctus: non ergo pedibus propriis, sed virtute producentis. 
Fit hoc in corde poenitentis: cum audis hominem poenitere peccatorum su­
orum, jam revixit; cum audis hominem confitendo proferre conscientiam, 
jam de sepulcro eductus est, sed nondum solutus est" (Migne, PL 37.1306). 
5. See chap. 4 for further discussion of anagnorisis. 
6.	 All text and translations of Dante throughout this study are taken from the 
John D. Sinclair edition. 
CHAPTER 1 
1. Compare with Duby: 
Mais peut-on imaginer révolution plus radicale et d'un effet plus pro-
fond et prolongé sur les attitudes mentales que le passage d'une céré­
monie aussi ostentatoire que l'avait été la pénitence publique— 
succédant à la reconnaissance publique de la faute, elle introduisait 
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dans un état social particulier ouvertement désigné par certaines ma­
nières de se conduire, un vêtement, des gestes, bref, tout un spectacle 
d'exclusion monté sur la scène publique—à ce simple dialogue, celui 
des exempla, entre le pécheur et le prêtre, c'est-a-dire entre l'âme et 
Dieu, confession auriculaire, de bouche à oreille, un secret inviolable, 
l'aveu ne comptant que s'il préludait à un travail de rectification, 
d'émondage livré par la personne en silence à l'intérieur d'elle­
même? ("Situation" 525) 
2. See Groupe de la Bussière. 
3. See Jameson's "Religion and Ideology." 
4.	 On the sociology of confession and the theme of inclusion and exclusion,

see Hepworth and Turner.

5. See Derrida, "Freud et la scène de l'écriture," in L'Écriture et la différence. 
6. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche discusses how ascetic ideals be­
came "life-affirming" ("Ja-schaffende"): "This ascetic priest, this apparent 
enemy of life, this denier—precisely he is among the greatest conserving 
and yes-creating forces of life" (120). My work is an attempt to show spe­
cifically how the ascetic ideal involves a yes-creating on the level of dis­
course, a "yes-saying." 
7 According to Janet,

Les religions dans l'organisation des couvents ont toujours donné

une place importante à la personne du supérieur; les anciennes mo­

rales comme celle du stoïcisme comprenaient fort bien le rôle du

directeur de conscience; la religion catholique ne s'est pas bornée à

instituer la confession, mais elle a recommandé au fidèle de con­

server le même confesseur et a perfectionné la conception du direc­

teur de conscience, Ignace de Loyola, Saint François de Sales,

Bossuet, Fénelon savaient fort bien l'importance de la continuité

dans le traitement des scrupuleux, beaucoup mieux dirigés quand

ils étaient entre les mains d'un confesseur qui les connaissait depuis

longtemps. (Qtd. in Schaller 91)

8.	 "La porta che chiude la fenditura nella roccia simboleggia la confessione

sacramentale corne accesso al sentiero délia purificazione progressiva

dell'uomo peccatore durante questa vita, prima di giungere all'unione per­

fetta con Dio" (Meersseman 141).

9. See "Dante as Confessor" in Paolini 82. 
10.	 "Dante descrive minutamente questo sacramento (Pg IX 70-147), seguendo 
qualche Ordo reconciliationis poenitentium o Ordo ad dandam poentitentiam, 
cioè rituale o manuale usato dai penitenzieri romani incaricati di con­
fessare i romei (letteratura non ancora studiata dai liturgisti per l'epoca di 
Dante)" (Meersseman 141). 
11.	 Dante uses the term contrapasso in Inferno XXVIII 142, where Bertran 
de Born explains that his ghastly punishment—he is decapitated 
and carries his head in his hand—is ordained by divine justice: 
"Cosi s'osserva in me la contrapasso" ("Thus is observed in me the 
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retribution"). Dante's primary source for the idea of the contrapasso 
came through St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa theologica (III—II, q. 612, 
art. 4), where the saint conflates the Aristotelian idea of reciprocal 
justice with the lex talionis of the Old Testament, implicitly con­
trasting it with the "turning-the-other-cheek" exhortation of the New 
Law: "I answer that retaliation (contrapassum) denotes equal suffer­
ing in repayment for previous action; and the expression applies 
most properly to injurious sufferings and actions, whereby a man 
harms the person of his neighbor; for instance, if a man strike, that 
he be struck back. This kind of justice is laid down in the Law (Exo­
dus 21: 23-4): He shall render life for life, eye for eye, etc. And since 
also to take away what belongs to another is to do something unjust, 
it follows that, secondly, retaliation (contrapassum) consists in this 
also that whoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his 
belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law (Exodus, 21: 1)." 
(Cassell 3) 
See also Singleton, Commentary 2:522-25. 
12.	 The legend of Theseus will be discussed further in chap. 4 in relation to 
Racine's Phèdre. See Eisler, Arthur Evans, Faure, Hawkes, Marinatos, Nich­
ols, Nilsson, and Rohrlich-Leavitt for further information about Minoan 
civilization and the legends of Theseus and Minos. 
13.	 For discussions of the Greek and Roman beliefs concerning life after death, 
see Cumont, Clark. 
14. As R. G. Austin puts it, 
The language is meant to suggest Roman court procedure: Heyne 
notes ps.-Asconius' argumentum of Cic. Verr. ii. I (p. 61, Klotz): "ad 
hanc enim similitudinem poeta Vergilius Minoem iudicem apud in­
feros, tamquam si praetor sit rerum capitalium, quaesitorem appel­
lat; dat ibi sortitionem, ubi urnam nominat, dat electionem judicum, 
cum dicit consilium vocat, dat cognitionem facinorum, cum dicit vi­
tasque et crimina discit." Virgil plainly imagines a ghostly tribunal in 
formal session, to review the cases of those falso damnati crimine mor­
tis. Their condemnation by an earthly tribunal would presumably 
have destined them as sinners to Tartarus; now, instead, they are 
allocated to the "neutral" region. (156) 
15.	 "La parola dénota in verità il possesso di un sapere ben approfondito in 
campo morale, di una vaste e scaltrita esperienza intorno alia casistica dei 
peccati, premessa di un giudizio rigoroso e infallibile (Minos, a cui fallar 
non lece, XXIX 120): tutto ciô va sottinteso al valore di 'giudice,' atttribuito 
comunemente al vocabolo" (Consoli 154). 
16. For further discussion of the fresco, see Marinatos, Minoan Religion 71-75. 
17.	 I tratti grotteschi (ma—si badi—non comici) della rappresentazione 
dantesca di Minos culminano nel particolare della coda (un'innovaz­
ione dell'Alighieri di cui non è facile rendersi ragione, a fronte del 
virgiliano, e generalmente classico, 'urnam movet'), che Minos at­
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torce intorno a se per tanti giri quanti cerchi il colpevole deve scend­
ere nell'abisso: gesto forse di per se inutile, se la sentenza é 
pronunciata anche a viva voce (come parrebbe, almeno per la pre­
cisazione del girone o délia parte del cerchio cui l'anima è destinata: 
cfr. Inf. XXVII 127). (Padoan 963) 
18. See Salsano for discussion of the many interpretations of Minos's tail. 
19.	 "Tisiphone quatit insultans, torvosque sinistra / intentans anguis vocat 
agmina saeva sororum" (Aen. 6.571-72). 
20.	 Freccero discusses the eucharistie parody in the Ugolino episode in "Bes­
tial Sign and Bread of Angels: Inferno XXXII and XXXIII" (Dante 152-66). 
21.	 It is a law of the unconscious that words are often treated like things. In 
the case history of the Rat-Man, for example, the rats in the obsessional 
neurotic's story represent an array of words related to his case; the Ratten 
(rats) are also Raten (installment payments), Spielratte (gambling debts), 
and signify his fear of marriage, heiraten (Freud 10:213-14). Lacan also de­
votes considerable attention to this process in his writings: "Les mots peu­
vent eux-mêmes subir les lésions symboliques, accomplir les actes 
imaginaires dont le patient est le sujet. On se souvient de la Wespe (guêpe) 
castrée de son W initial pour devenir le S.P. des initiales de l'homme aux 
loups, au moment où il réalise la punition symbolique dont il a été l'objet 
de la part de Grousha, la guêpe" (Ecrits 1:183). 
22.	 Piero's barren metamorphosis contrasts ironically with his surname, 
"della Vigna" or "de Vinea" ("vineyard" or "vine"). Although mod­
ern commentators have ignored this aspect as, perhaps, too prim­
itive or naive, during Piero's life his family name offered a fertile 
field for puns of adulation; and after his death it became the source 
of many a frivolous tale in the chroniclers... . His friend Nicola 
della Rocca indulged himself and the Notary with "O blessed root 
which hath brought forth such a fruitful branch, O blessed vine 
['felix vinea'] . . .  " (Cassell 34) 
23.	 Mitchell Greenberg has brought it to my attention that the term Thanatos 
never actually occurs in Freud's published works. It appears that he re­
ferred to it in conversation. 
24.	 Les chrétiens de l'époque féodale, ceux du moins dont on peut con­
naître les attitudes, se tiennent devant la puissance divine dans les 
postures rituelles de qui fait dédition de soi: comme les chevaliers 
qui se confient au maître du château, ils sont à genoux, volontiers 
mains jointes, attendant récompense, espérant être entretenus dans 
l'autre monde paternellement, aspirant à s'introduire dans le privé 
de Dieu, dans sa familia, mais au degré convenant à l'ordre dont ils 
font partie, c'est-a-dire au bas d'une hiérarchie de soumission.... 
Le peuple dévot prit ainsi figure, irrésistiblement, d'une immense 
maisonnée démultipliée en diverses demeures, placées chacune sous 
la protection d'un saint ou de la Vierge, accueillantes, englobantes, 
elles aussi tentaculaires, et le rêve s'est déployé au long du Xle siècle 
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d'introduire l'humanité tout entière dans les multiples casiers de la 
domesticité céleste. (Duby, "Féodalité" 39-40) 
CHAPTER 2 
1. "Imaginary" and "Symbolic" are Jacques Lacan's well-known, if elusive, 
concepts of psychical organization in which human relations are governed 
simultaneously by the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. These can be 
described schematically as (1) real historical circumstances; (2) imaginary, 
primarily visual relations of substitution; and finally, (3) symbolic relations 
that are governed by the impersonal code of signs. It should be stressed 
that, for Lacan, these aspects of reality always occur at once; there is no 
unmediated or originary experience of the Real, the Imaginary, or the Sym­
bolic. 
2. For Martha Noel Evans, Lacan's commentary on the ecstasy of St. Teresa in 
Encore marks the inability of psychoanalysis to understand female desire 
and a last attempt by Lacan, at the end of his career, to let the female uncon­
scious speak by colluding with the hysteric: "The discourse of psychoanaly­
sis fused with the discourse of hysteria where knowledge melted into a 
swoon" (196). Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, although attacking Luce Irigaray and 
"feminists" (298), takes the same position: "Lacan located the hysteric's dis­
course close to the analyst's, that is, close to the search for being in terms 
of unconscious truth. Lacan claimed that his own discourse was grounded 
in the structures both of the hysteric and the analyst" (305). 
3.	 For an interesting study of the telephone as a materialization and territorial­
ization of modern philosophical discourse, see Ronell. 
4. See "True Confessions by Telephone," Time 3 Oct. 1988: 85. The article re­
lates how a Los Angeles service receives "200 anonymous calls a day from 
people admitting everything from marital infidelity to murder. On another 
number, callers pay $2.00 for the first minute and $.45 a minute after that to 
listen to confessions. The second number receives up to 10,000 calls a day." 
5. This distinction should be respected in modern usage, according to the Lit­
tré: "Aveu est plus général que confession; il s'applique à tout ce que l'on 
avait dessein de cacher, bon ou mauvais. La confession ne s'applique qu'au 
mal, à un tort, à un méchef. Aussi la torture, la menace arrachent non une 
confession, mais des aveux." Torture extracts an aveu because the person 
being tortured could perfectly well be hiding something that in itself is 
innocent but desired by an oppressive inquisitor. Confession, on the other 
hand, implies a transcendental evaluation of the hidden fact as being in 
itself sinful. 
6. In How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin mentions confession under the 
category of "expositives," a type of "highly developed explicit performa­
tive" (86). To be classified as such, an utterance must in itself accomplish a 
certain conventional act. Confession meets this criterion: by pronouncing 
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the words of confession in the correct setting one is formally entering into 
a contract with diverse consequences depending upon the context. The per-
formative utterance can also function only in the first person, since only the 
speaker or subject of enunciation can verbally commit himself. Confession, 
for example, can only be performed by saying "I confess," and not "He con­
fesses." 
7. On this subject see Apostolidès, Bloch, and Kantorowicz. 
8. See also Lebrun's article in the same volume, which discusses the impor­

tance of confession and the confessional in the religious reforms of the

seventeenth century.

9.	 "Wenceslas, roi de Bohême, voulait savoir ce que la princesse Jeanne son

épouse avait dit à confesse. Il employa les prières, les promesses, les me­

naces; toutes ses instances furent inutiles. Saint Jean Népomucène fut mis

à mort, il devint martyr du secret de la confession" (Pontas 595).

CHAPTER 3 
1. All citations of Corneille, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from Oeu­
vres complètes, éd. Stegmann. 
2.	 All citations of Racine, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from Oeuvres 
complètes, éd. Picard. 
3.	 "Le lieu le plus retiré dans le plus bel appartement des palais, des grandes 
maisons" (Furetière). According to the Petit Robert, the word "cabinet," as 
used here by Corneille, was first introduced in 1627. 
4.	 "The exile is not simply excluded from a material area of contact; he is 
chased out of a human environment measured off by the law. Henceforth 
the exile will no longer haunt the human space of the fatherland; where the 
fatherland ends, there his defilement also ceases" (Ricoeur, Symbolism 40). 
5.	 See Greenberg for a discussion of Jason as narcissistic type, although he

does not treat Medea as a return to primitive narcissism (27).

6. For Gilles Deleuze, "Schizophrenia is the universe of productive and re­

productive desiring-machines, universal primary production as 'the essen­

tial reality of man and nature'" (5).

7. In Le Prince sacrifié, Apostolidès traces the concept of the "roi-prêtre" from 
the Middle Ages down to the seventeenth century. 
8. See Esmein for further discussion of "abolition" and royal justice (435). 
9. English Protestants called the Jesuit casuists "king killers" because some

of them defended the use of force against an unjust king. See Leites 106.

10. Apostolidès describes how confession itself was part of the royal sacré: "La 
vieille métaphore du mariage mystique unissant l'évêque à son siège est 
reprise pour définir les liens entre le roi et l'Etat, ce dernier étant lui-même 
interprété comme un corps mystique. D'où le strict rituel qui entoure le 
sacrement de l'onction: le monarque doit être en état de grâce pour le re­
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cevoir; il jeûne et se confesse avant de revêtir les insignes de la royauté" 
(Prince 12, emphasis added). 
11.	 In the Examen of 1660, Corneille mentions this scene and comments on the 
abuse of avowal scenes as a theatrical expedient to provide the spectator 
with background information: 
Sa confidence [Pauline's] avec Stratonice, touchant l'amour qu'elle 
avait eu pour ce cavalier, me fait faire une réflexion sur le temps 
qu'elle prend pour cela. Il s'en fait beaucoup sur nos théâtres, d'af­
fections qui ont déjà duré deux ou trois ans, dont on attend à révéler 
le secret justement au jour de l'action qui se présente, et non seule­
ment sans aucune raison de choisir ce jour-là plutôt qu'un autre pour 
le déclarer, mais lors même que vraisemblablement on s'en est dû 
ouvrir beaucoup auparavant avec la personne à qui on en fait confi­
dence. Ce sont choses dont il faut instruire le spectateur en les faisant 
apprendre par un des acteurs à l'autre, mais il faut prendre garde 
avec soin que celui à qui on les apprend ait eu lieu de les ignorer 
jusque-là aussi bien que le spectateur et que quelque occasion tirée 
du sujet oblige celui qui les récite à rompre enfin un silence qu'il a 
gardé si longtemps. (292) 
12. See Greenberg for an interesting discussion of Pauline's dream. I concur 
that it contains erotic, rebellious elements, but I disagree with his idea that 
her "female pleasure" is fulfilled by the play's ending: "This pleasure re­
veals (as it does for Emilie, for Camille) the destructive Medea that is hid­
den in all of Corneille's heroines" (143). For me, Pauline is the antithesis 
of Medea in her passage through the discourse of confession, which, as I 
pointed out, Medea specifically rejects. I would agree that there are Uto­
pian, revolutionary aspects of Pauline and Polyeucte's vision, but they 
must not be confused with the tragic, demonic force of Medea. 
13.	 Rousseau explores the perverse possibilities of this model in the incident 
of the stolen comb in the Confessions. There, the shame of confession is 
enjoyed as masochistic pleasure, and the very enterprise of the Confessions 
becomes suspect. See de Man 278-301. 
CHAPTER 4 
"Comme Jésus-Christ nous apprend que le démon nous suit partout, [Mes­
seigneurs ont] toujours quelque ange visible auprès d'eux, soit de jour, soit 
de nuit, soit à la chambre, soit à l'église, soit dans les divertissements, soit 
dans les visites et enfin jusque dans les nécessités les plus secrètes" 
(Lancelot, qtd. in Snyders 45). Marin comments: "A vrai dire, le maître n'est 
pas cet ange visible dont parle Lancelot à propos de ses élèves, mais cet 
invisible qui rend visible ce qui, dans les comportements, pourrait rester 
caché et, du coup, échapper à la clôture du modèle" (Critique 213). 
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2. On the meaning of dissection in Rembrandt's Anatomy Lesson and its impor­
tance to all forms of bodily representation in the seventeenth century, see 
Barker. 
3.	 L'anatomie, au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle, a perdu le rôle recteur qu'elle 
avait à la Renaissance et qu'elle retrouvera à l'époque de Cuvier . . . 
la disposition fondamentale du visible et de l'énonçable ne passe plus 
par l'épaisseur du corps. De là la préséance épistémologique de la 
botanique: c'est que l'espace commun aux mots et aux choses consti­
tuait pour les plantes une grille beaucoup plus accueillante, beau-
coup moins "noire" que pour les animaux; dans la mesure où 
beaucoup d'organes constitutifs sont visibles sur la plante que ne le 
sont pas chez les animaux. (Foucault, Mots 149) 
4.	 "Male psychic development and male fantasies, including those of his geni­
talia, are taken as the standard model of the human psyche. In Freud's the­
ory, because the male's genitals are easily visible and those of the female 
are not, she seems not to possess any at all. Not only is the male valuation 
of visibility projected onto woman to her disadvantage, so also are his sexual 
fears" (M. N. Evans 211, emphasis added). 
5. Timothy Reiss believes that the seraglio represents a state of nature without 
political structure: "The beginning of Racine's Bajazet corresponds rather 
closely to that moment in the Hobbesian monarchical state when the 
prince's protection of his individual subjects has been suspended and they 
find themselves as a consequence returned to the condition of permanent 
war in which natural law holds sway: the individual must defend and pro­
tect himself, must seek the imposition of his own power" (219). For me, the 
seraglio is, on the contrary, a sophisticated dispositif that governs its inhabit­
ants most efficaciously by employing calculated amounts of physical re­
straint, fear, and surveillance. It manages to smother all opposition, even 
that plotted by its apparent master—Roxane. 
6. Racine uses poetic licence here, dropping the g from seing, the correct spell­
ing for the word, to produce the graphic similarity between the two kinds 
of sein. 
7. The use of the letter as a model for the unconscious and the analytic skill 
involved in discovering it are reminiscent of Lacan's essay on Poe's "Pur­
loined Letter": 
Ce que Freud nous enseigne dans le texte que nous commentons, c'est 
que le sujet suit la filière du symbolique, mais ce dont vous avez ici 
l'illustration est plus saisissant encore: ce n'est pas seulement le sujet, 
mais les sujets, pris dans leur intersubjectivité, qui prennent la file, 
autrement dit nos autruches, auxquelles nous voilà revenus, et qui, 
plus dociles que des moutons, modèlent leur être même sur le mo­
ment qui les parcourt de la chaîne signifiante.... Notre apologue est 
fait pour montrer que c'est la lettre et son détour qui régit leurs en­
trées et leurs rôles. Qu'elle soit en souffrance, c'est eux qui vont 
en pâtir. A passer sous son ombre, ils deviennent son reflet. A tomber 
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en possession de la lettre,—admirable ambiguïté du langage,—c'est 
son sens qui les possède. (Ecrits 1:40-41) 
8.	 Freud describes the first métonymie "propping up against" (Anlehnung) of 
the sexual drives on the instinct of preservation: "At its origin it attaches 
itself to one of the vital somatic functions; and its sexual aim is dominated 
by an erotogenic zone" (7:182). 
9.	 "Alexandre, Andromaque, Britannicus, Bérénice, Bajazet, Mithridate sont des 
pièces formées, malgré l'empreinte d'un génie très personnel, sur un modèle 
tout moderne et français qui a presque oublié, sinon renié, ses lointains as­
cendants grecs. . .  . Mais Iphigénie, mais Phèdre, se donnent, et en somme avec 
quelque justesse, comme bâties, pour le plan comme pour les données, sur 
des tragédies toutes faites, des tragédies d'Euripide" (Knight 325). 
10.	 Girard's own discussion of the medieval scapegoating of Jews would sug­
gest that the old mechanism survived in Christian cultures. See his discus­
sion in "Guillaume de Machaut et les juifs" (Bouc 7-21). 
11.	 Apostolidès aptly describes the marginalization of Eriphile: 
Avec Eriphile, c'est tout un monde trouble, alternatif, ambigu, qui est 
sacrifié. Amante d'Achille, Eriphile mêlait ensemble ses sentiments 
incompatibles, l'horreur et l'amour, la violence et la douceur, le sang 
et le sperme.... Chez Eriphile, amour et haine sont liés comme Eros 
et Thanatos.... En sacrifiant Eriphile, le pôle religieux prend en 
charge ce qui relève de l'inconscient, l'irrationnel, le trouble, l'excès, 
et le met au service de l'Etat. ("Belle" 152) 
12.	 See Barbara Woshinsky's "Iphigénie Transcendent" for a discussion of this 
point: "Neither Aeschylus nor Euripides refers to Iphigenia's sacrifice in 
this way. It is a 'straight' human sacrifice, if one may use this expression, 
with no augury involved. Euripides' Electra, however, which Racine had 
reread and annotated prior to composing Iphigénie, does contain a graphic 
description of sacrificial augury" (90). 
13.	 For an analysis of French classicism from the perspective of the Freudian 
family romance, see Greenberg, Subjectivity. 
14.	 For example, Hardison: 
Recognition of persons takes us far from the kind of self-knowledge 
that figures like Oedipus or Lear are supposed to attain by their 
suffering. The concept should be understood in its narrow sense. It 
means just what it says. In Oedipus, which is atypical, the hero recog­
nizes himself. He does not gain insight as a result of the information 
supplied by the messenger, he simply learns who he is. He learns 
that he is the son of Laius, whom he has slain, and the son of Jocasta, 
whom he has married. The typical Greek recognition is a recognition 
of one character by another, and what is more, the characters are 
usually blood relations. (171) 
15.	 For example, Kaufman writes: "Aristotle, for all his preoccupation with 
'recognition,' stayed at the surface. He discusses this phenomenon as a 
part of stagecraft, as a device used in many tragedies, and most effectively 
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in Oedipus. But he failed to see how recognition is in this tragedy not 
merely a matter of superb technique but, along with blindness, of the very 
substance of the play" (139). 
16.	 Vinaver even argues that Racine's different conception of anagnorisis led 
him to mistranslate the passage on that subject in the Poetics (50-51). 
17.	 Homer's Minos as described by Odysseus: "Here lived King Minos whom 
great Zeus received every ninth month in private council—Minos, the fa­
ther of my father, Deucalion" (bk. 19). The hero of the Odyssey also meets 
him in the Underworld: "There then I saw Minos, the glorious son of Zeus, 
golden sceptre in hand, giving judgment to the dead from his seat, while 
they sat and stood about the king through the wide-gated house of Hades 
and asked of him judgment" (bk. 11). 
18.	 See Denis Hollier's Against Architecture for a discussion of the association 
between architecture, sacrifice, and Western philosophy in the work of 
Georges Bataille. For further information about animal sacrifice in Crete 
see Marinatos, Minoan Sacrificial Ritual. 
19. In addition to the tale of Pasiphaë and the bull, there are other stories 
associated with the king of Crete: 
Minos had a large number of amorous adventures and is said to have 
been the originator of homosexuality. In one tradition Minos rather 
than Zeus abducted Ganymede. He is also said to have been the 
lover of Theseus and was supposedly reconciled with him after Ari­
adne's abduction and gave him his second daughter in marriage. His 
mistresses were so numerous that Pasiphaë became angry; she cast 
a spell on him which caused all the women whom he possessed to 
die, devoured by the scorpions and snakes which emerged from his 
body. (Grimai 291) 
See also chapter 1, p. 63 for a discussion of Minoan Crete as a matriar­
chal state. 
20.	 Even the term Minotaur may be more than linguistic fancy, for there 
are a few half-men, half-bull representations in Minoan art. In the 
opinion of commentators on the ritual content of myths, the Mino­
taur is the remembrance of a cult ceremony in which the Cretan 
priest-king donned the mask of a bull. Annually (or once every 
eight years?) the king defended his crown against new claimants 
by engaging in a symbolic combat, during which he wore an 
elaborate representation of the sacred animal. The memory of 
that solemn event, it is believed, was encapsulated in the Theseus 
myth. (Nichols 122) 
21.	 It is my belief that the combination of Christian and pagan elements in 
Phèdre symbolizes the ambiguous appropriation of sacred forms by the 
monarchy. Jean Delumeau comments that "dans les structures d'Ancien 
Régime, Eglise et Etat se confondaient." He observes that one result of the 
confusion between Church and state was the production of cultural hy­
brids, in his words, "le syncrétisme religieux et le mélange, souvent déton­
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nant, du sacré et du profane" (Christianisme 73). He sees these mixed 
productions as symptoms of the Church's political ambitions and an over­
all attempt to subjugate society as a whole, which he likens to trying to 
"faire entrer des millions de gens dans un immense monastère" (71). The 
role of confession within court society does corroborate this image of an 
"immense monastère." 
Racine's tragedies represent the union of the sacred and profane as an 
unholy alliance. Either the Church is too political and unworthy of the 
believer's confidence (Mathan is such a figure of the political cleric) or the 
state is depicted as being invasive and abusive of the sacred conscience— 
the state as voyeur and spy. Vigny's scene in which Cinq-Mars unknow­
ingly confesses to Richelieu's spy is in the same spirit as Racine's plays. 
22.	 Compare St. François de Sales: "Si vous pouvez découvrir votre inquiétude 
à celui qui conduit votre âme, ou au moins à quelque confident et dévot 
ami, ne doutez point que tout aussitôt vous ne soyez accoisée; car la com­
munication des douleurs de coeur fait le même effet en l'âme que la 
saignée fait au corps de celui qui est en fièvre continue; c'est le remède 
des remèdes" (Introduction 315). 
23. Again I cite Foucault at length on the uniqueness of the Christian obliga­
tion to confess: 
As everybody knows, Christianity is a confession. This means that 
Christianity belongs to a very special type of religion—those which 
impose obligations of truth on those who practise them. Such obliga­
tions in Christianity are numerous. For instance, there is the obliga­
tion to hold as truth a set of propositions which constitute dogma, 
the obligation to hold certain books as a permanent source of truth 
and obligations to accept the decisions of certain authorities in mat­
ters of truth. But Christianity requires another form of truth obliga­
tion. Everyone in Christianity has the duty to explore who he is, 
what is happening within himself, the fault he has committed, the 
temptations to which he is exposed. Moreover everyone is obliged 
to tell these things to other people, and hence to bear witness against 
himself.... The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the 
more we have to renounce ourselves; and the more we want to re­
nounce ourselves, the more we need to bring to light the reality of 
ourselves. ("Sexuality and Solitude" 5) 
24. See May and, more recently, Dejean. 
25.	 Stephen Greenblatt also sees a rapport between Loudun and Phèdre: 
Theater and exorcism were nonetheless culturally juxtaposed, shar­
ing specific techniques and forms, and this proximity has its dialec­
tical consequences. What is excluded from theatrical representation 
in seventeenth-century France may make itself felt in what is actu­
ally represented; I refer, for example, to the pervasive presence of the 
pagan deities, who were, after all, most often identified in Christian 
theology as demons... . The greatest image of possession in French 
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drama of the period is that of "Venus tout entière à sa proie at­
tachée/' and for this possession there is no exorcism. ("Loudun" 
343-44) 
26.	 "Adjuvant" and "opposant" designate two structural possibilities of the 
"actant" in A. J. Greimas's morphological model of narratives. 
27.	 "La place du roi" was the name given to the ideal position from which a 
perspectivist painting was to be observed. The idea that any field of ratio­
nality should be organized from the point of view of one sovereign subject 
was central to the ideology of representation during the classical age. See 
Foucault, Mots; Goux. 
CONCLUSION 
1.	 "This aim of undoing is the second underlying motive of obsessional cere­
monials, the first being to take precautions in order to prevent the occur­
rence or recurrence of some particular event" (Freud 20:119). 
2.	 See, for example, the recent erotic novel Vox, by Nicholson Baker (1992, 
Random House), consisting solely of telephone conversations. 
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Following Trent, a new mode of confes­
sion makes its appearance, a baroque dis­
course in which "the heart speaks to the 
heart." Senior argues that Corneille simi­
larly creates a new kind of hero who dis­
tinguishes himself as much by the 
confessional trial of self-statement as by 
his military exploits. In the work of Ra­
cine, Senior notes, Minos appears again, 
tormenting the conscience of Phèdre. 
Throughout Senior's challenging in­
quiry, major canonical texts are illumi­
nated by the contemporary debate about 
the modern equivalent of confession— 
psychoanalysis. Senior engages the work 
of Freud, Lacan, Foucault, and the 
Lacanian feminists in an attempt to estab­
lish the religious and literary genealogy of 
psychoanalysis and to explore its poten­
tial as a critical tool and, more important, 
its ability to bind and loose men and 
women. 
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